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Recent scholarship on Romantic women’s writing has frequently been preoccupied with 
the loss, suffering, and sensibility central to women’s poetry.  My dissertation 
investigates how four women poets after the French Revolution eventually react against 
the cult of emotion that trapped them as primarily feeling subjects.  Rather than passively 
depicting absence, they employ various figures of vacancy, a poetic tactic that 
productively and actively empties out habituated language and the regnant ideologies of 
the day.  In vacating reified thought, women poets more importantly reconceptualize the 
Enlightenment thinking subject, rejecting two dominant modes of thought—sensibility 
and progressive reason—instead experimenting with anhedonia, non-meaning, and 
counterfactuals. 
 
Because these women poets view language as necessarily imposing structures of 
thinking, their varying poetics propose home-grown epistemologies, in dialogue with 
English and continental philosophy as well as Romantic theories about the revolutionary 
potential of language.  Moreover, since these poets all share a belief in the intimate 
connection between poetic form and cognition, my chapters reveal how the poets’ formal 
  
techniques reify, alter, and create ways of thinking.  Though they often work from 
traditional forms, they make use of repetition, caesura, and footnotes to alter the way 
poems make and unmake meaning.  Even more broadly, these poems about thought do 
not fall prey to Romanticism’s tendency to escape from history into the imagination, yet 
neither do women poets allow themselves to be confined by either their historical place or 
their embodied identities.  Instead, Romanticism might be defined as a movement that 
employs non-understanding as a means of keeping ideology, and the history that ideology 
presupposes, at bay.  My first chapter defines vacancy as a trope for linguistic or 
cognitive breakdown, and my next two chapters on Charlotte Smith and Mary Robinson 
explore how these writers engage respectively with Kantian ideas of free beauty and 
empiricist epistemologies about idiots.  My chapter on Felicia Hemans discusses her use 
of brain-based models of the mind to create perceptual overload that challenges 
imperialist thinking, and the final piece demonstrates how Maria Jane Jewsbury uses 
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Women’s Poetics and Representations of Vacancy:   
An Introduction 
 
In the years following the South American and Spanish rebellions, Felicia 
Hemans penned an epic poem, for the most part dismissed in the periodical press, about 
the uses of skepticism to incite revolution.  In The Forest Sanctuary, an unnamed Spanish 
Catholic protagonist witnesses some of the horrors of the inquisition and eventually utters 
these lines: 
  There are swift hours in life—[…] 
  They shake down things that stood as rocks and towers 
  Unto th’ undoubting mind  (I.658, 660-61) 
Hemans evokes tumultuous times that not only engender doubt in the mind but even more 
dramatically have the power to topple such ideas that stood as rocks and towers—
material reality and phallic institutions.  These “tempests” uproot “oaks” and sweep away 
metaphorical “mists” clouding the sight with Catholic idolatry, and more generally, with 
limiting views and ideologies.  Finally, the Spaniard says, “They touch with fire, 
thought’s graven page” (665).  As a figure for desolating mental revolution, the 
chastening fire goes so far as to erase writing and those signifying systems that bolster 
personal credos, concepts, and national ideologies.   
 The passage may seem quite uncharacteristic of Hemans, a poetess who is now 
widely read under the aegis of domestic patriotism.  Rather than describing affect or 
domesticity, however, these lines and many others in women’s poetry of the period 
represent moments of breakdown that create productive kinds of doubt.  Vacancy, or 
figures, tropes, and rhetoric of cognitive pause and breakdown, actively empties out 
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hackneyed thoughts and feelings, taking particular aim at patriarchal sign systems.  The 
tempests Hemans describes grow out of the discourse of sensibility, which has dominated 
critical work on women writers, but scholars have yet to address how sensibility, like its 
counterparts the sublime and transcendence, ends up as a skeptical epistemology.  Seen 
through this perspective, women poets not only generate a self-reflexive poetics but one 
that meditates on the doubting mind:  how cognition operates and how altered perception 
might in turn evince social change.  This dissertation aims to demonstrate the hard 
thinking women poets did about epistemology, cognition, perception, and ultimately the 
revolutionary potential for the Romantic imagination.   
As a figure for ideological and linguistic evacuation, vacancy is found in much of 
the women’s and men’s poetry of the period, and, in fact, it emerges through an 
interesting web of conversations among all these poets.  Ever since Anne K. Mellor’s 
well-known delineation of male and female Romanticisms, critics have assumed that 
women poets were less interested in philosophy and perception than they were in 
psychology and social relationships.1  And though scholars have spent much time 
debating male poets’ use of self-reflexive or deconstructive language inherently tied in 
the Romantic period to political reform, we have yet to explore how women writers 
uniquely contributed to this political, philosophical conversation.  While the bulk of this 
dissertation discusses the intrepid and diverse models of vacancy that women developed, 
Percy Shelley most fully and explicitly articulates a prose explanation of this idea, and 
his definition can help us initially flesh out the concept.  Just he was finishing 
Prometheus Unbound, late in 1819, he writes a fragment of an essay entitled “On Life,” 
                                                
1 See the introduction to Mellor’s Gender and Romanticism. 
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where he talks about the creative capacity of the poet—a power that paradoxically rests in 
what he calls vacancy.  
Philosophy, impatient as it may be to build, has much work yet remaining 
as pioneer for the overgrowth of ages.  It makes one step toward this 
object, however; it destroys error, and the roots of error.  It leaves, what is 
too often the duty of the reformer in political and ethical questions to 
leave, a vacancy.  It reduces the mind to that freedom in which it would 
have acted, but for the misuse of words and signs, the instruments of its 
own creation. (507) 
The poet attests to the idea that over time words become misused, lose their flexible 
metaphoricity, and retain only habituated meanings.  Yet, it is also the duty of the poet-
philosopher to root out error and “reduce the mind to that freedom” which composes a 
new ground of knowledge.  When Shelley’s pioneer stamps out the error of its ways, it 
does so to clear the space for a mind concerned, above all else, with social change.  1819 
was also the year of the Peterloo massacre, a public meeting of thousands of people 
demonstrating voting rights in parliament that ended in a bloodbath, and it is no 
coincidence that Shelley depicts vacancy in a revolutionary mode, instigating ethical and 
political reform that must likewise happen in the mind.  In rehashing language as a means 
of reform, he reaches back toward episodes during the French Revolution, such as the 
revolutionaries’ rewriting of the Calendar of Reason to begin with the Year 1, an act that 
cast aside the past by renaming years, months, and days. 
The idea of vacancy formulated by women writers acquires many of the same 
characteristics as Shelley’s but is particularly aimed at stopping the habitual use of two 
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dominant modes of thought during the period:  reason and affect.  That the solution rests 
in reforming language lies at the heart of works such as Jane Austen’s Sense and 
Sensibility when Marianne complains, “I detest jargon of every kind, and sometimes I 
have kept my feelings to myself because I could find no language to describe them in but 
what was worn and hackneyed out of all sense and meaning” (82).  Though usually taken 
to be the novel’s epitome of overwhelmed and hackneyed sensibility, Marianne actually 
refuses both overwritten feeling and “sense,” or rationality.  Her reaction depicts what 
happens when hackneyed language makes new ideas or meaning impossible.  Women 
poets of the Romantic period do not only ironize sense and sensibility as Austen does but 
go so far as to write models for thought other than affect or rationality.   
By routing the twinned pillars of Enlightenment subjectivity, they aim to recreate 
the thinking subject as one that will allow women (and sometimes “others” such as the 
poor or the colonized) to lay claim to the French Revolution’s promises of equality, 
freedom, and universality without absolutes.  That this occurs on the level of discourse is 
in part a symptom of the meta-discursive revolutionary environment that pervaded the 
French Revolution.  Women writers were quite alive to the idea that the French 
Revolution in Britain was in part played out through the manipulation of increasingly 
partisan language.2  While Mary Wollstonecraft argued that equal education must be 
extended to women if for no other reason than to create intelligent, useful wives, women 
poets, who already had given themselves some semblance of learning, wrote literature to 
intervene into modes of representation and attendant political discourses. 
                                                
2 A good set of arguments addressing this question is the Romantic Circles’ praxis 
volume, Romanticism and Patriotism:  Nation, Empire, Bodies, Rhetoric edited by Orrin 




Women’s Poetry:  Sensibility and High Romanticism 
 As opposed to the loss of meaning and knowledge that vacancy instigates, 
scholarship on women’s writing has frequently discussed the loss associated with 
suffering and sensibility.  In large part, the recovery of women’s writing occurred in 
conjunction with the historicist turn to affect and domesticity as important categories of 
history, experience, and literature.  Stuart Curran’s groundbreaking essay, “Romantic 
Poetry:  The I Altered” intended to reframe Romantic poetry as a whole by pointing out 
two important poetic innovations initiated by women poets:  the turn to quotidian details, 
often amassed from domestic spaces, and the creation of the cult of sensibility, or high 
feeling.  Women poets, composing lyrics of domestic emotion, posed a challenge to the 
Romantic imagination’s feats of transcendence.  As Sonia Hofkosh, Alan Richardson, 
and Margaret Homans later suggested, male poets, in their anti-Enlightenment 
manifestos, stole fellow-feeling from women, even as they anxiously derided feminine 
poetic prowess.3  Following in Curran’s footsteps, Judith Pascoe argued that women’s use 
of material nature, such as Charlotte Smith’s extensive botanic cataloguing, helped poets 
create a material, historically grounded, responsive poetics, opposed to the 
Wordsworthian egotistical sublime.  Jacqueline Labbe’s important book on Smith, along 
with Pascoe’s study on Romantic performance and theatricality, subsequently explored a 
more postmodern version of sensibility and sympathy, arguing that women such as Smith 
performed a number of shifting identities in order to portray the sad state of women at the 
                                                
3 See Sonia Hofkosh, Sexual Politics and the Romantic Author, Homans’s Bearing the 
Word, and also Alan Richardson’s, “Romanticism and the Colonization of the Feminine” 
in Anne K. Mellor’s collection, Romanticism and Feminism.  
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turn of the eighteenth century.  Similarly, critics of Felicia Hemans’s poetry argued that 
her numerous poems documenting women’s deaths, murders, or suicides revealed the 
violent terrain of feminine loss.4  For this generation of feminist Romanticists, women’s 
poetry was one of protest, lodged through authentic feeling and the depiction of women’s 
tragic biographies.  Both Catherine Gallagher and Isobel Armstrong provocatively, and 
counter-intuitively, demonstrated that women often used this kind of loss to critique 
society.  In particular, Armstrong showed that the pattern of affect and loss might be read 
as a larger, figurative description of women’s grappling with aesthetics and social reality.  
Most recently, Yopie Prins and Virginia Jackson have begun to theorize the “poetess” 
figure of the nineteenth century less as a biographical depiction than as a self-conscious, 
abstract historical category used by both women and men in their poetic representations.  
Finally, while Romanticists such as Elizabeth Fay have touched on the influence of the 
philosophically-minded Bluestocking circle on Romantic women writers, her essay on 
“Women and Thought” mostly centers on their intellectual interests in sexual relations, 
marriage, and pedagogy.5 
For these reasons, women writers have served an exceedingly useful role in 
critiquing that ever-dissolving, ever-emerging, conflicted concept of Romanticism.  Their 
work reveals the embodied, historical, economic, and emotional realities that played such 
a large part in a rich and complicated literary culture.  There was room for both elite 
                                                
4 See Pascoe “Female Botanists and the Poetry of Charlotte Smith” in Re-Visioning 
Romanticism:  British Women Writers 1776-1837 and Romantic Theatricality, Labbe 
Charlotte Smith:  Romanticism, Poetry, and the Culture of Gender, and Lootens, 
“Hemans and Home.”  Jackson and Prins make their argument about the poetess in 
“Lyrical Studies.” 
5 See Gallagher’s Nobody’s Story, Armstrong’s The Radical Aesthetic, and, Fay’s 
Feminist Introduction to Romanticism. 
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poets of the imagination as well as popular writers in the periodical presses—and just as 
men often took on both roles, so did women.  Not content to be merely popular writers, 
women had dreams too about reforming the world through language.  They repeatedly 
developed classic Romantic tropes and fitted them to their own uses.  In fact, since they 
often couldn’t actually go out questing for the philosopher’s stone, it makes sense that 
they did so through their writing.  Mary Robinson, for example, spins out the internalized 
quest for the Romantic object into Sappho’s desperate search for her own worth in the 
lost object of Phaon’s affection.  From the start, Sappho’s quest is doomed, but  by 
beginning with an already defunct trope, Robinson can start down a path other than the 
Romantic need for unified subjectivity or fusion of the subject with the objective world. 6  
Women’s poetry begins not outside the purview of classic Romantic tropes but at the 
moment that these tropes break down, at the point of skeptical, testing curiosity about the 
powers and pitfalls of the Romantic imagination.  Paul de Man’s point in “The Rhetoric 
of Temporality,” that the Romantic symbol deconstructs itself in into an allegory that 
undermines the authenticity of a transcendent relationship with nature, already has 
precursors in women’s poetry, as I suggest in my discussion of Charlotte Smith’s uses of 
aporia in chapter two.7  The Romantic symbol, which naturalized relationships like 
women’s unthinking, sensory association with the landscape, was one of the first literary 
habituations that women actively set out to rewrite. 
 
                                                
6 Two classic studies dealing with these classic romantic tropes are Harold Bloom, “The 
Internalization of Quest Romance,” and Earl Wasserman, “The English Romantics:  The 
Grounds of Knowledge.” 
7 See de Man’s classic “The Rhetoric of Temporality” in Blindness and Insight for his 
deconstruction of the Romantic symbol in Wordsworth. 
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The New Aesthetics 
Beginning with de Man, Romanticism has had a lengthy, if conflicted, 
relationship with deconstructive criticism, which decisively posited language as a 
skeptical mode that disrupted Romanticism’s authentic affect and its use of nature as a 
model for self-conscious self-knowledge.8  Following Jerome McGann’s call for a 
historicized approach to Romantic texts in The Romantic Ideology, both the Romantic 
imagination and deconstructive criticism—as well as criticism strictly about aesthetics—
have come under fire for seeking an escape from the historical, economic difficulties of 
the modern, industrialized world.  Recently, Romantic scholars have sought a middle 
ground between on the one hand the escapist lyric and the “close reading” of 
deconstruction and on the other an embodied, historicized poetry.  Forest Pyle, in an 
essay on Keats entitled “Kindling and Ash” locates a “vacating radical” in certain works 
of both Keats and Shelley:  “a radical aestheticism is the experience of a poetics that 
exerts such a pressure on the claims and assumptions of the aesthetic that we encounter 
through these works something like auto-immolation” (431).  He is admittedly working 
from de Man’s aporetic aesthetics, a crisis of representation that marks a desolate state of 
self-reflexivity only the aesthetic attains.   
Robert Kaufman has likewise developed a version of what he calls “Negative 
Romanticism” by reading Keats and Shelley through Kantian-inflected, aesthetically-
minded Adorno (“Legislators” 709).  By using Adorno’s Kant, Kaufman can rescue 
Marxism, Romanticism, and Kantian aesthetics from reified concepts and 
                                                
8 See de Man’s “Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image” in The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism.  For other Romantic-deconstructionist criticism in this vein see Rajan’s 
Dark Interpreter, Chase’s Decomposing Figures, and Marc Redfield’s Romantic Circles 
Praxis volume, “Legacies of Paul de Man.” 
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instrumentality:  “The Kantian, romantic, and Adornian-modernist aesthetic undertake 
temporarily to negate conceptual/instrumental thought, enabling present construction of 
new concepts and the new social dispensations that may spring from them” (“Negatively 
Capable Dialectics” 372n36).  Kaufman implicitly sides with Derrida’s own 
deconstructive reading of Kantian “free beauty,” as I do in chapter two, insisting that it is 
through aesthetic free play that instrumental (ideological, habitual) thought is rerouted:  
“The aesthetic is ‘free’ (as concept-based thought cannot be) from preexistent concept, 
purpose, law, or object.  […]  The aesthetic is thus both a boot-up disk for conceptual 
thought as such … and, as Adorno and others will stress, the engine for new, 
experimental—because previously non-existent (and therefore, free of status quo 
determined)—concepts” (“Red Kant” 711).  Finally, for Kaufman, “aesthetic experience 
has political value because of its potential to generate critical (or at least proto-critical) 
thought” (“Legislators” 709).  Both Pyle and Kaufman stress the degree to which the 
aesthetic demands not agreement or consensus but impasse, a crisis that does not flee 
from the problems of reality but creates a space for new kinds of thought that might 
transform the capitalistic structures of society and the mind.   
If Kaufman emphasizes the extent to which Shelley’s sympathetic imagination, 
Keats’s negative dialectics, and Kant’s purposiveness without purpose “tease us into 
thought,” then women’s writing actively courts a similar goal for aesthetics but 
concentrates on generating those moments that first interrupt thought.  Women writers 
are largely skeptical of the creation of new concepts, which themselves have the potential 
to become ideologically charged and ultimately tyrannical.  This formulation perhaps 
comes closer to Pyle’s radical aesthetic that returns to the aporias between perception and 
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sensation, cognition and conceptualization (432), yet women’s writing offers us other 
models for rethinking cognition in addition to the scandal of thought that is aporia.  As 
women steer clear of both reason and sensibility as their main modes of thought, they 
experiment with other figures of vacancy:  anhedonia, idiocy, counterfactuals, and 
simulation as they hash through contemporaneous philosophy.  Romanticism, as read 
through these women writers, might be defined as a movement that courts non-
understanding as a means of keeping ideology, and the history that ideology presupposes, 
at bay. 
 
Women Thinking Philosophically, Thinking Historically 
Women’s poetry of the period consistently approaches these questions of history, 
aesthetics, and perception.  Reinscribing women poets back into high Romanticism does 
summon a certain kind of historical effort in investigating the various models of the mind 
that women sought to vacate.  Many women poets were voracious readers and 
participants in the exploding periodical culture of the day, so even if Hemans did not 
have the opportunity to attend one of Spurzheim and Galt’s lectures on the material brain, 
she almost certainly read about it in the pages of the journals she frequently perused.  My 
readings place women in the context of empiricist epistemology, Kantian aesthetics, or 
brain science, and work through an underlying assumption that women were well aware 
of current philosophic debates.  Although Charlotte Smith most likely did not read Kant’s 
third Critique, her poetry reveals that she was working through the problems and 
limitations of empiricism in a remarkably similar way.  To demonstrate these close 
connections between philosophy and women’s poetics, each chapter examines a woman 
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writer in the context of a contemporaneous philosopher or a set of philosophical ideas 
dealing with vital epistemological questions.   
What they did with these paradigms, however, often extends or stretches 
contemporaneous thinking in ways that are best explained, evoked, or compared with 
high theory’s own rereadings of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy.  In part, 
this manipulation of women’s poetry into the spheres of high theory stems from a 
provocation—why shouldn’t women’s writing sustain theoretical investigation?  Though 
women were not philosophers, their theoretical inquiries seem especially intriguing and 
appealing because of the way they strive to elude formalization.  As Simon Jarvis has 
recently discussed Wordsworth’s “philosophic song,” poetry’s formal dynamics can be 
especially useful in fashioning a type of philosophical thinking, particularly about 
cognition.  
Women’s poetics of the period also suggest the limitations of historicism.  The 
first generation of new historicist critics has granted women a privileged role as 
representative poets especially sensitive to facticity.  But scholarship on Romantic 
women’s writing has perhaps suffered the reverse fate of being over-historicized.  
Women writers indeed did have bodies and socio-economic relationships that influenced 
their perceptions and their poetry.  Yet it is not out of the realm of historical possibility 
that women sought to change how these perceptions might be constructed in their own 
heads and the minds of their readers.  Charlotte Smith’s work was greatly admired by 
even Wordsworth for its sensitivity and sensibility, but we are in danger of repeating 
history’s own neglectful approach to her poetry when we use the paltry evaluations of 
contemporaneous critics to characterize her work.  Our current fashion for sensibility has 
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aided tremendously in the recovery efforts of women’s writing, but it has also obscured 
more complicated ideas in these poets’ work.  For instance, Smith’s uses of anhedonia, or 
the absence of feeling, reveal her to be rejecting sensibility even as she works through 
how non-knowledge might complicate both embodied and categorical ways of knowing 
the world.  It may behoove us to think beyond women’s contemporaneous reception and 
reputations, especially given the dearth of paratextual materials such as manuscripts, 
journals, and lengthy correspondence.  We can do so ethically, without assuming that 
women did not have lofty, journal-worthy thoughts.  Likewise, we can rethink women’s 
home-grown epistemologies without reaching outside the bounds of history. 
Even more drastically, women writers may offer us other models for history.  
Opposing historicism’s focus on the recovery of differences with the past, Marc Redfield, 
Ian Balfour, and Orrin N. C. Wang have all plotted other, more post-modern models for 
history’s temporality.9  Smith’s hermit of Beachy Head, situated as he is on the precipice 
of the English Channel during the Napoleonic Wars, offers an ethical, transnational figure 
who is both aware of history and yet lives his life outside its exigencies.  Acting with 
disregard for French and English animosity, he represents what Smith acknowledges to 
be an impossible futurity.  Hemans’s Spaniard likewise offers a version of counterfactual 
history, where history is not composed of differences between then and now but the 
contemplation of how what might have been could offer other models for what might be 
in the future.  All these women writers think critically about the dangers of nostalgia but 
                                                
9 Each of these scholars has been influenced by de Man or Derrida’s interventions into 
temporality, in “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” “Literary History and Literary 
Modernity” and Specters of Marx.  See Balfour’s “History against Historicism,” Wang’s 
“Ghost Theory,” and Redfield’s The Politics of Aesthetics. 
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more importantly contemplate the constructed nature of the past, unreified futures, and 
the complicated interrelation of the two. 
 Finally, since vacancy most ardently aims to empty out hardened ideologies, a 
word should be said about the concept of ideology with all its varied Marxist baggage.  
Most of these writers, but Smith and Maria Jane Jewsbury especially, critique not simply 
the consumer culture that dominated both British imperial prerogatives and daily life but 
also the ideologies such commodity exchange produced and exacerbated.  I have used 
quite different accounts of ideology, however, depending on the specific preoccupations 
of each writer.  Smith, with her drive for a more elite notion of free beauty, veers close to 
Adorno’s support of high art to route ideology.  Hemans, with her constant use of 
paratextual materials that deconstruct the aura of her popular poems even as they 
reproduce its content, at times seems close to Benjamin’s more populist notions for 
ideology critique.  Her Spaniard’s attempts to be “included out” of the imperial system, 
however, appear much like Zizek’s ticklish subject.  Finally, Jewsbury participates in the 
construction of images that critique the sign systems and visual power structures of a 
culture increasingly fascinated with visual markers such as phrenology.   
She ultimately provides a model to stem and neutralize Althusser’s interpellation, much 
like Natalie Melas’ idea of “dissimilation.”10  This exceedingly varied spectrum attests to 
the wide-ranging scope and perhaps desperation of women’s ideology critique.  What all 
of these models have in common, however, is the trope of vacancy, the figurative 
possibility of circulating signs that in some sense bar signification.  They do this by 
creating a gap between representation and understanding or meaning, a pause that might 
                                                




be enough to expunge or let go of the hardened meanings that representations often bring 
with them.   
 
A Closer Look at the Dialectic of Skepticism & Sensibility 
The vacating of history and ideology begins in large part with women’s refusal to 
be seen as merely embodied subjects, and this reaction occurs perhaps not surprisingly as 
sensibility, with its emphasis on embodied emotions, is at its peak.  I would like to flesh 
out a broad interrelation between sensibility and skepticism that dominates much of 
Romantic thinking to complicate current accounts of the eighteenth-century context for 
women’s writing.  Just as the empiricism of Hume and Locke produced drastic doubt 
about experiential knowledge, the cult of authentic feeling was actually always in 
dialectical relation with a radical skepticism about embodied ways of knowing.  This 
dynamic, yet to be fully discussed in histories of sensibility, helps to explain why women 
became drawn to epistemological issues.11  This relationship, moreover, can further help 
us understand women writers’ complex reactions and resistances to the allied concerns of 
materiality, sensibility, history, and consumer-commodity culture.   
Both Locke and Hume after him argued that people came to knowledge from 
sensation later converted into memorable experiences.  As G. J. Barker-Benfield has 
persuasively argued in The Culture of Sensibility, sensibility sprang up as a subsidiary 
discourse of empiricism, in particular from medical experimentation and scientific 
                                                
11 A good discussion of this dynamic between sensibility and skepticism occurs in 
Charlotte Sussman’s essay, “The Art of Oblivion:  Charlotte Smith and Helen of Troy.”  
Sussman argues that through the figure of nepenthe (and its relative, opium), Smith 




observation that was part and parcel of the fascination with sensation and material 
experience.  More sensitive people—particularly women—would often become 
overwhelmed with feeling, a state that at times led to hysteria but was also thought to 
provide an abundant and authentic source of knowledge.  On a larger scale, sensibility 
eventually became a way of changing public discourse about gender.  Men were 
encouraged to become “men of feeling,” which raised their sensitivity to women even as 
they allowed women a safe point of entry into the public sphere.   
Under the aegis of sympathy and exquisite feeling, women writers found a unique 
way of entering into literary discourse, since their sensitivity arguably granted them 
greater access to authentic experiences, which they could then write about with some 
modicum of authority. Helen Maria Williams offers perhaps the most dynamic use of 
radical sensibility in her Letters Written in France as a dramatic effusion of sublime 
emotion with the power to usher in social change and create wider, affective communities 
immune to rank.12  Increasingly, however, the literary-political battle over the uses of 
affect led commentators and critics to turn against the “cult” of high feeling.  By the end 
of the century, sensibility became an extraordinarily contested term, used by both radicals 
as a rallying cry for revolutionary fervor, as Chris Jones argues, and by Edmund Burke as 
a conservative call for civility, as Claudia Johnson and Barker-Benfield both 
demonstrate.13  Sensibility was not simply a domesticating force, but a discursive 
construction of sentimentality and domesticity, available for both conservative and 
radical agendas. 
                                                
12 See Neil Fraistat and Susan S. Lanser’s introduction to Letters Written in France. 
13 See Chris Jones, Radical Sensibility and Claudia Johnson’s Equivocal Beings. 
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Women too reject sensibility’s trite aura, as Austen does in Sense and Sensibility, 
and as  
Adela Pinch argues Smith does in her Elegaic Sonnets.14  But women writers also had 
two other bones to pick with this discourse.  First, they quail against the way sensibility 
especially trapped women in only embodied ways of thinking.  As John Barrell has 
argued, Wordsworth pits his own self-conscious understanding against Dorothy’s merely 
sensory, immediate connection to nature, a poetic moment that epitomizes the kind of 
paradigm women eschewed through their poetry.15  Blake’s invective against 
empiricism’s tendency to confine people in hysterical, limited bodies—in the feminine 
underworld of Beulah—most closely resembles how women writers would eventually 
resist empiricism.16  Mary Robinson’s “oblivion,” which bears striking similarities to 
Locke’s images of dark abysses, blindness, and tabula rasa, seems especially aimed at 
Edmund Burke’s insistence that prejudice and sensibility were necessary to society’s 
survival.  Both Robinson and Hemans lodged critiques of the way embodied habituations 
led not only to hackneyed sentiment but gendered ideologies that installed wide-ranging 
social inequality.     
Second, women’s poetic explorations of affect often reveal the way in which 
copious emotions paradoxically produce skepticism about emotive forms of knowledge.  
This tendency in part stems from the problems inherent in empiricism’s epistemology.  
                                                
14 See Pinch’s Strange Fits of Passion and Peter Knox-Shaw’s chapter on Sense and 
Sensibility in Jane Austen and the Enlightenment. 
15 Barrell’s seminal “The Uses of Dorothy” spells out this argument. 
16 Mary-Kate Persyn argues that Blake, working from Wollstonecraft, argues that this 
male Romantic connects sensibility to chastity as a bad form of feeling, opposed to 
sexual liberation.  See her “‘No Human Form but Sexual’:  Sensibility, Chastity, and 
Sacrifice in Blake’s Jerusalem.” 
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As historians of skepticism have duly noted, the use of the body or individual experience 
to derive knowledge presented a perceptual quagmire, which Hume tried to solve by 
resorting to common sense.17  Not only did humans become trapped in their own 
perceptions and ideas, distinct from the objective world, but they also became irrevocably 
disconnected from knowledge of God and subjectivity beyond those sensations 
immediately present to the body.  This doubt provoked Kant to formulate his a priori 
theories, including the faculty of aesthetic judgment constructed to bridge pure and 
practical reason.  As Donald Reiman long ago delineated, moreover, most of the high 
Romantic male writers turned to some form of skepticism that took from both the revival 
of Greek philosophy but also empiricism’s own nagging doubts.  In large part, the 
failures of the French Revolution transformed the revolutionary zeal for Enlightenment 
philosophies into a disappointed, disillusioned skepticism about rationalism. 18   
While male writers could turn to a kind of quasi-religious emotive transcendence, 
women were in fact much more skeptical about the uses of affect, and a previous 
generation of eighteenth-century women writers, such as Anne Finch, along with other 
contemporaries, including Hannah More, duly explore a more celebratory turn to feeling.  
For women Romantics, skepticism often appears after they have glutted themselves sick 
on feeling and found its answers wanting.  Each poet tends to characterize, in one way or 
another, the way too much feeling often leads to numbness or cognitive confusion.  These 
                                                
17 A good place to start would be Richard Popkin’s The History of Skepticism from 
Savonarola to Bayle.  
18 A few good studies of Romantic male poets and skepticism include Reiman’s Intervals 
of Inspiration:  The Skeptical Tradition and the Psychology of Romanticism, Andrew 
Cooper’s Doubt and Identity in Romantic Poetry, Ben Brice’s Coleridge and Scepticism, 
Pulos’ The Deep Truth, Hoagwood’s Byron’s Dialectic and Skepticism and Ideology, and 




periods of cessation in sensation result in an experiential blanking out that make full 
knowledge problematic, yet this kind of feminine lack works in women’s favor to 
produce thinking subjects who can create their own ways of being known.  
The doubt about strictly embodied forms of knowledge pairs nicely with other 
kinds of material representation women sought to critique such as commodity culture and 
the scenes of feminine consumption and gluttony that were set pieces in eighteenth-
century poetry.19  Adam Smith, working off Hume’s theories of empiricism, created the 
philosophical underpinnings that connected sensibility, sympathy, and capitalism.  In his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that fellow-feeling for mankind springs from 
putting another in one’s own position, essentially exchanging the other with one’s self or 
the other’s desires with one’s own.  These structures of interest and exchange form the 
early vocabularies of sympathy as well as Smith’s later capitalist tomb, The Wealth of 
Nations, and Hume similarly translates his empiricist ideas into imperatives for bourgeois 
trade in essays “On Taste.”   
While Pascoe and others have argued that writers like Charlotte Smith embraced 
the materiality of nature, in my discussions of Smith and Jewsbury, I suggest that these 
writers play with the ideas of speculation and exchange as a way to distance themselves 
from natural, pastoral symbols and representations of women as mindless, consuming 
subjects.  As early as Finch, women writers begin troping the bower or the landscape as a 
melancholy space, which Susan Stewart has argued is evidence of a material, sensory 
                                                
19 Laura Brown first made the point that women bore the brunt of consumption in Ends of 
Empire.  Even as Addison and Steele often summon women in their remarks to showcase 
good consumption, poets like Pope had already stigmatized the “fairer sex” for their 
addictions to make up, coffee, tea, silk, and other domestic and consumer items.  
Romantic women poets finally take a stand not just against consumerism but against the 
constant portrayal of women as primarily consuming subjects. 
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lyricism.20  Increasingly, however, in the later eighteenth-century, women writers become 
quite aware of the pastoral’s own dual nature, as a retreat always already disrupted by 
modernity.  Beginning with Smith’s poetry, ideas connected to taste and commodity 
culture help to sell the pastoral even as they evoke altered states of thought that might 
combat materiality and embodiment—evidenced by the frequency with which drugs like 
nepenthe, sleep, or hallucinations enter the picture.  Moreover, with the return of the early 
modern poetic and pastoral tradition, women must wrest representational control of the 
pastoral from its roots as a poetry of seduction that figured women as unthinking, 
beautiful prey on the run from eloquent, male pursuers.  Thus for women writers, the 
pastoral has always been a problematic site that warrants a lyrical pause for meditation.   
Finally, women writers had other sources for skepticism other than the empiricists 
and the discourse of sensibility.  It is clear that Robinson knew of Locke and Newton’s 
theories, Smith read Hume, and Hemans was steeped in German literature’s encounter 
with idealist philosophy.  These encounters with philosophy culled from allusions in 
literary texts remain circumstantial at best, without the corroboration of letters or prose 
works documenting women’s reading of these sources.  Yet skepticism was rife in other 
literary sources that women no doubt read.  As James Noggle has argued, the Tory 
satirists engaged in a skeptical tradition that created a proto-aesthetic of the sublime 
where reasoning turns on itself into a dizzying defiance of ratiocination.  Augustan 
poetry’s numerous satirical turns reprise a classical skepticism that refutes philosophy 
and rational thinking altogether, effectively drawing a line from Pope to Robinson and 
Byron.  As Noggle writes, “The recurrent sense in Augustan satire that thinking itself is a 
                                                
20 See her chapter on Finch in Poetry and the Fate of the Senses. 
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kind of trap reveals their commitment to viewing their own thought as ideology, placed at 
an always mediated, dissatisfied, subjugated remove from the truth” (32).  Recently J. T. 
Parnell has written about a more fideistic skeptical tradition in Swift and Sterne, taken 
from Erasmus.  Both writers use satire and skepticism as a means of undermining their 
religious opponents even as they preserve faith and the transcendent realm as something 
beyond human understanding.21  This type of skepticism that undermines ideologies 
created by perception and language yet preserves religiosity finds parallels in Locke’s 
and Kant’s religious piety.  Even more, it bears comparison to Hemans’s and Jewsbury’s 
rejection of Byron’s and Shelley’s atheism, as they develop their own, pious forms of 
skeptical inquiry.  Finally, the great revival of Shakespeare offers another wealth of 
skepticism.  In Disowning Knowledge, Stanley Cavell discusses King Lear and A 
Winter’s Tale among others as part of Shakespeare’s overall effort to overcome the 
skepticism that plagues early modern culture.  Lear was Smith’s Shakespearian persona 
of choice and Robinson donned the Perdita character on stage and in real life when she 
pursued her affair with the Prince’s Florizel.  Both writers may very well have imbibed 
some lessons on doubt and skepticism from reading and inhabiting these plays. 
 
A Taxonomy of Vacancy 
 But what is vacancy?  Though this trope generally creates moments of cognitive 
breakdown that lead to altered states or altered ideas about perception and understanding, 
my discussion so far has most likely revealed how vacancy involves a large amount of 
slippage moving from one use of the term to another, even during the course of a single 
                                                
21 See Noggle’s The Skeptical Sublime.  Parnell’s essay, “Swift, Sterne, and the Skeptical 
Tradition” appears in Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy:  A Casebook. 
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author’s career.  In part, this variation comes from the nature of skepticism itself, with its 
commitment to root out systematic philosophies and false knowledge and to rethink, 
continually, the methods for doing so.  At the same time, different types of vacancy are 
naturally generated by the large confluence of models about the mind and brain during 
the period.  Empiricist and Enlightenment philosophies are still popular and circulating 
when Immanuel Kant publishes the third Critique in 1790, which propels German 
idealism to Goethe, Schiller, the Schlegels, British writers such as Coleridge, and 
eventually post-Kantians like William Whewell.  In the meantime, as Alan Richardson 
has demonstrated, Spurzheim and Galt’s materialist notions of the brain penetrate much 
of Romantic thinking.22  Finally, proto-cinematic technologies such as the 
phantasmagoria engender new relationships between the image, commodity culture, and 
technology, which create epistemological questions about perception and vision. 
At this point, I would like to further discuss several issues Romantic poets 
struggled with as they attempted to construct their own models of vacancy as a way of 
thinking about the mutual forms that can be found in both men’s and women’s poetry of 
the period.  These problems include but are not limited to:  the kinds of habituations 
vacancy attacks—hardened language or embodied perception; vacancy’s ability to stay 
open or suspended; the agency, violence, and addiction that play a part in altered states of 
mind; vacancy’s status as a feminine or gendered trope; and its relationship to budding 
nationalism in the nineteenth century.  If Romantic writers were interested in finding new 
ways to change the mind’s relationship to the world, they also diverge—sometimes along 
                                                
22 Richardson ushered in the cognitive or brain-science model of the mind with his book, 
British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind. 
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gender lines and sometimes due to the radical nature of their vision—regarding just how 
vacancy works. 
Both Shelley and Charlotte Smith circle around vacancy as a manipulation of 
language, and both eventually arrive at aporia as perhaps the most radical means of 
stopping thought.  Shelley’s plan to “destroy error” instigated by misused words and 
signs comes to fruition in Prometheus Unbound, when Prometheus must revoke his curse 
against Jupiter, which replicates Jupiter’s tyrannical acts.  In Act II, Asia discovers how 
to get out from under the language and history that instantiate patriarchal mental and 
social structures.  The poem ends with Act IV’s sublime and radical revolution in syntax 
alongside the Earth’s physical rejuvenation.23  Shelley depicts the expurgation of bad 
language from the mind, which later flushes dangerous toxins from the earth.   
This vacancy has another, much bleaker aspect, which Shelley reveals in his last, 
unfinished fragment, “The Triumph of Life.”  As de Man argued in “Shelley Disfigured,” 
the poet attempts to root out ideological ways of viewing the parade of world leaders and 
thinkers that passes him.  Instead, he finds himself in a desolating aporia, where meaning 
is entirely suspended in a no man’s land of signification.  If, in Prometheus Unbound, 
Shelley depicts the sublime unification of reason and affect to create the revolutionary 
sympathetic imagination, in his final poem, the poet is left in a vacuum of non-
knowledge, outside the bounds of thinking and feeling.   
                                                
23 C. E. Pulos first studied Shelley’s intense study of Greek skepticism in The Deep Truth, 
which Hoagwood updates in Skepticism and Ideology by contextualizing by putting 
Shelley in the context of contemporaries such as Thomas Reid and William Drummond 
as well as Karl Marx.  Timothy Morton in Shelley and the Revolution in Taste and Nora 
Crook in Shelley’s Venomed Melody demonstrate how Shelley’s idealism necessarily 
extends to rejuvenation of both the personal and social body. 
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Though Shelley certainly took from both Mary Wollstonecraft’s dialectical and 
aporetic thinking as well as Mary Shelley’s allegories about destruction, it is in Charlotte 
Smith we find Shelley’s match.24  Smith likewise uses the contingent nature of language 
to develop vacancy as an aporia of thought.  At first she poses the critical paradox as one 
between embodied notions of taste and Kantian quasi-conceptual aesthetic judgment in 
Elegiac Sonnets, but eventually this becomes writ large in Beachy Head as an aesthetics 
about a quasi-conceptual ethics, or a universal hospitality that is not bound by codified, 
strictured law.   
Robinson delineates a much different version of vacancy when, rather than 
rhetorical paradox or syntactic revolution, she offers a model of physical, cognitive 
blankness.  Working from the empiricist theory that new sensations lead to new ideas, 
Robinson argues against those forms of feminine affect, such as melancholy and 
sensibility, which promote monologic sensation and cognitive stasis.  Her poems provoke 
moments where the mind is emptied of all sensation, creating a vacuum that might pull in 
new perception and eventually new ideas.  Rather than only seeking to change linguistic 
structures, Robinson takes special aim at habituated memory and feeling, or types of 
embodied perception.  Felicia Hemans works with a brain-based model but to similar 
ends when she depicts vacancy as the overloading of the mind with too many perceptions 
in “The Widow of Crescentius.”  The shock of these physical moments goes a long way 
to help Robinson and Hemans shake those conceptual towers of thought that dominate 
                                                
24 See Wang’s “The Other Reasons” in Fantastic Modernity for his argument about 
Wollstonecraft and radical aporia. 
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women during the period.25  Moreover, both reveal how language might change 
embodiment or at the very least the physical aspects of thought. 
Many writers, perhaps women more than men, ultimately concern themselves 
with the ends of vacancy—what happens after the revolutionary ground-clearing?  They 
ponder how to keep ideology at bay as long as possible and how to reinvent it once 
ideology inevitably forecloses on vacancy’s intervention.  Smith deals with this problem 
by focusing on the trope’s ability to stop thought and keep it suspended.  Smith’s Beachy 
Head ends with the hermit’s unwritten epitaph, poised just before both the moment of 
writing and the construction of understanding.  In “The Oceanides,” Jewsbury develops a 
similar form of unreified futurity with her final image of an infant who remains outside of 
interpellated institutions or structures, freed from those codified ways of viewing the 
English self and the colonial other.  Much more tragically, Hemans’s early examples of 
vacancy in “The Widow of Crescentius” depict vacancy as the necessary destruction of 
the widow’s mind as the only way to shock her brain out of long-held ways of 
understanding the world.  
The only male writer that depicts such a permanent cognitive breakdown is Keats.  
In “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” the irascible nature of the urn teases the speaker out of 
thought, just as Mnemosyne confronts both speakers of the Hyperion poems right before 
those texts break down into fragments, arriving at vacancy with a grinding halt.  In 
Hyperion, Apollo begins his transformation into an immortal god by drinking the 
peerless, bright elixir as he looks into the face of Mnemosyne.  Convulsing and flushing, 
                                                
25 Jason Rudy argues that the use of electrical shock in Robinson and Hemans helps these 
poets to compose a poetics that provides access to universal, bodily sensation and 
ultimately helps to create new versions of universality in the social realm.  See his 
Electric Meters:  Victorian Physiological Poetics  
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he attempts to “Die into life,” yet the poem only ends with a glimpse of his “limbs/ 
Celestial” (130).  Looking into her face filled with the chaos of past memory or history, 
Apollo cannot transcend himself.  Though the goddess enflames him, effectively leaving 
him forever tumescent, he is also eternally barred from transforming into something else.  
Like Hemans’s heroines, Keats’s aspiring gods gaze at something they cannot 
comprehend and fall silent.  Both Hyperion and The Fall of Hyperion end this way, with 
the dashed lines of vacancy and the tragic failure of the Romantic imagination.  While 
Keats’s male characters stare down vacancy and lose their ability to think or to function 
in society, Smith, Jewsbury, and Hemans devise this suspension of thought as an 
important means of exiting those social structures that did not include them. 
In large part, these women writers were all responding to Wordsworth’s poems, 
especially his tendency to fill in vacancy with some form of either male transcendence or 
feminine feeling.  Beachy Head especially seems written in reaction to “Tintern Abbey,” 
a poem that suggests the recompense for great loss comes by way of the “sad still music 
of humanity.” For Wordsworth, poetry reconnoiters a unified subjectivity against the 
ravages of industrial modernity but also vacancy.  His explicit attempts to formulate a 
kind of vacancy, however, occur in “Lines Written Upon the Seat of a Yew Tree,” as well 
as his idiot boy poems, “There was a boy” and “The Idiot Boy.”26  As I discuss at greater 
length in chapter three, Wordsworth’s idiot boys present blank minds, free from theories 
of the picturesque or the disruptions of history, ready and waiting to be filled with 
something else.  Critics have argued whether this something else represents a kind of 
anti-Enlightenment quasi-religious feeling or something akin to the dialectical dynamic 
                                                




sublime that reinstates the subject’s rationality.27  Different versions of Wordsworth have 
differing degrees of success with leaving vacancy open for pedagogical purposes or 
filling it in with a new kind of Romantic instruction, and it is difficult to decide whether 
he finally ends up with a troubled mind that “broods/ Over the dark abyss” (Prelude 
XIV.71-72) or “on the edge of vacancy” composing a “unity sublime” (The Excursion 
IX.608).28   
Like Wordsworth, Samuel Coleridge also resorts to sympathy and to 
transcendence as an antidote to vacancy’s uncomfortable suspension in non-knowledge.  
For example, in “Frost at Midnight,” he depicts Hartley’s breathing and his exuberant 
shouting as an affective bond and fellow-feeling that “Fill up the interspersed vacancies/ 
And momentary pauses of thought” (51-52).  In The Biographia Literaria, Coleridge 
attempts to define the Romantic imagination as that which unifies the Romantic symbol.  
He inadvertently describes vacancy, however, when he constructs the secondary 
imagination as an ultimately unifying force that first stops along the way to deconstruct:  
“It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create” (304).  This dialectic becomes 
clear in “Kubla Khan,” a poem in some ways about the poet’s inability to stem the tide of 
imaginative dissipation, as I discuss in chapter three. 
As opposed to these strict attempts to keep vacancy open or find a new ideology 
to replace its uncomfortable skepticism, Robinson and Hemans later in their careers both 
                                                
27 See Bewell’s Wordsworth and the Enlightenment. 
28 Mary Jacobus in Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual Difference and Avital Ronnell in 
Stupidity capitalize on this indecidable or unreadable Wordsworth. One point to be 
considered here is that if Wordsworth in the Prelude or his idiot boys in Lyrical Ballads 
end up in a chaos of non-meaning, he does not see this as the means to a new community 
but an unfortunate by-product.  My argument is that Shelley and the female poets actively 
cultivate these moments. 
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attempt to find a form of thinking where vacancy inheres in a procedure that periodically 
resets thought.  Robinson especially tackles the Wordsworthian dialectic (of vacant or 
unified) by finding a structure for vacancy that produces an open-ended mechanism for 
thought, rather than simply pausing cognition or perception.  In rewriting Lyrical Ballads 
into Lyrical Tales, she composes her version of the idiot-savage whose stuttering 
utterances generate a range of disparate perceptions and linguistic options.  This model 
also has its counterpart in Byron’s immanent, revolving voice that explodes any one 
philosophy or identity with a host of satirical voices.  Unlike Byron, however, Robinson’s 
language of potentiality is always connected to and created from the flux of embodied 
realities. 
Though like Smith, Hemans initially focuses on simply retarding thought, by the 
time she writes the wandering Spaniard in The Forest Sanctuary, she works with ways to 
instigate vacancy on a repetitive, permanent basis through mind-emptying meditation.  
Similar to Robinson’s later model, she eventually looks to a mechanism that continually 
produces moments of vacancy as a means of repeatedly stemming the tide of conceptual 
and linguistic habituations.  Shelley takes the opposite route from Hemans, beginning 
with a more repetitive model of vacancy in Prometheus Unbound but eventually ending 
in the non-knowledge of aporia at the end of his life.  His idealist closet drama culminates 
with the idea that revolution must be constantly recreated in the mind.  In Act IV of 
Prometheus Unbound, Demogorgon explicitly warns the new utopian family of the 
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danger in resorting to old ways of thinking, and the entire act is engaged in reimagining 
the syntax of language as flexible, non-determinate, and constantly open to change. 29  
Alongside these questions of how to keep vacancy open, some poets ponder the 
problem of how vacancy inhibits or provides opportunities for political agency.  Though 
we could discuss many of the poets, Shelley and Hemans provide the most interesting 
contrast.  In Hemans, cognitive overload occurs only with the prodding of outside stimuli, 
such as drugs, social trauma like the death of a husband, or intoxicating poetry.  After 
women like the widow of Crescentius fall prey to vacancy, they then disperse it to the 
public at large, becoming agents of revolution even as their victims loose their agency in 
the process.  In “The Forest Sanctuary,” Hemans does away with the reliance on outside 
influences such as drugs when she finds a self-reliant, self-instigated process for vacancy.  
These motifs also have interesting parallels in Shelley, who also depicts women either 
ingesting or dispensing mind-altering drugs.  In Prometheus Unbound and the “Triumph 
of Life,” Asia and the feminine “shape all light” dose compatriots with nepenthe in order 
to grant them the necessary forgetfulness that will blot out past tyranny and allow them to 
reconceptualize social and political organization.  Shelley’s women play important roles 
in the revolution, though the nepenthe they offer acts to mute potential violent or 
vengeful side effects from fellow travelers. 
If vacancy is often portrayed as a revolutionary force, there is some argument 
between poets as to whether vacancy offers a violent or peaceful form of social change.  
Smith’s hermit has been subject to violence, but the vacancy he exemplifies is a form of 
peaceful hospitality.  Similarly, Jewsbury offers a form of friendship that attempts to put 
                                                




an end the hostility of colonial prejudice.  Perhaps not surprisingly, both Hemans and 
Robinson, whose vacancy is already more embodied, depict jarring, painful mental 
shocks that produce oblivion or overload.  Although Hemans eventually writes of the 
peaceful Spaniard who flees the inquisition, throughout her career she depicted a number 
of revolutionary women toppling patriarchal structures by inciting violence.  As Tricia 
Lootens first noticed, “The Widow of Crescentius,” “The Bride of the Greek Isle,” and 
“The Wife of Asdrubal” all spill blood either to murder a tyrant or protest his ascendancy.  
More cerebrally, they do so after experiencing a painful cognitive breakdown.  These 
poems ponder to what extent women imitate tyrannical power-mongering when they plot 
regime change and to what extent violence may be the only and necessary means of 
affecting women’s positions.   
Shelley also explores the question of violence when he stops work on Prometheus 
Unbound to write The Cenci, a gothic drama about the daughter of a sixteenth-century 
Italian Count who is raped by him and then plots his death in revenge.  Her refusal to 
speak the crime indicates how withholding—as opposed to feminist writing—might also 
be claimed as a revolutionary vacancy.  In the introduction to the play, however, Shelley 
specifically excoriates Beatrice’s violent actions because they initiate another cycle of 
tyrannical violence.  The persistence of violent women in Hemans’ oeuvre suggests that 
this form of vacancy may serve only as a critique and cannot truly enact a revolution that 
alters anything on a more permanent basis.   
Vacancy clearly has implications for how gender might be reconceptualized as a 
part of revolutionary change, as Hemans and Shelley attest when they question the ethics 
of vacancy as a performance of masculine aggression.  Both Smith’s hermit figure, who 
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ends Beachy Head, and Robinson’s idiot boy-savage in “The Savage of Aveyron” may be 
universal figures deracinated of gender, or they may be male figures feminized by 
masculine aggression.  Robinson’s idiot, however, seems to manifest gender as only one 
of many alterities, in an attempt to undermine the male-female duality.  Whereas the 
widow of Crescentius or Beatrice Cenci literally or figuratively don masculine attire, 
Asia and Prometheus combine to form a single, androgynous consciousness, though one 
that has been tutored in feminist critique.  Hemans’s Spaniard likewise represents a 
conquistador who is vacated of his masculine aggression and, in the new world, becomes 
somewhat androgynous, as Gary Kelly has argued.30  His wife, who cannot tear herself 
away from the rooted domesticity of her home country or its symbolic, idolatrous religion 
dies during the oceanic trip, leaving the Spaniard to become both mother and father to 
their young son.  Finally, when the speaker of Jewsbury’s The Oceanides adopts the 
figure of infancy as her final gesture at the end of the poem, she summons another 
representation of androgyny, or an imago created before gender is instantiated through 
language.  Each of these models plays differently with admixtures of masculine and 
feminine on a discursive level, and a large part of this effort seems wrapped up in the 
possibility of rethinking femininity beyond the over-sensible domestic feminine body.  At 
other times, many of these writers seem to aspire to a non-gendered mind, and they 
certainly hope to explode the language that overwrites existence with pre-patterned 
gender dichotomies.  
Though all of the male writers associate vacancy in some way with feminine 
affect or receptivity, for Shelley vacancy seems especially tied to women’s intellectual 
                                                
30 See Kelly’s essay on Hemans in Felicia Hemans:  Reimagining Poetry in the 
Nineteenth Century, eds. Julia Melnyk and Nanora Sweet. 
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development.  Asia becomes a particularly feminist figure through her drug trip and 
confrontation with Demogorgon, the spirit of the deep, when she comes to consciousness 
about her place outside the patriarchy and, more importantly, her ability to critique it.  
Rather than becoming silent and taking back tyrannical language as Prometheus does, 
Asia must execute a feminist act of writing, when she regurgitates a history of the 
patriarchy precisely so that she may understand herself as a historical actor who has the 
power to reframe tyrannical discourse.  As Demogorgon says to Asia afterwards:  “—If 
the Abysm/ Could vomit forth its secrets: —but a voice/ Is wanting, the deep truth is 
imageless” (II.iv.114-16).  Asia supplies this voice, and through her, Shelley argues just 
how much the world needs women’s writing.  It is no coincidence that he writes 
Prometheus Unbound just after Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is published, a novel very 
much about how women’s acts of creation are stamped out, especially by male geniuses.  
Seen from this perspective, Shelley presents vacancy as a feminine figure for revolution, 
which even Prometheus must learn if he is to be part of the new, utopian family. 
 For Keats as well, vacancy is gendered as feminine, and the agency his women 
figures possess—their ability to provoke cognitive pauses—appears quite aggressive.  
Keats often characterizes his male speakers as the unfortunate victims of vacancy.  As 
Marlon Ross, Marjorie Levinson, and others have argued, Keats’s “cockney” poetry was 
lambasted for being both lower-class and effeminate.31  As he sketches out vacancy in his 
poems, beginning with the skepticism of negative capability, his masculine figures 
always appear to be assaulted by the seductions of confusing, ruthless female figures—
those belles dames sans merci—and males’ lack of agency in this drama may mean that 
                                                
31 See Marlon Ross’s chapter on Mary Tighe and Keats in The Contours of Masculine 
Desire and Levinson’s Keats’s Life of Allegory. 
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they are victims of vacancy.  On the other hand, Keats too seems to suggest that feminine 
figures hold a tremendous, if castrating, revolutionary power.   
Finally, the exploration of vacancy almost always pushes poets past the 
boundaries of the national imaginary.  Prometheus must physically and mental journey to 
the vale of Kashmir to reap the benefits of Asia’s vacancy, and Shelley’s metaphor of 
philosophy as the vacating “pioneer” has special resonance for women writers.  Unlike 
the general tendency for Britons to define themselves against other nationalities, 
particularly the French, as Linda Colley has argued, women writers seek quite the 
opposite.32  Hemans and Jewsbury are both taking this lesson not only from Shelley’s 
“Alastor” and “The Wandering Jew,” which influenced them, but also from Madam de 
Staël’s Corinne, a novel about the impossibility of a woman being a poet and living by 
English values.33  Smith and Robinson plot their vacant figures of the hermit and the 
savage on the edges of the nation, Hemans relocates vacancy to early sixteenth-century 
North America, and Jewsbury’s vacancy becomes entirely groundless when she sketches 
a transnational journey from England to India that effectively deracinates English 
national signifiers.  In this way, vacancy is already a transnational trope. 
 
Vacancy & Genre 
If vacancy crosses gender and national boundaries, it is often located at the 
intersection of lyric and narrative modes—but particularly as they are formulated in the 
                                                
32 Colley makes this well-known argument in her book, Britons:  Forging the Nation 
1707-1837. 
33 In Wolfson’s edition of Hemans’ poetry, she comments prolifically about Hemans’ 
borrowings from “Alastor.”  Jewsbury has a tongue and check piece in her 
Phantasmagoria that partly imitates and partly satirizes the poem, and she also published 
a review of “The Wandering Jew” in The Athenaeum. 
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genre of Romantic poetry.  Although it is possible to discuss vacancy in novels of the 
period, this dissertation gives great credence to the poetry of women writers.  Both 
women’s and men’s poetry were exceptional in their pervasive and intense exploration of 
perception and cognition through the particularly self-reflexive forms poetry offered.  
Perhaps the novel exerted too much consumer pressure, as opposed to poetry, which still 
remained a somewhat elite art form with audiences that might be more amenable to 
philosophical thought.  As I have already mentioned, however, Jarvis has recently argued 
that poetry is especially suitable for philosophical contemplation.  Its inherent play with 
repetition, rhyme and caesura provides forms suited to the exploration of different models 
for cognition other than reason or affect.  Women play with these all these techniques as 
they think through how formal constraints might spur the mind’s ability to stop itself 
mid-thought.   
Many women poets also wrote prose, and they often transpose similar concerns 
into their novels, yet the structure of these works often requires a romantic solution to 
vacancy’s doubts and ideology critique.  As Andrew H. Miller has recently suggested, in 
nineteenth-century poetry, marriage—as a state of perfection—is often posed as a 
solution to skepticism.  Romanticists would easily view this literary history as the 
continuation of the Romantic struggle of the subject alienated from the outer world.34  If 
novels solve this problem by unifying the subject to one other subject in his or her outer 
world, then novels present marriage as a foil for skepticism.  Moreover, and perhaps 
more importantly, the teleological nature of romance novels tends to subvert vacancy’s 
                                                
34 He makes this argument in Burdens of Reflection:  On Ethics and Reading in 




relish for pauses and uncertainty, even if there is some room for doubt along the way.  As 
I argue in chapter three, Robinson’s use of poetry interpolated into novels suggests that it 
is up to the genre of poetry (or structures in novels that mimic it) to stem the tide of 
romance’s teleologies and the novel’s romantic tendencies.  The pastoral-poetic scenes in 
Charlotte Smith’s novels are a good case in point.  In both Desmond and The Old Manor 
House protagonists Geraldine and Monomia both wander unsettled and unsure through 
the woods magically to find and reunite with the objects of their affection.  At times these 
novels appear to transform the deconstructive pastoral of Smith’s poetry into unifying 
Romantic lyrics. 
Austen, with her own brand of skepticism cultivated through the irony of indirect 
narration, was also certainly thinking through these issues.  Her narrators, of course, have 
the propensity to articulate moments of skepticism, particularly at the end of novels.  She 
often pits reason and feeling against one another in Sense and Sensibility and frequently 
writes two opposing characters whose seeming difference eventually collapses.35  
Moreover, the irony of her indirect narration builds on a suspicion regarding happy 
endings and characters who are blind to their own meanness, avarice, sexual desire, or 
conservative ideologies.  One could cite any number of endings in Austen, though 
                                                
35 In Unbecoming Conjunctions, Jill Heydt-Stevenson makes this kind of argument about 
James Thorpe and Henry Tilney in Northanger Abbey.  While James at first appears to be 
a middle-class braggart hungry for horses and women, uncouth compared to Tilney’s 
gentrified figure, when Catherine Moreland finally arrives at Tilney’s abode, we see just 
how enmeshed Tilney is in the comforts of consumer culture.  Austen effectively reveals 
Tilney as one who is able to paint his consumption with the ideological veneer of class. 
 
35  
Emma’s experience at Box Hill and her subsequent capitulation to Knightly have become 
paradigmatic.36   
I have not yet had the opportunity to think through Austen’s position, but at the 
very least it seems clear that her endings often serve as a pause for contemplation about 
the propulsive marriage plot that has just been recounted.  In this sense, the irony of her 
endings creates a lyrical moment that adjoins the narrative similar to the way women 
poets envision vacancy as a gap or crux in narratives of linguistic inheritance, or those 
habitual meanings words import.  In their works, the tension between the lyric and the 
narrative becomes dramatized as a dialectic inherent to cognitive pause.  In almost every 
example, vacancy presents a lyrical moment outside of thought, ideology, or even rich, 
meditative subjectivity.  At the same time, this pause in the chain of signification is 
always contingent on the resumption of understanding or narrative that comes to fill that 
void.  Thus the lyrical aspect of vacancy does not aim to erase history or time but to place 
a referendum on traditional histories or narratives that insist on things like teleological 
trajectories and domestic ideologies.  Their goal is not to proffer the lyric as superior to 
narrative but to find types of lyricism that circumvent narrative teleologies or ideologies 
by literally providing other ways of thinking.   
  
Chapters 
Not all women poets are interested in this skeptical approach to epistemology, of 
course, and even those that form the main focus of this study at times do value sensibility, 
affect, reason, and other Enlightenment modes of thinking.  Yet these four poets represent 
                                                
36 See the Romantic Circles praxis volume on Box Hill, Re-reading Box Hill:  Reading 
the Practice of Everyday Life, edited by William Galperin. 
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four different and prominent ways of thinking differently.  The body of this dissertation 
begins with Charlotte Smith, who in some ways is “the mother” of Romanticism but even 
more strikingly presents the most idealistic and aporetic version of vacancy.  Chapter 
two, “Charlotte Smith and the Enlightenment to Come,” looks at how Smith rejects the 
aesthetic position often allotted to women of the eighteenth century, who were frequently 
depicted as rabid consumers of new market goods and services.  Smith attempts to vacate 
bourgeois ideas of taste and instead imagines aesthetic judgments formed not on feelings 
or material desires but based on formal and immaterial ideals close to Immanuel Kant’s 
notion of free indeterminate beauty.  I argue that Smith self-reflexively employs a 
Kantian kind of aporetic thinking about the possibilities of Enlightenment reason.  This 
happens through the quasi-conceptuality offered by the radical aesthetics of free beauty 
and the free play of the mind.  Her epic poem, Beachy Head, extends the possibilities 
found in aesthetics to ethics, the law, and nationality.  Written during the height of the 
Napoleonic wars, the poem looks for a way out of England’s imperialistic history by 
imagining a cosmopolitan future through the figure of a hermit.  Living on the shores of 
England but constantly looking onto the English channel, the hermit saves those mariners 
who are washed ashore.  As a figure of unconditional hospitality who defies national 
borders, the hermit represents a kind of lawfulness outside the rigid confines of the law, 
or a justice beyond the juridical order.  
If Smith’s hermit allegorizes a futurity that remains open to whatever and 
whoever might come across England’s shores, Mary Robinson’s poetry is occupied with 
the multiplicity of sensation and thought that poetry might produce.  In chapter three, 
“Mary Robinson’s Diverse Mind:  from Oblivion to Idiocy,” I argue that Robinson 
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engaged in quite a radical use of empiricism, using Locke’s ideas about oblivion and 
tabula rasa as a means of vacating the mind of hackneyed sensations and reflections.  For 
the poet, the worst of these are stale poetic habituations, and Robinson demonstrates this 
most fully in her sonnet sequence Sappho & Phaon.  Unlike other commentators who 
aver that the poet’s use of sensibility is a substitute for reason, I argue that the sequence 
in fact highlights Robinson’s rejection of sensibility and the 1790s lyric of feeling 
precisely because it tends to get caught up in decades-old emotional and intellectual 
content.  By the end of her career, Robinson turns simultaneously to the ballad and the 
Enlightenment trope of idiocy as a means of generating textual and intellectual 
multiplicity.  Through the ballad’s refrain and its tendency to proliferate textual variants 
with each printing and performance, this popular poetic form figures a kind of textual 
idiocy that does not idly repeat poetic content but instead generates repetition as 
difference and the plenitude of non-linear thought.  This plenitude of the “open text” 
focuses on the potentiality of poetry to find a flexible materiality outside the body and to 
pose solutions to the radical politics of the 1790s beyond either Painite intellectual 
individualism or Blakean communitarianism.   
The next two chapters deal with vacancy during the Regency period and beyond, 
in the poetry of Felicia Hemans and her close friend Maria Jane Jewsbury.  In chapter 
four, “Felicia Hemans’s Ruined Minds:  Cognitive Overload and the Blows of Freedom,” 
I show how Hemans uses notions from both nineteenth-century brain science and 
philosophies of the mind to write about vacancy as cognitive and conceptual overload.  
Though contemporary scholars have often read her characters as manifesting instances of 
hysteria that underwrite the need to secure patriotic, imperialistic domesticity, I read 
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these moments as paralysis stemming from the brain overloading with perceptual data, 
which in turn shatter long held concepts such as the belief in English imperialism.  
Hemans triangulates between brain science, with its mind-brain quandary, and Whewell’s 
versions of continental philosophy, with its mind-world problem, postulating that the 
overload of the brain might create new possibilities to change the mind’s abstract 
conceptualization and understanding of the outside world.  In earlier poems, individuals 
transfer their cognitive paralysis virus-like to the conservative tyrants they topple; in later 
works, such as The Forest Sanctuary, characters emigrate to the empty cognitive space of 
America.  In this epic poem, the protagonist Spaniard eventually learns a method of 
thinking vacantly by practicing mind-emptying meditation that helps him continually 
outrun the increasingly ideological American imaginary.  Both the vaginal space of the 
New World and the Spaniard’s empty mind present feminine lack as an intrepid and 
active countermeasure to phallic church and state institutions.  Moreover, Hemans 
performs these modes of vacancy formally through both her propensity to overwork a 
given text with footnotes as well as her rampant use of dashes to emphasize the mind’s 
natural pauses.  This chapter ultimately helps us to understand Hemans neither as a 
political conservative nor a supporter of liberalist ideology, but as someone attempting to 
resist ideology outside all available political structures. 
The final chapter, “Maria Jane Jewsbury’s Childlike, Ethical Vision,” plots an 
escape from grounded, pastoral, national imaginaries altogether.  In “The Oceanides” the 
poet describes her trip from England to India as a journey of liberation, as she floats amid 
a non-signifying sea.  Jewsbury takes Hemans’ rejection of Catholic idolatry one step 
further when she builds her models of vacancy as an interrogation of visual sign systems.   
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Rather than using a single philosopher to contextualize the poet’s approach to 
epistemology, I look at several developments in popular culture that produced doubt 
about ways of seeing and consequently about methods for knowing the world in an 
increasingly visual culture.  Working from both the phantasmic quality of commodity 
culture and contemporaneous visual technologies such as the phantasmagoria, the poet’s 
pictorial representations separate image from reality, vacating visual markers of 
embodied identities that increasingly served to assign women and racialized groups to 
biological and evolutionary inferiority.  By concentrating on the partial immateriality of 
verbal or poetic images, Jewsbury is able to put visions of British and Indian landscapes 
into conversation.  More importantly, this version of vacancy allows her to model British-
Indian relations as the superimposition of one landscape over another that always 
preserves a certain amount of non-coincidence.  This representational gap preserves the 
unknowable qualities that inhere in the Other, which ultimately insures the ethical 
treatment of the Indian Other.  This visual blind spot is best represented in Jewsbury’s 
final figure of an infant.  As a visual provocation, this picture of childhood argues with 
classic Romantic depictions of idyllic youth by presenting an imago that is not fully 
codified and thus figures the cut before knowledge, narratives of development, or 
interpellation.  Not unlike Robinson’s savages, Jewsbury ends her long poem with an 
image of non-knowledge, whose visual representation perhaps offers the most drastic 





Chapter 2.   
Charlotte Smith and the Enlightenment to Come 
 
 
More often than not, the speakers in Charlotte Smith’s poems find themselves 
sitting on a cliff, looking out on the coastal waters of the English Channel, and wishing 
they were somewhere else.  Though they may attempt to take refuge from despair in the 
earthy pastoral landscape that Smith has become known for, her speakers never manage 
to gain solace by imaginatively bonding with the beauties of the landscape.  Instead, they 
wish for something outside material reality, as in this well-known sonnet where the 
speaker goes so far as to envy bones uncovered in a seaside graveyard: 
 Lo! their bones whiten in the frequent waves; 
 But vain to them the winds and waters rave; 
 They hear the warring elements no more; 
 While I am doom’d—by life’s long storm opprest, 
 To gaze with envy on their gloomy rest (44.10-14) 
What the speaker desires is not quite death itself but a release from feeling, sensation, and 
embodiment altogether.  Smith’s seascapes consistently dwell on moments where sea 
meets land, where the waves carve out a space beyond the tranquil bowers on the shores 
of her childhood home, the national boundaries of Britain itself and materiality 
altogether.  Nihilistic as poems like these might sound, it is important to understand how 
Smith repeatedly returns to the language of numbness or spaces white-washed by waves 
as a figurative gesture.  In doing so, her poetics seek possibilities for thinking about 
women outside the late eighteenth-century discursive field that almost always located 
women and their aesthetics through their gendered bodies.  
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Recently Jacqueline Labbe has read Smith as attempting to shed the limiting 
identities of mother and distressed woman,  yet Smith’s poems about vacancy reveal that 
she was engaged in a much larger project positing women not just as feeling but as 
thinking subjects entitled to freedom and universality—the unfinished promises of the 
Enlightenment.37  Throughout her poems, Smith locates vacancy as a process of exploring 
a language beyond the body, sensation, and other kinds of material limitations.  In later 
poems, Smith sets her sights on national and international waters in order to wash away 
the narratives of imperialism and nationalism that underwrote the Napoleonic Wars and 
at the same time relegated women to severely limited roles in the public sphere as 
affective rather than thinking subjects.  Even as she attempts to find a way out of 
teleological discourses, Smith necessarily leaves language open and hospitable to 
contingency, conceptualizing a future like Derrida’s “future to come,” a future prospect 
made vulnerable to the shock of both conceptual and historical events.  
To argue that Smith envisions an imaginative life outside the limits of the body is 
to set aside the reigning historicist view that situates the poet in various empiricist 
discourses.  From the outlook of the long eighteenth century and recent feminist thought, 
in Smith’s poems the body, like nature’s material landscape, becomes a founding site for 
a feminist aesthetics that reinforces maternity and domesticity against failed reason and 
                                                
37 See also Rachel Crawford’s section on Smith in “Troping the Subject:  Behn, Smith, 
Hemans and the Poetics of the Bower.”  Crawford also views Smith’s use of gender as 
performative, which helps to undermine the normalized alliances between nature and 
gender: “her choreography of gender relations suggest that the female inhabitant of the 
bower, with her feminine charms, is as inscrutable and enticing to the female poet as to 
the male.  Femininity itself is revealed as an enchantment which is not automatically 




masculine, unfeeling law.38  Moreover, Smith has often been aligned with those 
categories that define women as tied to sensation and sensory ways of understanding the 
world, including sensibility, luxury, the aesthetics of “taste,” and, underlying them all, 
empiricism.  Like John Barrell’s critique of the distinction between the logic of sensation 
and reflection in reference to Dorothy and William Wordsworth respectively, Smith 
scholars have tended to link the woman poet to the cult of sensibility to the exclusion of 
reason or reflection.39  More sensitive people—particularly women—were seen as more 
susceptible to physical sensation and passion, as well as to the novelties of new consumer 
culture.  The discourses of sensibility and commodity culture, especially as authored by 
Adam Smith and David Hume, were forged together and later reified in discussions of 
taste.  Empiricists like Hume suggested that taste was created in the subject through a 
series of educational experiences in the world.  Good consuming subjects would propel 
the English economy by fueling a demand for imperial raw materials to be produced into 
goods by English manufacturers.40   Taste became one of the foremost signs of the 
educated bourgeois subject, particularly chaste, “tasteful” women, who themselves were 
                                                
38 See for example, Maria Jerinic, “‘The mild dominion of the moon’:  Charlotte Smith 
and the Politics of Transcendence,” Kathryn Pratt, “Charlotte Smith’s Melancholia on the 
Page and Stage,” Donnell R. Ruwe, “Charlotte Smith’s Sublime; Feminine Poetics, 
Botany, and Beachy  
Head,” Judith Pascoe, “Female Botanists and the Poetry of Charlotte Smith,” and Sarah 
Zimmerman’s Romanticism, Lyricism and History (39-72).  Many of these studies take 
their cues from Anne K. Mellor’s identification of male and female Romanticisms in her 
Romanticism and Gender.  According to Mellor’s formulation in her introduction to the 
volume, women writers foreswore the linguistic concerns of their male peers with the 
limitations of the language, or the use of language for political and spiritual salvation and 
instead looked to “the workings of the rational mind, located in the female as well as 
male body” (5). 
39 See Barrel, “The Uses of Dorothy.” 
40 Classic texts include Smith’s The Morals of Sentiment and Hume’s “On Taste” as well 
as many of his other essays on trade and consumerism. 
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valued for their ability to interpellate their English children into appropriate spending, 
dressing, and social habits.  While Smith no doubt was privy to these arguments, if only 
through the pages of Addison and Steele, she dramatically challenges women’s position 
in these discourses as well as the place of women’s writing by rejecting bourgeois taste 
for something more like Immanuel Kant’s competing notion of aesthetic judgment, which 
sought to locate beauty beyond the body in disinterested, somewhat conceptual 
formulations built around the object.  Not unlike the development of Kant’s own 
thinking, what begins for Smith as a meditation on how the aesthetic might enact and 
conceptualize freedom becomes, in her later poems, also about the possibilities for 
universal rights and justice.  
It may be odd to speak of a feminist Kantian idea of beauty, particularly because 
his rejection of the body historically served his desire to ghettoize women from the 
sphere of philosophic, public thought.  Yet it is not outside the realm of possibility that a 
writer like Smith, weighed down by so many discourses about the body, might try to 
imagine what it would be like to think outside the demands of sympathy and material 
needs that always served to remind smart writers that they were, in the end, needy 
women.  Such a post-feminist stance, moreover, seems especially possible in the years 
surrounding the French Revolution, when universality seemed promising if illusive.  
Aesthetics would be an apt place to center any kind of universality, particularly because 
eighteenth-century women like Smith were educated in the arts.  Additionally, Kant’s 
brand of aesthetics, with its emphasis on judgments of beauty located in the object, could 
be theoretically available to any person, male or female, who could educate themselves in 
using reason to arrive at objective judgments.  In the wake of the French Revolution, 
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women could be eligible particularly if they heeded Mary Wollstonecraft’s injunctions to 
develop their reason and demand the equality proffered by the Revolution.  Though 
Kantian beauty necessitated judges schooled in Enlightenment reason, his beauty was 
only quasi-conceptual, uniting both the understanding and the imagination.  Thus, though 
an abstract universal, beauty was not beholden to a concept’s strict laws and teleologies.41  
Though a priori, Kantian beauty is always subject to the free play of the imagination—
including a portion of formal indeterminacy and contingency, as both Adorno in 
Aesthetic Ideology and Derrida in The Truth in Painting have argued.  This indeterminacy 
becomes a particularly apt way to categorize an aesthetics that might move beyond a 
number of norms that rest on conceptual rules—such as gender, nationality, class.  In The 
Critique of Judgment, Kant terms this formal indeterminacy “lawfulness without law,” 
and this quasi-conceptuality is an extremely useful way of describing Smith’s 
complicated rejection of masculine law and simultaneous espousal of what Derrida has 
called justice beyond the law, a radical ethics that goes beyond individual sympathy and 
that obtains conceptuality but is not bound to its strictures.  Smith’s poetics does to 
Kant’s ideas what Wollstonecraft’s The Vindication of the Rights of Woman did to Tom 
Paine’s “Rights of Man,” ensuring that the Revolutionary rhetoric of universality, reason 
and human rights did indeed include women.42 
                                                
41 For a thorough discussion of Kant’s quasi-conceptual basis for beauty see Rodolphe 
Gasché’s The Idea of Form:  Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics, in particular his chapter 
“Mere Form” as well as Robert Kaufman’s “Red Kant” (710-12). 
42 Orrin N. C. Wang’s chapter on Mary Wollstonecraft in Fantastic Modernity sets the 
precedent for viewing a woman writer as attempting to be included in the radical, 
aporetic possibilities of the Enlightenment.  My argument about Smith’s use of aporetic 
thinking, however, demonstrates that for Smith Enlightenment reason is about the 
possibilities of radical aesthetics, in particular the possibilities of Kant’s free play of the 
mind and free beauty. 
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Finally, though Smith’s self-reflexive discourse ties together the promises of 
aesthetics and universal freedom, her meditations on taste and imperialism also worry 
over the elitist and ideological strains inherent in Enlightenment discourses.   Recent 
critical commentaries on Kant suggest that the philosopher may have anticipated his own 
failures in transcending certain problems of language and of universalism,43 and like 
Kant, Smith may be submitting to the reader her own failed attempts to create universal 
aesthetic judgment as precisely the point.  This inability to imagine non-restrictive 
universality and Enlightenment ideals become part of Smith’s constant striving, a 
characteristically Romantic trait.  For this reason, she repeatedly turns to abstract, empty 
spaces that have all the possibility of as-yet-unfulfilled promises.   
This chapter looks at the two works that bookend Smith’s career—her great 
commercial success Elegiac Sonnets (1784) and her final, posthumously published epic 
Beachy Head (1807). Reading these two works together links Smith’s earliest efforts at 
reconceiving aesthetics to her final, and most fully realized, attempts at thinking through 
language’s role in the problems of trade, imperialism, and ethics.  In her early sonnets she 
begins to measure the competing definitions of taste in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century and rejects the aesthetic position allotted to eighteenth-century women as rabid 
consumers of new market goods and services.  She instead tries to imagine aesthetic 
judgments formed not on feelings or material desires but based on formal and immaterial 
ideals.  The lyric beauty Smith works with in the Sonnets reappears at the end of Beachy 
                                                
43 See Robert Kaufman’s “Red Kant: or, the Persistence of the Third Critique in Adorno 
and Jameson” (689n12) and David Clark’s “We ‘Other Prussians’:  Bodies and Pleasures 
in De Quincey and Late Kant.” These accounts of Kant suggest that the idealist 
philosopher was not so blind to the logical problems his arguments entailed, for example, 




Head as a space of possibility, England’s southern coast vacated of the narratives of trade 
and conquest that represent Britain’s imperialist history.  Beachy Head finally seeks to 
find a way out of this history by contemplating the figure of a hermit who enacts one 
version of universal rights by living on the edge of the nation and imagining a future 
unallied to nationalistic concerns.  
 
The Elegiac Sonnets and the Impossibility of Taste 
Most accounts of Smith’s wildly successful commercial venture, Elegiac Sonnets, 
agree that her first poetic foray sold the language of sensibility for some sorely needed 
cash.  A destitute mother of numerous children, whose profligate husband had recently 
been thrown in debtor’s prison, she marketed the autobiographical sonnets, hoping that 
chivalrous customers would pay to help end her tales of woe.44  The sonnets at first 
appear as effusions, moments of high passion that leave the speaker no distance from her 
subject for reflection.  Yet Smith’s use of the language of taste, particularly in describing 
the pastoral landscape, reframes her sonnets as both reflective and self-reflexive poems 
about the possibilities of poetry and the redemptive qualities of nature.  More than once 
in the Elegiac Sonnets, Smith longs for the pastoral retreats of her childhood, as she 
describes them, those “scenes could charm that now I taste no more!” (31.14).  More than 
nostalgia for rural comfort or relief from poverty, these sonnets link the degraded position 
of women to debates about taste and aesthetics at the end of the eighteenth century.  At a 
time when writers like William Cowper and later William Wordsworth capitalized on 
rejecting urban luxury and consumer culture for the rural beauties of nature, Smith 
                                                
44 See especially Labbe’s “Selling Sorrows.” 
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figures these attitudes toward consumption in her sonnets about female subjectivity.  
Rather than representing women as good consuming subjects forming proper bourgeois 
taste, as many subsequent women novelists did, Smith uses her role as a woman poet to 
lodge an acute critique of bourgeois taste mediated through the feminine body and its 
metonymic associations with nature.  She searches for a version of beauty located in 
reflective judgments of nature’s formal qualities.  
Smith accomplishes this aesthetic revolution not only through the language of the 
poems themselves but also through her savvy editorial practices.  Her original 1784 
volume went through at least sixteen editions during her lifetime, and in the process she 
added a large number of sonnets, eventually including an entire second volume in 1797.  
While the initial sonnets reject sensation and memory for a kind of numbness, the later 
poems introduce the language of “taste” and figures of open, abstract space that represent 
an aesthetics located outside the body and outside memory’s narrative histories.  These 
later poems insert new language about consumption and the body, and with each new set 
of additions, they refract or revise her oeuvre as a whole.  Just as Smith disperses the 
speaking subject through her poetic personae, each new wave of sonnets destabilizes her 
body of work and performs the act of critical thinking by repeatedly reframing poems 
about sensation and numbness through the discourse of taste.45  Though this new 
language develops a weighty alternative aesthetics, it is essential to remember that the 
original sonnets remain in the collection, as well as many others that almost neurotically 
repeat the move of painfully and unhappily languishing in sensation and sensibility.  Thus 
                                                
45 For a discussion of the ways Smith’s multiple poetic personae destabilize notions of 
identity and subjectivity, see Labbe’s seminal Charlotte Smith:  Romanticism, Poetry, 
and the Culture of Gender. 
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the poet ends up in a dialectical struggle between her longing for an aesthetic that 
“refuses to matter in terms of human economies” as Karen Swann has put it, and the 
sensibility and pain of her position in a society that bars her from and forces her to 
question the exclusionary nature of that aestheticist fantasy (qtd. in Pyle 13).  Smith 
perhaps never truly writes herself out of this quandary, yet she makes a valiant effort to 
stop resisting old discourses and imagine a space where new language might be created at 
the end of Beachy Head. 
The word “taste” doesn’t appear in the sonnets until the third edition, but the 
particular tensions between embodied taste and non-embodied aesthetics are already 
present in the first two editions, which offered Smith’s initial germ of sixteen sonnets.  
Though these sonnets employ some stock tropes from the cult of sensibility so popular at 
the turn of the eighteenth century, the speaker too often ends up sick of her own feelings, 
pleading for anhedonia or numbness as a relief from such extreme, painful feeling.  In 
sonnet five, “To the South Downs,” the speaker implores the pastoral countryside for a 
healing balm: 
  Ah! hills belov’d—where once a happy child, 
  Your beechen shades, “your turf, your flowers among,” 
  I wove your blue-bells into garlands wild, 
  And woke your echoes with my artless song. 
  Ah! hills belov’d—your turf your flowers remain; 
  But can they peace to this sad breast restore; 
  For one poor moment soothe the sense of pain, 
  And teach a breaking heart to throb no more? 
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  And you, Aruna!—in the vale below, 
  As to the sea your limpid waves you bear, 
  Can you one kind Lethean cup bestow, 
  To drink a long oblivion to my care? 
  Ah! no!—when all, e’en Hope’s last ray is gone, 
  There’s no oblivion—but in death alone!  (5.1-14) 
Since the South Downs represent Smith’s childhood home and aristocratic upbringing, 
then her memories of this place should soothe and comfort her now, stuck as she is in a 
failed marriage with the son of a West Indies planter and merchant.  Smith’s visions of 
her childhood, Edenic pastoral, however, no longer hold the same charm.  Her 
unhappiness may alienate her from the pastoral bower and its “artless song,” yet it has 
compelled her to write a sonnet that is already self-reflexive about its impossibility to 
take in easy pleasure or sensation.  Even in this early poem, the poet turns from a vision 
of the land to the river Arun for a draught she might consume, which rather than 
nourishing her would erase her memory altogether and numb her to the pain it brings.  
Through this erasure, the poet seeks a space beyond memory that neutralizes not only 
desire but also those personal and societal histories that seek to define her as a jilted 
woman, fallen from an aristocratic and then even a secure middle class existence.  
Though divorced from the unmediated, easy pleasures of aristocratic leisure or a 
shepherd’s existence, Smith rejects communing with the landscape’s “charms” through 
the avenue of consumption supplied by her (faltering) middle class status.  Instead, she 
only figuratively ingests a substance that will block all sensations, memory and desire.   
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In an article on Smith and nepenthe, Charlotte Sussman notes how Smith uses 
Helen’s draught of nepenthe to release herself from the painful, exhausting demands of 
sympathizing with others.46  It seems important, moreover, that this anesthetic is taken in 
through the mouth.  Even in the early sonnets, there is a turn from the eye to the mouth, 
as Smith refuses the eye, the “higher” order sense in the eighteenth century hierarchy, for 
the “lower” order mouth, only to reject that as well.47  Rather than following 
Enlightenment tropes of vision as the reasoning sense, here both sight and taste are forms 
of sensation.  To subvert either means of sensory consumption, these sonnets develop a 
liquid economy aimed at preventing sensation or feeling altogether.  In the previous 
sonnet, the speaker desires to drink the draught of Nepenthe to stop herself from crying.  
The speaker similarly supplicates sleep’s opiate in sonnet eleven:  “But still thy opiate aid 
dost thou deny/ To calm the anxious breast, to close the streaming eye” (13-14). Ingesting 
nepenthe, according to the formula laid out in the couplet, would dry up the stream of 
tears from the eyes and slow down the flow of blood through the heart—or possibly stop 
it altogether.  
These lines connect several viscous fluids together—blood, nepenthe, and tears—
not simply as substitutions or metonymies for pain, but in a relationship of expenditure 
                                                
46 Adela Pinch also notes that Smith’s quotations of Pope and others occur in places 
where the speaker expresses a dire sensibility.  This move serves to critique the nature of 
sympathy, as if noting the already textualized nature of the cult of sensibility.  These 
citations mark sensibility as an overly-cited affect that points to the failures of sympathy 
and the poem’s own inability to call up authentic feeling, even as it attempts to evoke 
sympathy or feeling in its readers.  A good example of this is the last line in the first 
sonnet, where Smith mentions “Pity’s melting eye” as a manifesto of sensibility that 
“those paint sorrow best—who feel it most!” (14).  Quoting the line from Pope’s “Eloisa 
to Abelard,” Smith already puts distance between her speaker and that speaker’s 
sensibility. 
47 For a good discussion of the relative values of the senses, see Gigante’s introduction to 
her book Taste. 
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and exchange.  Through this liquid economy, the speaker refuses the commodity culture 
of mere consumption and instead turns to the gift exchange of the aristocracy.  Rather 
than simply selling her poems to buy something to eat, Smith depicts herself as giving 
tears and begging for relief—in the form of numbness or readers’ patronage.  The poet 
must take in something besides food, something inedible, to transport herself to a state 
beyond bourgeois consumption.  These poems, however, attest to the fact that Smith 
cannot permanently reside in this anesthetic position precisely due to the temporary 
nature of the cure—she must repeatedly dose herself with nepenthe.  The drug’s status as 
both an inedible substance and a commodity helps the poet perform an exquisite 
awareness of both her physical conditions and the limitations of her body.48  
 It is in Smith’s next poem about the Downs, sonnet thirty-one, “Written in Farm 
Wood, South Downs, in May 1784,” that she first uses the word “taste.”  Appearing in 
the third edition of the sonnets (1786), this iteration refracts the liquid economy of the 
first two editions through the language of taste, which serves as a meta-discourse on the 
questions of consumption and sensibility already broached in the initial poems.  Like 
sonnet five, this poem begins by attempting to recreate a visual memory of the Downs, 
which might serve as a balm but ultimately fails. 
  Spring’s dewy hand on this fair summit weaves 
  The downy grass with tufts of Alpine flowers. 
  And shades the beechen slopes with tender leaves, 
  And leads the shepherd to his upland bowers, 
                                                
48 Smith herself used opium occasionally with her friend Henrietta O’Neill, who ended up 
dying from an opium overdose.  Her friend’s accidental achievement of quiescence 
further added to Smith’s pain in the loss of a dear friend and a wealthy benefactor. 
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  Strewn with wild thyme; while slow-descending showers 
  Feed the green ear, and nurse the future sheaves! 
  —Ah! blest the hind—whom no sad thoughts bereaves 
  Of the gay season’s pleasures!—All his hours 
  To wholesome labour given, or thoughtless mirth; 
  No pangs of sorrow past, or coming dread, 
  Bend his unconscious spirit down to earth, 
  Or chase calm slumbers from his careless head! 
  Ah! what to me can those dear days restore, 
  When scenes could charm that now I taste no more!   (31.1-14) 
The poem presents a happy shepherd sustained and nourished by the pastoral landscape.  
There he finds “wholesome labour” and “thoughtless mirth” (9) while the spring showers 
“Feed the green ear, and nurse the future sheaves!” (6).  This shepherd, a carefree hind, is 
“unconscious” of the “sorrow past, or coming dread” (12,11).  Existing in a perpetual 
present of the rejuvenating spring, the shepherd is “unconscious” of the suffering outside 
the idyllic pastoral setting.  Though corn can be nourished by the rain, Smith cannot feed 
off this land—the landscape cannot act as nursemaid to her woes.  In the final lines, she 
introduces herself into the sonnet by excluding herself from the very setting she has just 
described:  “Ah! what to me those dear days restore,/ When scenes could charm that now 
I taste no more!” (13-14).  Suddenly appearing in the couplet, Smith turns the sonnet 
back on herself, and the poem reveals itself to be not primarily about the shepherd but 
about her own inability to partake of the natural scenery of her childhood.  The couplet 
offers the possibility of restoration in the first line—the creation of a pastoral retreat 
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through the imagination’s use of a memory—only to relinquish that fantasy as the poem 
cruelly comes to a close.  Alienated from the landscape by her fallen middle class 
existence and resisting any easy alliance between “woman” and “nature,” the poet again 
refuses to regain Eden by consuming the pastoral. 
 Not only does Smith reject nature’s consolation and its sensory charms, but she 
also rebuffs the faculty of taste and the discourses of luxury and feminine consumption 
that were often attached to eighteenth-century women on their entrance into the public 
sphere.  Though as a poet of sensibility Smith might seem to stand in obvious relationship 
with some of the discourse on taste’s main tenets, she ultimately critiques empiricism for 
its inherent gender bias.  As critics have argued, the cult of sensibility was underwritten 
by empirical science that connected physical stimulation and sensitivity to taste; more 
sensitive people would likely have better taste.49  This also meant women could be more 
prone to emotional disorders like hysteria and to rabid consumerism, and much 
eighteenth-century conduct literature was written to correct these perceived tendencies.  
Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s program for taste still held sway even at the turn of 
the century, and in The Tatler and The Spectator, women often serve as natural models of 
taste, particularly when they are shopping or talking about dress, in a discourse that often 
circulated around the female body.50   
                                                
49 For the connections between empirical science and eighteenth-century sensibility see 
especially G. J. Barker-Benfield’s The Culture of Sensibility:  Sex and Society in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain.  See also Janet Todd’s Sensibility An Introduction and 
Jerome McGann’s The Poetics of Sensibility:  A Revolution in Literary Style. 
50 See Erin Mackie’s excellent discussions of fashion, dress and taste in both her study 
Market à la Mode:  Fashion, Commodity and Gender in The Tatler and The Spectator 




The concept of taste, in its journey from Addison to the nineteenth century is 
often credited with consolidating a middle class public sphere by educating readers in the 
ability to make appropriate consumer or aesthetic choices in a burgeoning free market.  
Their choices would signify their class interests and at the same time educate them in 
those values that reinforce a liberal, modern state.51  These “aesthetic narratives of 
acculturation,” as Marc Redfield terms them, were once available to Smith, as a child of 
the South Downs and a girl at boarding school exhibiting a flair for polite 
accomplishments like singing, acting and writing poetry.  Later, however, as an 
economically abject woman and a poet aspiring to high aesthetic poetry, Smith rejects 
these normative models of acculturation.  Her superlatively abject speaker tries to ally 
herself with a proto-Kantian high aesthetic of poetry over and against the unreflective 
consumption that often characterized bourgeois taste.  In this way, her poetry becomes a 
poetics of rejection, resisting—even as it appears to feed upon—sensation, emotion and 
experience that form subjective ideas of bourgeois taste. 
Newer sonnets, which Smith adds in subsequent editions (1786-89), begin to shift 
from representing a speaker numb to sensation to depicting aesthetic objects that are at 
once correlatives for numbness yet also objects of beauty independent of individual, 
subjective predilections like taste.  Several poems describing the ocean waves that border 
England’s southern coast entail descriptions of blankness, voids or melancholy bordering 
                                                
51 See especially Timothy Dykstal, “The Politics of Taste in the Spectator” and Marc 
Redfield’s introduction to The Politics of Aesthetics.  Dykstal argues that Addison’s ideas 
about taste helped to shift the main activity of the public sphere from action to “making,” 
the making or selection of consumer goods that would, in turn, signify a class.  Redfield, 
on the other end of the period, traces the political ends of aesthetic discourse through 




on death.  In sonnet 44 mentioned earlier, “Written in the church-yard at Middleton in 
Sussex,” the stormy ocean and windy climate, which represent classic tropes of 
sensibility and passion, eventually unearth bones from the cemetery:  “Lo! their bones 
whiten in the frequent wave,/ But vain to them the winds and waters rave” (9-10).  
Similarly the Laplander in sonnet 53 looks wistfully at the Tenglio river:  “O’er the blank 
void he looks with hopeless pain” (13).  Both poems emote a melancholic desire for 
eternal rest.  Even more importantly, death becomes a signifier of the absence of 
sensibility and its emotional pain.  With its heaving waves, moving water might first 
seem to act as a sign of this sensibility, yet as a cold, insensible body that looks nearly 
infinite, the water begins to represent a kind of abstract void or space that replaces the 
embodied charm of the pastoral landscape.  The ocean’s repeated motion also chafes 
bones into a clean white slate, a figure of beauty based in the representation of its 
whiteness.  These images of death verge on a kind of universality and abstraction that 
place aesthetics, as Kant did, outside personal proclivity or feeling and into a subjective 
but formal judgment of the object—or a space bereft of objects altogether. 
Smith develops the imagery of insensible voids even more fully in sonnet 62, 
originally published as a sonnet written by Orlando in The Old Manor House (1793), but 
incorporated into the Elegiac Sonnets in Volume II, first published in 1797.  The speaker 
passes through a farm village covered in snow, which becomes the object of his lament:   
While thus I wander, cheerless and unblest, 
And find in change of place but change of pain; 
In tranquil sleep the village laborers rest, 
And taste that quiet I pursue in vain! 
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Hush’d is the hamlet now, and faintly gleam 
The dying embers, from the casement low 
Of the thatch’d cottage; while the Moon’s wan beam 
Lends a new lustre to the dazzling snow. 
O’er the cold waste, amid the freezing night, 
Scarce heeding whither, desolate I stray;  
For me, pale Eye of Evening, thy soft light 
Leads to no happy home; my weary way 
Ends but in sad vicissitudes of care; 
I only fly from doubt—to meet despair! 
When the language of taste appears again in this sonnet, it is the tranquil numbness of 
sleep and quiet that the speaker cannot experience.  As opposed to the more sensible 
consumption in the earlier poem, here what the speaker now wishes to taste is a vacancy 
represented by the stillness and silence of the village at night, if not by the white 
moonlight and snow—“the cold waste, amid the freezing night” (11).  Though the winter 
pastoral scene—the “hush’d hamlet” and the snow “dazzling” in the moonlight—seems 
to offer comfort, the speaker is only passing through.  The village represents a distant 
idyllic retreat and the fantasy of a happy home, which the speaker cannot possess along 
his or her “weary way.”  This happiness depends not on pleasure but a lack of feeling or 
thought—peace, quiet and sleep.   
This poem vacates not only the consumption and sensibility represented in 
previous poems but also gender itself.  As Anne Meyers has suggested, this sonnet, 
voiced by the male Orlando and later appropriated by Smith as a female poet in another 
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collection of Elegiac Sonnets, presents an androgynous speaker vacated of gender.  The 
poem similarly plays with affect by vacating the winter landscape of people and the 
feeling attached to them.  The weather—the snow and the temperature that keeps the 
snow cold—provides a kind of physical sensation that can negate or move beyond feeling 
altogether, both physical sensation and emotions.52  The freezing night is physically 
painful, yet the dazzling power of the cold rests in its ability to burn through sensation 
and numb the speaker.  Intense physical sensation—like the effusive sonnets 
themselves—actually provides a means of moving beyond sensation and emotion toward 
a space where the body can no longer pose such a threat to the speaker.   
Like the move beyond gender, the speaker travels completely beyond the body to 
establish an abstract retreat that appears as an anti-pastoral.  With its self-quotation of the 
language of taste, the poem ironizes that language altogether, since the speaker desires 
not sensory stimulation but something purely beyond the senses.  What the poem 
provides after the first quatrain is exactly this something else:  a vision that doesn’t play 
on the senses (as the descriptions of the Downs do) but outlines an abstract form of 
beauty.  We might see this abstraction in Smith’s choice to drain the landscape of color.  
In eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, color was often subservient to line.53  As Jeffrey 
Robinson argues, line was analogous to the highest form of imagination in poetry: “The 
outline corresponds to traditional abstract form in poetry and a focus on the precision of 
identity expressed by the lyrical subject” (6).  Painting the landscape white and devoid of 
                                                
52 I take my distinctions between emotion, feeling, sensation and passion from Rei 
Terada’s Feeling in Theory:  “Feeling is a capacious term that connotes both 
physiological sensations (affects) and psychological states (emotions)” (4). 
53 Jeffrey Robinson similarly discusses how line and color relate to the categories of 
imagination and fancy (The Fancy in British Romanticism 5-6). 
 
58  
color, Smith emphasizes the line of her drawing, or the figure the poem makes, the path 
the speaker takes through the landscape, from passion and the childhood pastoral to 
numbness and the shape of a landscape outlined in snow.  The sonnet effectively creates a 
form of beauty vacated of its painful content.  Like many other sonnets Smith wrote, it 
seemingly pleads for death as the only way out of her financial and emotional problems.  
Her solution, in the poem’s figure, suggests that what Smith longs for is the death of 
subjectivity into an aesthetics not based on a subject’s individual perception but the free, 
formal beauty of the object. 
 It is this way of constructing beauty that resembles Kant’s ideas, not the least of 
which is his repudiation of empiricism.54  For Kant in the Critique of Judgment, universal 
aesthetic judgments should be based solely on “the mere form of purposiveness” in an 
object, or that object’s presentation (66); overly invested or emotional subjects could not 
retain the objectivity needed to look at the form of the object without bias.  As Kant 
writes, “Any taste remains barbaric if its liking requires that charms and emotions be 
mingled in, let alone if it makes these the standard of its approval” (69, Kant’s emphasis).  
If we take Smith’s claims about moving beyond despair seriously, then her aesthetic 
vision, at least in the earlier sonnets, might also be located in an idyllic and redemptive 
idea of the mind resisting the reality that insists on impinging on its imaginative power.  
But if Smith carves out respite from emotion—in a cold, white, distant landscape—then it 
is a vacancy that begs to be filled.  The cold will only momentarily numb her before it 
                                                
54 We might also think of Shaftesbury who, in his writing on taste, talks about the need to 
evacuate social concerns in order to arrive at disinterested judgments of taste.  See 
Gigante for a good discussion of Shaftesbury’s obsession literally evacuating and 
emptying the body of taint to arrive at a personal disinterestedness “from which all 
idiosyncrasies of birth, habit or circumstance have been purged” (qtd. in Gigante 49). 
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becomes, again, too painful.  In her vacillation between sensibility and senselessness, she 
charts a dialectic that often traps her in an eternal present of poverty and suffering, 
longing for an aesthetic that might be only marginally possible and whose certainty needs 
to be repeatedly envisioned.55   
Smith develops this idea elsewhere in her sonnets, where her inability to taste 
lands her in a state of tastelessness, signaling her desire to live outside class boundaries, 
particularly the middle class association with acculturated taste.  Like Keats, Smith 
attempts to shirk her middle class status with an aristocratic fantasy forged through 
poetics.  Though in Smith’s case her need to transcend class often resembles a middle 
class ideological desire, her persistence in linking elite notions of beauty with hinds or 
the destitute underlines her rejection of middle class consumption as a route beyond class 
distinctions.  This tendency toward classlessness situated in the ability to make objective, 
universal aesthetic judgments reformulates the sonnet as a lyrical space that can vacate 
the narratives of class descent and the other kinds of personal histories that might 
impinge on the poet.  In sonnet 73, “To a querulous acquaintance,” Smith takes time to 
chastise a more affluent friend for her complaining about her own pains.  Scolding this 
                                                
55 This aesthetics, moreover, represents abstract beauty as a means of routing not only 
gender and consumerism but also the incipient and hegemonic demands of bourgeois 
identity.  It is no coincidence that Smith writes a sonnet about seeking refuge from 
bourgeois taste in the voice of Orlando from The Old Manor House.  In the novel, 
Orlando is presented as the possible heir to his aunt Lady Rayland’s old manor, though 
his blood is also tainted with merchant-class roots on his mother’s side.  Orlando enters 
the winter scene while serving as an army officer, attempting to gain enough manly 
military experience to live up to Lady Rayland’s class ideals for the future heir of 
Rayland Hall.  His view of the scene unallied with sensation is ultimately related to his 
desire to white-wash his past of its bourgeois stain and either become fully aristocratic, or 
perhaps exhibit a kind of classlessness.  Orlando’s ability to write poems and form 
abstract aesthetic judgments goes a long way toward allying him with a Romantic 




woman who has prospered enough to walk “o’er level paths, with moss and flow’rets 
strewn” and sleep in “a downy bed/ With roses scatter’d,” Smith reminds this 
acquaintance that there are many women who make do with much less fortunate 
circumstances (2, 3-4).  Unlike those ladies who still live and sleep among floral, tranquil 
country spaces, Smith and others “Taste all the sad vicissitudes of grief;/ ... steep in tears 
their scanty bread” (8-9).  These abject women are forced to eat the inedible—bread 
drenched with salt water.  They do not even have the luxury most women of modest taste 
possess—a poor, but well-dressed meal.56  If they are to be nourished at all it must be by 
that which is both tasteless and inconsumable.   
It is precisely her fall from the middle class she was married into that allows 
Smith to take up something beyond aesthetics as taste epitomized by classy women.  In a 
last poem using this language, she depicts a “woodsman” who sleeps after a long day’s 
work and, unlike the poet, can find a momentary respite from life and labor.  The poet 
laments:  “Would I could taste, like this unthinking hind,/ A sweet forgetfulness of 
human care” (11-12).  If we take the hind to be the male farm laborer, then her lament 
signals a longing for country living and unalienated labor, or perhaps more realistically, a 
desire for the carefree life of the leisure class.  Smith’s somewhat abject representation of 
the “unthinking” laborer may reflect the aristocratic leanings of her aesthetics, yet when 
she revises the formulation in terms of herself, she pointedly uses the term “hind.”  This 
word, which also means a female deer like those that populated pastoral poetry and the 
                                                
56 Penny Bradshaw, in her discussion of Smith’s later Jacobin novel Desmond, argues that 
Smith’s later prose critiques not simply the excess of the French aristocrats but also the 
British middle class politics of consumption, whose excess was necessarily based on the 
hunger of the poor.  Smith, Bradshaw notes, was somewhat of a snob (n12), and her 
commentary reveals Smith privileging a certain kind of poverty that becomes linked with 
high aesthetics over and against bourgeois emulative consumption. 
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Early Modern English sonnet tradition, reminds readers of the kind of predatory 
consumption surrounding women that was endemic to the pastoral sonnet tradition.  In 
sonnets like Wyatt’s “Whoso list to hunt,” the male speaker cheerfully pursues his prey, 
who herself is a sensible but unreflective part of the pastoral landscape.  Smith’s use of 
the “hind” when connecting the laborer to herself in place of Orlando’s “village laborer” 
accentuates the gendered problems with the discourse of taste, consumption and luxury.  
Rather than abusing the “hind,” Smith uses him figuratively to critique the traditional 
associations between femininity and “unthinking” consumption.  
The Sonnets reveal Smith in the process of forging a lyric from the traditional 
sonnet—a lyric that provides a space outside the normative, often pastoral narratives of 
female acculturation in the eighteenth century.  Her execution of this move repeatedly 
through many sonnets, as well as her fall back into the language of sensibility and 
sensation in others, foregrounds the extent to which her project of aesthetics is marked by 
impossibility in the Sonnets.  It is this impossibility, however, that Smith will employ as a 
fruitful antinomy in her final epic work, Beachy Head.  There vacancy will become less a 
figure of a continually rejected past than of a future constantly created.  The impossibility 
of ridding bodily concerns from aesthetics will be transformed into the possibility of 
using the language of the market and the structures of Enlightenment reason and 
conceptual law to surpass their strict teleologies and create a string of suspended futures, 
an Enlightenment-to-come. 
 
Beachy Head and Narratives of Trade:  “Come and behold the nothingness of all” 
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Smith’s critique of the interlocking discourses of acculturation, consumption, 
taste, and class come to a head in her final poem, when she turns her focus on history and 
its imperialist and nationalist tendencies.  Her problems with the aesthetics of taste as 
consumption become writ large in this work through a meditation on international trade 
and its effects on the possibilities for universal freedom and ethical living.  Set on a 
Brighton cliff overlooking the English Channel, Beachy Head is often seen as the 
feminist version of the Romantic pastoral, a lush, botanical antithesis to Wordsworth’s 
transcendent nature.  The poem routes the mountain’s sublime status through the minute 
fossils and sedimentary materials that make up England’s dramatic Southern coastline, 
and Judith Pascoe and other scholars have shown how Smith delves into the empirical, 
material realities of the natural world—from the catalogues of local botany to laments 
about how the shepherd might make an honest living in an increasingly consumer 
culture.57  For these reasons Labbe suggests that in Beachy Head Smith showcases the 
apex of feminine intellectual capabilities at the turn of the nineteenth century (144).   
If the poem tries to recreate a real, empirical encounter with nature, then it also 
reproduces the violent geological and international forces that create England’s coastline.  
As Smith describes the cliff in the first lines of the poem: 
  Fancy should go forth, 
 And represent the strange and awful hour 
                                                
57 See especially Judith Pascoe, “Female Botanists and the Poetry of Charlotte Smith”; 
Donnell R. Ruwe, “Charlotte Smith’s Sublime; Feminine Poetics, Botany, and Beachy  
Head”; Kandi Tayebi, “Undermining the Eighteenth-Century Pastoral:  Rewriting the 
Poet’s Relationship to Nature in Charlotte Smith’s Poetry”; Anne D. Wallace, 
“Picturesque Fossils, Sublime Geology?  The Crisis of Authority in Charlotte Smith’s 




 Of vast concussion;  
[…]   
[that] from the continent  
 Eternally divided this green isle. 
Beachy Head represents less the accumulation and aggregation of positivistic 
understandings about the land, English history, or the role of the poet, and more a 
confrontation with this first vast divide and others that echo it through the poem.  It 
comes to figure the rift of possibility when material reality, history, and the very language 
used to articulate both are ruptured and thrown into question.  Though others have 
discussed Smith’s use of aesthetic discourses such as the sublime, the beautiful, the 
picturesque and the pastoral,58 she does not rest in her critique of these aesthetic 
discourses but uses them to present a case for the aporetic nature of language and of 
history itself.  In doing so, she develops her aesthetics as a practice of radical self-
critique. 
 Smith vacates imperialist and naturalist histories in order to arrive at a space of 
lyrical possibility—the right to imagine a future unallied to embodied identities, 
consumer trade and its culture, or the trappings of nationalism.  She achieves this through 
a series of interlocking moves.  First she articulates the history of imperial invaders on 
Britain’s soil only to show how their projects failed in the ever-changing “pathless 
topsoil” of the South Down.  Though Smith wants to see the pastoral as a space free from 
                                                
58 Donnelle Ruwe has contended that the poem works to deconstruct both the sublime 
located in the stupendous cliff and also the beautiful or picturesque found in the poem’s 
pastoral descriptions of the mountain’s surface, and Kandi Tayebi has similarly argued 
that Smith unravels the idealized eighteenth-century pastoral by populating the landscape 
with real shepherd figures. 
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the concerns of trade and empire, as she tried to free the pastoral from consumer taste in 
the Sonnets, in Beachy Head she takes a different tactic.  Rather than rejecting consumer 
language, she uses the capitalistic rhetoric of contingency and excess to exceed itself and 
the confines of consumer ideology.  Transforming the pastoral into a space riddled with 
accidents and chance, she uses these aesthetic strategies of “free beauty” to rethink larger 
concepts of ethics, justice and universality.  She finally returns to meditate on the liminal 
space of the channel’s cliff, its vantage point in the global world during the Napoleonic 
Wars, and its inhabitant, a lone hermit. 
As a figure for this kind of permeability, the cliff top itself is anything but 
immobile or stolid.  The first hundred lines or so of the poem depicts Beachy Head 
during the transitional (and cyclical) moments of sunrise and then sunset.  Its drama 
resides not in its jagged rocks, its height or girth, but in its effect on the air and water 
around it, particularly in the numerous descriptions of echoing sounds and alternating 
currents of air and water.  As the sun rises on the scene, Smith displays “the rippling tide 
of flood”: 
rough hollows echo to the voice 
Of the gray choughs, and ever restless daws, 
With clamour, not unlike the chiding hounds, 
While the lone shepherd, and his baying dog, 
Drive to thy turfy crest his bleating flock.  (24-28) 
The entire scene is in motion, particularly the bleating and baying animals, who speak in 
alternating pulses of sound.  In the distance a sloop “catches the light and variable airs/ 
That but a little crisp the summer sea/ Dimpling its tranquil surface” (34-36).  The winds 
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make tiny indents in the surface of the water and variegate what would be a calm, clear 
summer sea.  It would be easy to say these descriptions make the passage blandly lyrical, 
sketching the beauties of the cliff by making them quietly alive.  However, the alternation 
and motion of the water and air reverberate the “vast concussion” Smith has just narrated.  
If we consider the epic rift between the two landmasses as the first vacancy Smith carves 
out of the landscape in the poem, then the braying and the dimpling start to seem like 
echoes or tremors of that first vacancy.  The animals and the air create their own pockets 
of nothing that either become filled in with clamor or leave little rifts in the ocean.  The 
entire landscape vibrates with possibility. 
Beachy Head, even more than Shelley’s Mont Blanc, presents an ironic figure of 
the sublime or the natural Romantic monument, which would allegedly shore up 
subjectivity and imagination by its secure status as an object.59  As the poem’s central 
figure, Beachy Head is not only placed in doubt as dependent upon the imagination, as 
Shelley’s skepticism does to Mont Blanc, but it serves as a monument to the possibility—
and hope—that even the most grounded of natural elements (a mountain, a national 
coastline) remains unfixed.  Rather than remaining silent or still like Smith’s vacant 
anhedonia in the sonnets, Beach Head offers a vibrant vacancy, one that oscillates 
between material nature and the future that might come to fill it.   
 Before envisioning what this future might be, Smith has quite a lot to say about 
the past.  Narrating her version of English history, she examines the various layers of 
history and sediment that make up the cliff wall, from sea to cliff top.  Even before she 
begins, however, she gives us a model of history that resembles a palimpsest: 
                                                
59 See Frances Ferguson, “What the Mountain Said” for her now classic reading of 
Shelley’s “Mont Blanc.” 
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     Contemplation here, 
  High on her throne of rock, aloof may sit, 
  And bid recording Memory unfold 
  Her scroll voluminous—bid her retrace 
  The period  (117-121). 
Like the ancient manuscript scroll, historical memory will be written, scraped away, and 
written again on the same sheet of parchment.  Here memory recreates history and 
poetry—the epic writing on the scrolls.60  The manuscript she goes on to select contains 
the eras of English history made up of the Danish, Roman, and Norman invasions of 
England.  These histories, the “contemplation” of Smith’s brand of lyrical-epic poetry, 
are written as the repetition of history, incursions that substitute for each other as 
instances of imperial conquest that both rupture and then consolidate English identity.  If 
Beachy Head had set out to supply a linear or Enlightenment progressive history of the 
English, then Smith might have narrated the Roman invasion first, then the Danish and 
ended with the Norman.  Instead, she begins with the Norman invasion and its resonances 
with the contemporary conflict between the English and French, then goes back to the 
Roman invasion during the last century BC, and finally ends with a reference to the pirate 
Danes (eighth to tenth century AD): 
  The pirate Dane, who from his circular camp 
                                                
60 In Romanticism, Lyricism and History, Sarah Zimmerman argues that Smith’s earlier 
use of memory in the Sonnets documents how the poet’s growth in this poem becomes 
the historian’s ability to recover past social history.  For Zimmerman, the lyric practice 
associated with memory services Smith’s larger historical project, defining memory as a 
straightforward process of recollection (65).  I would instead suggest that Smith’s use of 




  Bore in destructive robbery, fire and sword 
  Down thro’ the vale, sleeps unremember’d here; 
  And here, beneath the green sward, rests alike  
  The savage native, who his acorn meal 
  Shar’d with the herds, that ranged the pathless woods; 
  And the centurion, who on these wide hills 
  Encamping, planted the Imperial Eagle.  (425-33) 
This plot of earth holds the histories of the native Britons, the Danes, and the Romans, 
who all lay buried in the layers of sediment on Beachy Head’s shores.  The irony of the 
passage, that all three are “unremembered,” emphasizes the extent to which their histories 
(the fossils and sediments both literally and figuratively buried in the mountain) have 
been erased or leveled by the “pathless” surface of the earth atop the cliff.  Moreover, 
despite the purported goal of these invasions—to colonize the native inhabitants in order 
to rob the land of its natural resources—the conquerors end up buried under the land as 
fossilized ruins of their imperialist projects.   
As Anne D. Wallace points out, Smith may not have been party to any one 
geological theory floated during her time, but the historical narratives she unearths 
resemble the strata that early geologists were beginning to uncover.  Smith surrounds the 
previous passage with some radical statements about how retracing various levels of 
sedimentary history erases as much as creates history.  In this view, history is built from 
layers of sediment constantly intermixing and radically erasing one another.  Looking 
upon elephant fossils from the Roman Claudius’ invasion, Smith chastises all past and 
future invaders of English soil: 
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    Hither, Ambition come! 
  Come and behold the nothingness of all 
  For which you carry thro’ the oppressed Earth, 
  War, and its train of horrors—see where tread 
  The innumerous hoofs of flocks above the works 
  By which the warrior sought to register 
  His glory, and immortalize his name[.]— 
  [...] 
  All, with the lapse of Time, have passed away, 
  Even as the clouds, with dark and dragon shapes, 
  Or like vast promontories crown’d with towers, 
  Cast their broad shadows on the downs; then sail 
  Far to the northward, and their transient gloom 
  Is soon forgotten.  (419-25, 434-9) 
These hoof prints, which act as signs of the Roman Empire’s gigantic ambition, also turn 
out to be the signs of its inevitable fall when they vanish from the surface of the 
landscape.61  Here Smith verges on satire, mocking the imperial claims of the Romans, 
their “unwieldy” elephants, the epic mode and the linear, teleological narrative that often 
becomes history.  The poem recounts national history and origins precisely to reject 
                                                
61 Smith’s view of the Romans would seem to oppose Edward Gibbon’s arguments about 
the fall of the Roman Empire, which Smith read (Fletcher 80, 95).  Though Smith might 
agree with Gibbon that as with the Romans, an effeminate, English aristocracy was 
already corrupting the foundation of English Empire, Smith here satirizes imperial, 
masculine ambition itself—the very drive to make history by conquering peoples and 
claiming a piece of land as property.   
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them,62 and in the process posits the very writing of history as a kind of perpetual erasure 
of one narrative for another, just as shadows temporarily darken the blank page of the sky 
and then disperse.63  Though Smith rejects the imperial history and piracy that these 
invaders represent, by transforming them into the beachy sediment of the cliff, Smith is 
still able to find a place for them on Britain’s shores.  The original colonial violence that 
the Romans and Danes inflicted on the native Saxons has been well repaid by death’s 
own brutal hospitality, the most universal equalizer.   
Smith’s version of history essentially vacates historical narratives in favor of the 
“pathless” ground, or the mountain’s unstable surface.  Toward the end of the poem, 
English histories eventually devolve into pastoral descriptions of the Downs, populated 
by fossils, flowers, smugglers, or shepherds.  The pastoral, secured from imperial 
invaders, potentially becomes a site for the lyrical imagination, temporarily freed from 
narratives of invasion and acquisition.  This lyrical topsoil remains open and hospitable 
even to antagonistic invaders and their ruined imperial or material desires.  As opposed to 
the necessities of history, the lyric becomes a space of future contingency and synchronic 
possibility. 
                                                
62 I follow Brian Wilkie’s account of the epic in Romantic Poets and The Epic Tradition.  
Rather than viewing it as a genre, Wilkie sees the epic as a shared tradition of literary 
characteristics. Its main attributes include the use of tradition that typically rejects the 
past (the “epic paradox”), a display of heroism, or a code of conduct, as well as the 
imitation of various conventions like the ordeal-journey or supernatural agencies.  There 
has not yet been a thorough discussion of Beachy Head as an epic poem—or as a 
Romantic epic, where the journey is an internal one, and the hero Byronic or otherwise 
conflicted.  Smith’s poem does not, at first glance, appear to use any of the typical epic 
conventions she must have known about through reading Milton, Spencer, Ariosto and 
others.  It does attempt a history of Britain, and Smith’s copious descriptions of flora and 
fauna might qualify as imitations of the listing or series of descriptions in other epic 
works.   
63 Paul de Man most famously proposed this version of history as narrative erasure.  See 




A New Language for the Pastoral:  Free Beauty and the Contingent Language of 
Capitalism 
Before arriving at the moment of lyric possibility, when the poem climaxes into a 
series of disappearances, the poet first must reconceptualize the pastoral itself, because 
though it is a location that purports to offer a lyrical escape from trade, conquest and law, 
the pastoral is nonetheless a topos still very much attached to the material problems of 
luxury and property.  The poet does exploit the pastoral as a retreat from narratives of 
invasion, trade, and luxury but not as one might think.  Rather than simply chastising 
market culture’s ability to affect people’s taste for the countryside, Smith instead 
defamiliarizes the pastoral using rhetorical tactics that we might associate with 
capitalism.  First, her pastoral descriptions eschew nature as a vehicle for natural 
resemblances, ultimately endowing the poet with choices that release her from necessary 
comparisons dictated by nature.  Smith often compares the natural world to man-made or 
market items, and this fungibility of luxury goods and natural objects in her poetic 
descriptions reveals the contingency inherent in metaphorical language as a mode of 
exchange, even in seemingly exact representations of nature.  Second, her luxuriant 
descriptions often incorporate poetic excesses that imitate the speculation in new markets 
and mass production.  The intense materiality of Smith’s over-abundant descriptions ends 
up transcending representations of actual flowers and vines and instead expresses an 
indeterminate but formal design.  By uniting poetic practice with capitalist praxis, she 
pointedly pushes the language of capitalism to exceed its own laws and to build upon the 
language of free beauty begun in the Sonnets.   
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Like Kant’s ideas of beauty as purposive purposelessness, Smith’s descriptions of 
the pastoral use excess and contingency to free the pastoral—and its saleable poetics—
from value based on use.  As a sign of lyrical futurity, Smith’s new version of the 
pastoral partakes in Derrida’s notions of “unconditional hospitality”—here a hospitality 
to concepts.64  Not unlike Smith’s violent hospitality to colonial invaders, rhetorical 
hospitality allows her to twist capitalistic rhetoric into a language that surpasses Kant’s 
aesthetics and violates capitalism’s conceptual teleologies.65  Where Smith initially 
attempted to make aesthetic judgment a function of the objective, white-washed 
landscape in the Sonnets, in Beachy Head she pushes aesthetics past the formal beauty of 
empty, open spaces toward a kind of free beauty that formally enacts and conceptualizes 
indeterminacy and incalculability.   
She first takes up her soapbox against trade at the beginning of the poem with a 
common eighteenth-century diatribe pitting natural beauty against artifice, or natural 
resources transformed into consumer goods.  Beachy Head’s waters become troubled 
when the speaker spies a “ship of commerce, richly freighted” off the coast, carrying 
“gaudes and baubles” (42, 58).  In a series of comparisons describing the seascape after 
the ship enters the picture, she pits the “pure air” of Heaven, “the sound of the seas,” and 
the “gay harmony of birds” against the “fretted stop, or modulated airs/ of vocal science” 
                                                
64 As I will discuss in more detail below, Derrida uses the concept of unconditional 
hospitality in both Rogues:  Two Essays on Reason (149-50) and Of Hospitality. 
65 Though Kant has often caught slack for the teleological nature of his supposedly “free” 
beauty, Derrida argues to the contrary in The Truth in Painting.  Similarly, Robert 
Kaufman has argued that Adorno reads Kant as privileging the aesthetic as a “boot-up 
disk for conceptual thought” that involves “a necessary eschewal of determination-by-
extant-concepts” (711, 714).  See his “Red Kant, or the Persistence of the Third Critique 
in Adorno and Jameson.”  Whatever views one takes of the “purposive,” ideological 
motivation behind Kant’s aesthetic, my argument is that Smith uses her aporia as a means 
of imagining an indeterminate free beauty.  
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(60, 62, 63, 67).  These natural sounds, according to the poet, are proof of “unadulterated 
taste” as opposed to the ostensibly vitiated taste of viewers accustomed to luxury items 
and tutored voices.  The contrast between natural and human music, or more generally 
organic and man-made beauty, carries into the next comparison between “the brightest 
gems/ Glancing resplendent on the regal crown” and the colors of a sunset over Beachy 
Head. 
    There, transparent gold 
  Mingles with ruby tints, and sapphire gleams, 
  And colours, such as Nature through her works 
  Shews only in the ethereal canopy. 
  Thither aspiring Fancy fondly soars, 
  Wandering sublime thro’ visionary vales, 
  Where bright pavilions rise, and trophies, fann’d 
  By airs celestial; and adorn’d with wreaths 
  Of flowers that bloom amid elysian bowers.  (81-89) 
This passage contains two paradoxical moves.  First, in order to depict the natural beauty 
of the skies, Smith relies on the language of gems.  Rather than those jewels ostensibly 
mined and imported from the colonies, perhaps sapphire-rich India or gold-bearing 
America, Smith places these gems as signifiers of nature’s uncommodified, decorative, 
regal beauty.  Second, this image of the sky becomes the basis of a Spenserian, Edenic 
bower.  Though filled with wreaths and flowers, the “ethereal canopy” and the “visionary 
vale” must be found in the open spaces of Fancy’s immaterial vision.  In both cases, 
Smith builds a poetry based on the paradoxical nature of resemblances.  If she articulates 
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the free and natural in terms of the commodified, then commodified goods also end up in 
the service of descriptions of immateriality.  Is Smith attempting to re-materialize the 
heavenly sublime, or is she abstracting empirical flowers into immaterial visionary vales?  
This paradox highlights the poet’s ability to manipulate representational language—and 
our perceptions of nature—into contradictory and non-coinciding positions.  The more 
the poet seemingly aims at making nature coincide with itself (the colors of the sky and 
the minerals in the earth), the more nature seems to resemble artifice (commodified 
gems).  The extent to which the poet can match the immaterial with the material 
emphasizes the poet’s ability to manipulate contingencies into metaphors that 
retroactively naturalize resemblance.  What seems to be the hand of God making natural 
associations is really only the poet’s dexterity.   
 Rather than securing poetic riches through a necessary connection to material 
nature, both nature and poetry become examples of speculation.  Just as gems enable 
speculative trade, Smith’s poetics venture into a speculative mode where customary value 
or associations detach themselves from material things, leaving her free to imagine poetic 
goods whose ship is yet to arrive.  This is not to say that Smith endorses the rapacious 
speculative economy that underwrote the slave trade or imperial looting, and she provides 
evidence of this stance in a later passage she writes condemning the commodification of 
slaves.  Neither does she use speculation’s abstraction of value to typify the world into 
insurable, averaged quantities—a prime characteristic of the eighteenth-century 
speculative imagination, as Ian Baucom argues.66  Rather, her abstractions loosen natural 
                                                
66 See Baucom’s discussion of speculative epistemologies and the speculative 




descriptions from their material moorings.  The fungibility of commodities and nature 
allows the poet some room for reflection, choice, and chance combinations in her 
comparisons, enabling the imagination to free itself from normative speculations in 
property. 
 Smith brings up this issue of the contingency of comparisons inherent in 
metaphorical language again in her much discussed section on geology.  There she 
wonders how it is that seashell fossils found in the cliffside look like oysters and 
mollusks, or, as she says, are “seeming of resembling substance” (375).  Her thoughts 
about nature’s resemblances, as other commentators have argued, lend themselves to a 
discussion of aesthetics and how aesthetics might represent the conflict between 
empirical and idealist traditions of thinking. 67  They also and more broadly implicate the 
contingent nature of language itself.  The preface to this section more than implies that 
Smith wants to delve into a meta-discourse on the relationships between art and nature, 
poetry and natural vistas: 
  Those widely spreading views, mocking alike 
  The Poet and the Painter’s utmost art. 
  And still, observing objects more minute, 
  Wondering remark the strange and foreign forms 
  Of sea-shells; with the pale calcareous soil 
Mingled, and seeming of resemblance.  (370-5) 
                                                
67 Ruwe reads these seashells as Smith’s statement about an empirical and minute version 
of the sublime, which would amount to a statement about feminine aesthetics.  Anne 
Wallace has gone a step further to suggest that competing views of the picturesque and 
sublime working in this passage reveal the aporetic nature of a sublime created on 
empirical terms.  See also Kelley’s reading of the shells and their relationship to Smith’s 
advocacy on grand versus local history in the poem. 
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The questions she goes on to ask about these shells is even more startling, taken as a 
referendum on the status of language:   
Does Nature then  
Mimic, in wanton mood, fantastic shapes,  
of Bivalves, and inwreathed volutes, that cling 
To the dark sea-rock of the wat’ry world? 
Or did this range of chalky mountains once 
Form a vast bason where the Ocean waves 
Swell’d fathomless? (378-84).   
If Nature mocks the painter’s ability to create an apt resemblance, then nature also 
encounters this problem when it mimics itself.  Like the poet’s use of the sky to strip 
gems of their material nature and rip them from their familiar commodified relationships, 
the poet again trumps nature by posing parts of the natural world as separated from other 
parts and only brought together by resemblance.  The poet asks whether nature resembles 
itself by mere chance or because it was once an organic whole whose parts are now 
separated by geological time and continental space.  Brought into such proximity with 
comments about the poet’s ability to make resemblances herself, these questions also 
seem to be about the accidents of language—and the unanswered possibility that 
resemblances are merely unacknowledged contingency.   
Straddling both sides of the vast concussion, the poet might have easily answered 
the question, telling the reader that indeed fossils are the self-same substance as the cliffs; 
instead, she leaves the question open to the possibility that linguistic representations offer 
not naturalism or realism but contingency.  If Smith rejects luxury—and the versions of 
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taste that oversee its production—then she rejects commodity culture not for nature but 
for poetry itself.  Ironically, it is nature, with its insistence on natural associations and 
inherent relationships between its parts, that begins to appear determinative and 
teleological within the confines of the pastoral.  The fungibility of commodities, on the 
other hand, allows the poet some room for reflection, choice and chance combinations in 
her comparisons.  Writing nature as mediated through the accidents of poetry—like the 
accidents of continental plate tectonics, Smith reshapes nature into whatever she wants it 
to be.  
Commodities, of course, have their own teleologies ending in the hands of 
consumers, since by definition goods are always circumscribed by exchange value or use.  
Smith mobilizes a second rhetorical tactic, that of excess, to propel poetry beyond these 
problems with value.  In many of the passages where she describes her formative walks 
through the countryside, she reaches toward beauty that approaches a quality of freedom 
through its lush variation: 
   bordering unfrequented lanes 
  Bowered with wild roses, and the clasping woodbine 
  Where purple tassels of the tangling vetch 
  With bittersweet, and bryony inweave, 
  And the dew fills the silver bindweed’s cups— 
  I loved to trace the brooks   (349-54) 
Through repeatedly describing this weaving and tangling, Smith engages in creating the 
kind of beauty that transcends the material qualities of the flowers.  Rather than praising 
their smell, or even their colors, she emphasizes the eye’s ability to trace the vines and 
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brooks, drawing their line for us, outlining their form.  As she describes them, these 
tangles of flowers begin to resemble Kant’s examples of free beauty as borders of vines:  
“free delineations, outlines intertwined with one another without design and called 
foliage” (41) and “the delineations à la grecque, foliage for borders or wall papers” (66).  
Such patterns exhibit freedom through the excess and contingency of their design, 
eluding any recognizable form.  In doing so they sustain the free play of the imagination 
and represent the form of form itself without reference to any kind of use.    According to 
Kant, this quasi-conceptual judgment represents “a lawfulness without a law” (92), and as 
such Smith looks to a kind of beauty that adheres to a certain conceptual law of free play, 
yet at the same time characteristically exceeds itself as well as the teleologies or 
structures such a law might require.68   
These patterns of flowers in part gain their abstract, formal quality from that 
profusion of detail so characteristic of Smith’s botanical landscapes.  If a landscape’s 
beauty is based on the purposeless form of the flowers, then this beauty also depends on 
the poet’s propensity—and ability—to manufacture an additional wealth of flowers, 
vines, and plants into a poetic profusion.  Even Smith’s copious footnotes listing the 
botanical names for the various flowers heighten this sense of excess and variation.  On 
the one hand, these new names create the feeling that more flowers are populating the 
scene than it can hold.  On the other, the poet’s imagination seems to supply a greater 
bulk of floral species than the land actually displays.  Beachy Head’s descriptive 
abundance appears to surpass even the quantities of gems and slaves involved in 
                                                
68 For another discussion of floral borders and the paradox of Kantian disinterested 
subjective aesthetic judgment, see Christina Lupton’s article, “Walking on Flowers:  the 
Kantian Aesthetics of Hard Times.” 
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speculative commerce, as if Smith is juxtaposing the wealth of national resources with 
Asian and African exotic luxuries.   
These sketches of natural flora and fauna, coming at the end of a poem vacating 
foreign, imperialistic commerce, seem part and parcel of the explosion of consumer 
culture, including the acquisitiveness that defined middle class culture during this period. 
69  Historian Maxine Berg, in her study of luxury and the eighteenth century, argues that 
British national markets sprang up in response to the unprecedented quantities of cloth, 
porcelain, and cabinets brought to England.  These patterns the poet “traces” in the 
landscape resonate with those Wedgewood patterns and designs on china and lacquered 
cabinets that were becoming common household items.  By the time Smith writes Beachy 
Head, however, Napoleon’s blockade of British ports on the continent brought about the 
possibility that British trade dominance might be muted, and Smith’s descriptions seem 
like a local version of the novelty sought abroad.  Smith’s tangling, imagined vines 
compete with these other freighted goods, but their success depends not upon their status 
as natural but their ability to overwhelm the reader with their attractiveness and their 
wealth—made nearly infinite by poetry’s ability to exceed material abundance and to 
speculate about the forms of free beauty.   
Perhaps Smith unwittingly represents the very desires of capitalistic excess in a 
poem that was meant to become a commodity itself.  If not unwitting, then the move is a 
particularly savvy one, as Smith redraws excess in terms of a beauty that moves beyond 
taste or commodification.  The excess and repetition of the weaving and tangling exceeds 
materiality and becomes immaterial.  The free beauty of the borders attempts to provide 
                                                
69 See Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in the Eighteenth Century (19-20) and Neil 
McKendrick’s seminal The Birth of a Consumer Society. 
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an abstraction of the form of beauty, and even though the Latin names for flowers in 
Smith’s footnotes provide scientific information, they also abstract the empirical living 
things into genus and species.  Just as Smith often used sensibility to burn itself out into a 
painless vacancy of calm immateriality in the Sonnets, here she mobilizes the rhetoric of 
excess to build a formal beauty that attempts to outdo luxury.  More importantly, the 
passage reveals Smith to be using accepted structures of language in subversive ways, in 
the attempt to unmake those very structures.  The paradoxical use of the rhetoric of the 
commodity critiques consumer culture even as such language throws into question the 
possibility sustaining an ideal beauty without its haunting, material other. 
These descriptions that display the purposeless beauty of the landscape almost 
escape the imposition of subjective desires, an ideal ultimately disrupted when the poet 
enters the picture saying, “I loved to trace” (my emphasis).  But it is not only the 
autobiographical Smith that impinges on the possibility of freedom that the landscape 
might entail.  The action of tracing memory also brings with it an instrumentality that 
mars any real vacancy.  Yet Smith notably makes this tracing impossible just a bit later in 
the poem, when she examines the archeological ruins at Beachy Head.  She states that 
there were “No traces in the records of mankind,/ Save the half obliterated mounds and 
half filled trenches doubtfully impart/ To some lone antiquary” (403-6).  She mocks the 
antiquary because he fancies that he can demarcate these ruins and vainly endeavors to 
delineate history.  The antiquary cannot trace without teleology, without narrative, 
especially because in the tradition of eighteenth-century antiquarianism, he is looking for 
that version of history—or literary history—that would ratify and consolidate England’s 
nationalism.  So the poet’s attempt to trace a free beauty in her memories of the 
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landscape is defeated by the narrative she is trying to draw about herself.  The imposition 
of her own history, the story of her class fall, undermines the immaterial and lyrical 
impulses that could usher the poet towards new, unconditional ways of thinking.  
Vacancy essentially offers a cognitive break from history’s exigencies and temporarily 
puts a stop to both the pastoral’s traditional ideologies and the poet’s own history in the 
South Downs.   In Smith, lyrical moments become associated not with a romanticized, 
nostalgic, static past but with the unfulfilled promises of the future.  The poet who uses 
memory and older literary forms like the pastoral becomes a problematic figure who 
stands in the way of her own invention.  For this reason, Smith ends the poem with a final 
confrontation with the role of poet and with the potential for living ethically outside the 
teleological demands of nationalism and capitalism in the Napoleonic age.   
 
The Hermit of Beachy Head:  Beside History, Open to What Comes 
The final movement does just this when it characterizes the disappearance of two 
successive figures who live on the Downs:  the stranger-poet and the hermit.  While, as 
Labbe argues, these may be figures for the poet, they more broadly offer two 
interlocking, final comments on language as guarantor of universal rights.  The stranger-
poet, a forerunner to the hermit, disappears from Beachy Head but not before leaving 
behind a trail of his romantic ballads near old trees.  These poems fuse his ideal views of 
the pastoral and his Wordsworthian Romantic “labor” of wandering through the land 
composing poems about the reunion with his lost love.  He laments to his absent 
Amanda:  “You’ld look, amid the sylvan scene,/ And in a wood-girl’s simple guise,/ Be 
still more lovely in  mine eyes” (646-8).  In his “visionary, nursing dreams” (655), he 
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represents the rustic poet who fuses his idealized views of the landscape with an idealized 
love for an unavailable maid.  Smith sympathizes with his dreams when she says, “let 
him cherish his ideal bliss” (667), but mocks him when she states that he might be happy 
in a bower in the South Seas.  As the footnote incisively points out, discoverers once 
imagined the newly found islands of Tahiti would offer the “visionary delights” of Eden 
the poet longs for, but they subsequently uncovered “the grossest vices.”  While the note 
may be referring to those native inhabitants viewed as unreflective, appetitive savages by 
eighteenth-century adventurers, it also may be pointing to those adventurers who, 
purportedly nostalgic for simplicity, made use of these bowers for unrestrained sexual 
romps.70   
The footnote ingeniously upends the purity of the wandering-poet, suggesting that 
his own lust for women and recognition—he is constantly leaving his poems for young 
village women to find them—complicate the pleas for simplicity, monogamy, and 
freedom found in his poems.  Moreover, his naïve ideas about nature and his role as poet 
secured from the literary market (or a capricious audience) represent a poet clinging to an 
older, antiquarian “ideal bliss” that is impossible not simply because it is idealized, or 
Romantic.  His vices stem from the fact that he turns to the past for his solutions, a past 
that narratively, ideologically, and teleologically impinges on the very freedom the poet 
desires to inhabit.  If the poet looks for freedom from urban luxury and corruption in the 
bower of the pastoral, then his lyric poetry ironically continues to look to the past for this 
                                                
70 For other approaches to the exploitation of Oceania as a Romantic bower of bliss, see 
James C. McKusick’s “The Politics of Language in Byron’s The Island,” a discussion of 
Byron’s depiction of Tahiti as a site for license and responsibility.  He similarly 
characterizes the South Seas as a basis for Coleridge’s and Southy’s pantisocracy in a 
piece written for Romanticism and Colonialism. 
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freedom, rather than to the possibility of a different kind of future.  His telos, like those of 
the Romans and the Danish pirates, has proven to be misguided.  Though his hope is to 
be envied, his disappearance from the landscape would seem to comment on just how 
useless his poetic model has become.  Unlike the poet of the egotistical sublime in 
Wordsworth’s The Prelude, the bard of Beachy Head is sublime in his disappearance, and 
the rift he creates offers the possibility to re-imagine the role of the poet.  
The final passages of Beachy Head circle back to Smith’s initial meditations on 
the liminal coastal waters of the English Channel and a hermit who lives in one of the 
cliff’s caves.  Associated with the Old Testament God of Genesis, who “Omnipotent/ 
Stretch’d forth his arm, and rent the solid hills” of Beachy Head (6-7), the ocean 
subsequently becomes a space of justice, equality and universality, and as such comes to 
represent the unrealized ideals of the Enlightenment.  By returning to this border between 
France and England, Smith offers a solution to the failures of the Enlightenment and 
French Revolution in the form of this hermit.  He represents the post-Enlightenment ideal 
of unconditional hospitality, an idea akin to “lawfulness without law,” and one that both 
Derrida and Peter Melville have culled from Kant’s late ideas about hospitality and 
cosmopolitanism.  As a figure of exile, the hermit suggests that the promise of 
Enlightenment freedom might be redeemed, but only through pledging oneself to 
something beyond nationalism and the materiality it proffers.  In his repeated attempts to 
save mariners lost at sea, he represents an ethics that exceeds the limits of nationalism or 
international law and remains open to whatever or whoever comes across Britain’s 
shores.  For this reason, the hermit, like the motion of the waves constantly changing 
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Britain’s boundaries, figures those repeated labors that have all the possibility of making 
good on unfulfilled Enlightenment promises, an Enlightenment to come. 
Exiled from society, the hermit burrows within the cliff face:  
   Just beneath the rock 
 Where Beachy overpowers the channel wave, 
 Within a cavern mined by wintry tides 
 Dwelt one, who long disgusted with the world 
 And all its ways, appear’d to suffer life 
 Rather than live   (672-676) 
The hermit lives between the sea and land, in a cavern that is less a womb, as biographer 
Lorraine Fletcher has suggested, than a site of vacancy itself, with the “wintry tides” 
forever mining and chipping away at both the hermit and his home.  Just as the ocean 
erodes the cliff’s materiality, creating the stunning white rock face the southern coast is 
known for, the hermit also lives outside any material needs.  He does not exist quite out 
of time but next to it, nesting beside those sedimentary layers of history Smith has 
already vacated.  He literally and figuratively lives beside the vast concussion, the jagged 
shore that is reminiscent of that first shocking and unexpected event that realigned 
geological, linguistic and political relationships.   
If the vast concussion promised one set of social, political, and material 
transformations, it has resulted in the failures of empire, imperial economics and 
nationalism in the Napoleonic age.  The hermit’s situation is a testament to these failures: 
   for his heart 
 Was feelingly alive to all that breath’d; 
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 And outraged as he was, in sanguine youth, 
 By human crimes, he still acutely felt 
 For human misery.  (687-691) 
Once a man of society, he rejected those “human crimes” that may very well be the 
luxury, corruption, and imperial lust Smith documents earlier in the poem.  These lines, 
moreover, suggest that the hermit may have chosen his home by the sea, creating a self-
imposed exile.  Scholars have tended to see the hermit figure as a stand-in for Smith 
herself, who was also pushed to the edge of society by crimes committed by men—her 
husband’s adultery and her father-in-law’s botched will held up in the chancery courts, 
both of which left her impoverished but for her poetry.  That the hermit is a man—and 
not a displaced woman or a grieving mother—significantly raises the stakes of the 
passage, depicting a country where both women and men must flee to the edges of 
society in order to live ethically and peacefully.  The hermit channels several other male 
figures from her works, including the stranger poet, the coastal smugglers, and the exiled 
clergy from The Emigrants, and even the traders and invaders skirting the channel.  This 
detail suggests quite powerfully that Smith may be advocating for the kind of change that 
can only happen from the margins of society.     
As Kari E. Lokke has discussed, Smith may be playing into the trope of the 
hermit popularized during the end of the eighteenth century, and he certainly can be read 
as a generic cipher for sympathy.71  Situated as he is at the end of an epic poem, seated in 
a continental rift, however, the hermit figures an even larger model for a universal ethics.  
                                                
71 See her book chapter, “Embodied Compassion:  The Figure of the Hermit in Charlotte 




As Smith elaborates in a footnote, the hermit is loosely based on a man named Darby 
who was believed to be living in a cave for many years, eating shellfish for sustenance.  
Additionally, the note mentions that the Parson Darby tradition might be thirty years old, 
a fact which would pointedly set the legend’s origin around 1776.  Rather than an 
unhistoricized figure, the hermit straddles the beginning of the American Revolutionary 
War and some important events in the Napoleonic Wars contemporaneous with Beachy 
Head’s composition:  the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 and the beginning of Napoleon’s 
blockade of English ports on the Continent with the Berlin Decree of 1806.  What the 
hermit looks out upon is some extremely contested naval space, fraught with colonial 
wars and blockades.  If the hermit has sought escape from “human crimes” on land—
perhaps the harsh measures of the Pitt government—he cannot help but look onto 
troubled waters.   
The footnotes themselves mimic this faux-escape.  Though the text seems to end 
with figures removed from history, the notes placed at the poem’s end mark a horizon 
that cannot be anything but historically grounded.  Unlike typically Romantic attempts to 
flee from history into the imagination, Smith ironically escapes out of the very history of 
imperialism she then sets as the vista of her final vantage point. 72 In more specific terms, 
this outlook—which is the poem’s final vista in a series of views taken throughout the 
poem—calls on the reader to look beyond England and English history to England’s 
relationship with France and the rest of warring continental Europe.73  Beachy Head, like 
                                                
72 Aside from Jerome McGann’s Romantic Ideology, see Alan Liu’s seminal 
Wordsworth:  The Sense of History for the classic argument on that poet’s ideological 
escape from history. 
73 Matthew Bray argues that Beachy Head represents Smith’s critique of Britain’s 
nationalistic Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism.  Rather than seeing the two nations as 
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the textual maneuvers of the poem itself, is constantly slipping into the sea, which marks 
both the erasure of historicity and its return.  
Though the hermit does watch the waves, they do not become a sign of 
nationalistic nostalgia as they do for the exiles in The Emigrants.  Instead the hermit 
becomes famous for wading through them and saving whoever might become stranded by 
their caprice. 
   Wandering on the beach, 
 He learn’d to augur from the clouds of heaven, 
 And from the changing colours of the sea, 
 And sullen murmurs of the hollow cliffs, 
 Or the dark porpoises, that near the shore 
 Gambol’d and sported on the level brine 
 When tempests were approaching: then at night 
 He listen’d to the wind; and as it drove 
 The billows with o’erwhelming vehemence 
 He, starting from his rugged couch, went forth 
 And hazarding a life, too valueless, 
 He waded thro’ the waves, with plank or pole 
 Towards where the mariner in conflict dread 
 Was buffeting for life the roaring surge; 
                                                                                                                                            
permanently severed and separate, Bray argues that Smith espouses a shared history 
between the two nations, encouraging Britain to incorporate French Revolutionary and 
even Napoleonic ideals.  Though the Channel obviously connects France and Britain, the 
generic figures of the hermit and the mariners he saves, I would argue, seem to suggest 




 And now just seen, now lost in foaming gulphs, 
 The dismal gleaming of the clouded moon 
 Shew’d the dire peril.  (692-707) 
Patrolling the shores, the hermit develops great skill in reading nature.  He learns how to 
“augur” storms, and in effect he becomes a master of understanding the various forms of 
motion the cliff’s climate tends to develop.  Smith’s descriptions of Beachy Head have 
not changed radically from the beginning of the poem, since even in her final lines the 
cliff is in flux:  the “changing colors of the sea/ And sullen murmurs of the hollow cliffs,” 
the dark porpoises “gambol’d and sported” and the wind “drove the blows.”  The air and 
water are constantly changing and in motion, though perhaps in this final passage they 
fluctuate with a degree of constancy formed by the simple verbs  “gambol’d,” “sported,” 
“drove,” and “learn’d.”  The hermit can read these signs, and his first feat is learning to 
live within the constant change, permeability, and instability Beachy Head represents.  As 
an avid reader of these events, the hermit positions himself as someone who understands 
large tempests—emotional and political—yet is not subject to them.  Rather, he 
unwaveringly rescues those who would be drowned.  As someone ostensibly abjected by 
the system, he acts as a countercurrent pulling mariners—participants in the system—
from its deadly grasp.   
In this light, the hermit becomes the inverse of the shepherd-smugglers Smith 
criticized toward the beginning of the poem: 
  one, who sometimes watches on the heights 
 When hid in the cold mist of passing clouds, 
 The flock, with dripping fleeces, are dispers’d 
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 O’er the wide down:  then from some ridged point 
 That overlooks the sea, his eager eye 
 Watches the bark that for his signal waits 
 To land its merchandize:--Quitting for this  
 Clandestine traffic his more honest toil, 
 The crook abandoning, he braves himself 
 The heaviest snow-storm of December’s night, 
 When with conflicting winds the ocean raves, 
 And on the tossing boat, unfearing mounts 
 To meet the partners of the perilous trade, 
 And share their hazard.  Well it were for him, 
 If no such commerce of destruction known, 
 He were content with what the earth affords 
 To human labour  (176-192) 
Smith reproves the shepherd who deserts his dripping, scattered flocks for illegal 
contraband.  A footnote points out, “shepherds and labourers of this tract of country, a 
hard and athletic race of men, are almost universally engaged in the contraband trade” 
(Curran 225, emphasis mine).  The note serves to censure the shepherds’ connection to 
the money economy.  Though hardy enough to live off the work of their bodies, even the 
hinds succumb to their own greed, participating in the commercial economy by treating 
animals like goods, raising them for sale or as ruses for more lucrative smuggling 
operations.  Smith brings up but denounces the universality of their employment, 
suggesting that global trade—and its capitalistic ideology and laws of exchange—is no 
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way to define universality.  Though the smuggler is quite accommodating, his hospitality 
is in the service of ships and commodities that necessarily participate in international 
violence during the Napoleonic era of blockades, what Smith alludes to as the “commerce 
of destruction” (190). 
 Like the smuggler, the hermit also deserts whatever his societal role once was to 
troll the shores of the channel, yet he picks up not goods but mariners—those stranded by 
wars and commerce gone awry.   
    Often he had snatched 
  From the wild billows, some unhappy man 
  Who liv’d to bless the hermit of the rocks. 
  But if his generous cares were all in vain, 
  And with slow swell the tide of morning bore 
  Some blue swol’n cor’se to land; the pale recluse 
  Dug in the chalk a sepulcher—above 
  Where the dank sea-wrack mark’d the utmost tide, 
  And with his prayers perform’d the obsequies 
  For the poor helpless stranger.  (707-16) 
With a large dose of poetic justice, Smith has the hermit save sailors from the sea only 
after they have been separated from their ship and cargo, so that he saves these 
transnational souls once the sea has freed them from—or taken revenge on them for—
their roles in the trade economy or in a European war based in large part on imperial 
economies.  As if baptized by the Channel waves, the “mariner” becomes the “unhappy 
man” and finally a “stranger” buried anonymously within the cliff face, not unlike the 
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hermit who, in the next few lines, will also rest in a grave unmarked but for the “chalk” 
of the Down cliffs.  Death, however, is not the only equalizer here; both the hermit and 
the lost naval souls have been denuded of their individual social identities and have 
become strangers to each other and the nations from which they came.  Like Julia 
Kristeva, Smith explores a kind of universality based on a mutual strangeness.74  The 
humanity of the hermit and the mariners is only confirmed once they have been stripped 
of various social identities and ideological claims.   
If the hermit resists any nationalist, consumerist interpellation into society that 
defines the rogue smuggler or legal merchant, he nonetheless becomes involved with a 
quite idealistic iteration of universality vacated of national ties, what Derrida has termed 
“universal hospitality.”  In many of Derrida’s later writings, the concept of universal 
hospitality, like his notion of unconditional forgiveness taken from Emmanuel Levinas, 
becomes the impossible condition for the acceptance of the Other, an open-ended 
cosmopolitan identity and the promise of democracy.  Derrida insists that hospitality 
occur before any kind of interpellation excludes the visitor or names him a foreigner:  
“Let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any 
anticipation, before any identification, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of 
another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or 
female” (77).  The anonymity of the hermit and the strangers arguably locates them 
“before any identification.”  Unlike either the penetrative imperial invasions or the 
                                                
74 See Kristeva’s Nations without Nationalism, where she argues:  “the universalist 
breakthrough continued to make progress up to Locke, Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, and, in 
my opinion, did not die out but rather took on a new orientation with the Freudian 
discovery of our intrinsic difference; let us know ourselves as unconscious, altered, other 
in order better to approach the universal otherness of the strangers that we are” (21). 
 
91  
blockades imposed by either England or France during the Fourth Coalition, the hermit 
stands as a figure of unconditional acceptance and forgiveness.  Rather than inseminating 
the world with trade or ideology, he sits poised on the border, ready to receive whatever 
and whoever comes ashore, particularly those who have been mangled by the voyage.  He 
not only saves men but also offers strangers a final resting place when he buries and 
presides over their deaths.   
As Melville has recently discussed, Derrida’s ideas about hospitality come from 
his reading of Kant, who had included hospitality in a plan for international peace (and 
Enlightenment freedom) in his 1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace.” 75   Kant advocated the 
creation of international or cosmopolitan law as well as a form of hospitality offering the 
rights of visitation to stranded international travelers.  Writing during the Napoleonic 
Wars, particularly after Prussia and Austria capitulated to Napoleon with the failure of 
the First Coalition, he argued that European cosmopolitanism must be based on a public 
legal code, which would grant the right of visitation to stranded travelers.  Though reason 
mandated this much, morality ultimately depended upon legislation rather than 
conscience, and hospitality became a duty-based right of visitation and nothing more.76  
Smith, however, surpasses Kant’s notions when she uses the hermit to represent the kind 
                                                
75 Melville argues that Kant’s work reveals how a “foreigner’s arrival plays itself out […] 
as the nation’s troubling recognition of its own internal strangeness” (74), an act that 
always involves violently interpellating the stranger as such.  I would argue that despite 
the fact that Smith names the dead mariner a “stranger,” part of the strength of her 
depiction depends on the freedom from interpellation as “foreigner” that the hermit and 
the mariners finally achieve, outside the bounds of the nationalism exacerbated by the 
Napoleonic Wars. 
76 For recent readings of Kant’s cosmopolitan notions on law and hospitality, see Michael 
Scrivener’s Cosmopolitan Ideal and Allen W. Wood’s “Kant’s Project for Perpetual 
Peace” in Cosmopolitics. 
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of justice that exceeds law.  The hermit comes to demonstrate a universal acceptance and 
veers close to Derrida’s critique of Kant: 
the thinker of the cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality, the author of 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), is also, without there 
being anything fortuitous in this, the one who destroys at its source the 
very possibility of what he posits and determines in this way.  And that is 
due to the juridicality of his discourse, to the inscription in a law of this 
principle of hospitality whose infinite idea should resist the law itself—or 
at any rate go beyond it at the point where it governs it.  (71)   
He goes on to characterize hospitality as a Kantian antinomy, in which freedom becomes 
defined as that which exceeds universal law:  “the categorical imperative of hospitality 
commanded that we transgress all the laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the 
conditions, the norms, the rights and the duties that are imposed on hosts and hostesses” 
(Of Hospitality 76-77).  Because the hermit’s repeated actions become something like a 
code of conduct, they exceed mere personal responsibility.  Yet on the borders of the 
nation, he also disregards any codified law that might dictate how the hermit should treat 
the stranded mariners.  Thus the hermit represents what Derrida has called a “non-
dialectizable, insoluble antinomy …between the law of unlimited hospitality and the 
laws” of philosophy and of sovereignty (77).   
At this point it should come as no surprise that the hermit, who seems like a 
simple figure of compassion and embodied sentiment, should come to represent a host of 
idealistic possibilities rife with paradox.  At this final precipice of the poem, the various 
structures of excess—nationality, market culture, ethics—come to a head and represent 
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what Derrida has termed “l’avenir” or “the Enlightenment-to-come”:  “criticizing 
unconditionally all conditionalities” (Two Essays 142).  This is Derrida’s attempt to find 
a reasonableness beyond the confines or failures of Enlightenment reason, with its stiff 
laws and morals.  The future-to-come or the Enlightenment-to-come will arrive when the 
ideals of nationality, law, and eighteenth-century Enlightenment reason are surpassed and 
exceeded (Two Essays 143).  Since all ideals involve teleology and instrumentality, the 
Enlightenment-to-come would move beyond both the empirical and the ideal, towards 
something tied down neither by the material demands of current existence (like the 
market) nor by the ideals that can only imagine old, defunct, and restrictive ideological 
structures (like nationalism).   
The future to come is an unthinkable ideal built around an unconditional event, 
such as Beachy Head’s “vast concussion,” or the textual events of Smith’s footnotes, 
injecting historicity into the idealized figure of the hermit, or even the rhetorical openness 
of pastoral description open to the logic of capitalistic excess.  This idea culminates in a 
final figure who represents both legal unconditionality and formal, lyric indeterminacy.  
Rather than simply rejecting trade or consumption as she does in the Sonnets, Smith 
accommodates even these foreign, law-bound concepts in order to exceed and overcome 
them.  In this way Beachy Head uses but reforms Enlightenment law and reason as 
concepts necessarily open to whatever political events, historical narratives, or concepts 
that come to alter it.  In particular, reason, in both Derrida and Smith, must be made open 
to an incalculable ethics of care.  It is important to note that this ethics of care is not 
simply the embodied sympathy derived from the discourse of sensibility, which Smith 
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rejected in the Sonnets, but a moral, conceptual notion of ethics allied to an 
uncompromising sense of justice.     
As in Kant, the ethics or Good of the hermit’s openness also corresponds to the 
beautiful, and the poem returns to figure vacancy as futurity, hospitality and aesthetic free 
beauty in a final void marked by the disappearance of the hermit and the absence of his 
parting words: 
    Those who read 
 Chisel’d within the rock, these mournful lines 
 Memorials of his sufferings, did not grieve, 
 That dying in the cause of charity 
 His spirit, from its earthly bondage freed, 
 Had to some better region fled for ever.  (724-31) 
If the hermit makes a life beside a vacancy, he becomes part of it the night he disappears.  
Washed into the sea, his bones might eventually become like those found on the shore of 
Middleton in Sussex.  The hermit has achieved Smith’s longed-for state of vacancy, 
figured in the earlier sonnet as the pure whiteness of the bones, chafed clean by the sea 
and ultimately deaf and insensible.  The poem, by eschewing the market and nation-
driven narratives that impinge on the hermit and the coastal, pastoral landscape, moves 
toward a lyricism that might exist beyond the material demands of location and luxury.    
The hermit might simply represent the quiescence the poet sometimes desires but 
for the missing epitaph he might have written, which signals that his death might also be 
about the possibilities of language.  As the poet explains, before the hermit died, he had 
chiseled on the rocks of his cave “these mournful lines,” and much critical speculation 
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has tried to figure out whether Smith never had the chance to write the hermit’s epitaph, 
or whether the poem itself stands in for his final words.77  Though we might read this 
poem as an unfinished fragment, perhaps the lacuna is Smith’s own final act of charity, 
freeing her readers from any kind of definitive meaning about Beachy Head itself. 
Unlike Wordsworth’s peddler or shepherd figures from The Excursion, Smith’s 
hermit disappears without preaching his words of wisdom.  His sermon is his silence, and 
he finally remains outside language but ever about to write his epitaph.  Rather than 
actually chiseling his last words in stone, in language that will become monumentalized 
and hardened, the hermit seems forever poised in the moment just before the act of 
writing.  This kind of futurity might smack of Romantic ideology, as it sounds much like 
Wordsworth’s pitch for the Romantic imagination in book Six of the Prelude:  an 
“infinitude … something evermore about to be” (605, 608).  On the one hand, though 
Smith’s vacancy aims to rupture material reality, rather than a process of constant 
creation, she envisions language as forever on the precipice of history, looking out at the 
beautiful yet politically fraught churning of the waves.  If the hermit figures the poem’s 
final vacancy, Smith’s footnotes reside next to his unwritten epitaph, once again filling 
the imaginative ideality with the excess and contingencies of history.  The poem, in 
effect, ends twice, as the historical footnotes subject the lyrical space of the hermit’s life 
and death to that history in the margins, a lyricism both hospitable to and in excess of the 
                                                
77 For a reading of Beachy Head as Romantic fragment poem, see John Anderson’s “The 
Romantic Fragment Poem As Mosaic.”  Jacqueline Labbe reads these final moments as 
both the dissolution of the author and of any stable notion of subjectivity, both of which 
“disallow closure and resolution” (159).  Lorraine Fletcher writes that Smith sent Beachy 
Head to her publisher five months before her death, and though she might have been too 
sick to finish the poem, it is a possibility that she intentionally left the hermit’s epitaph 
unwritten.  See Charlotte Smith:  A Critical Biography (335). 
 
96  
subsequent events that will mark the coast of Beachy Head.  The hermit signals Smith’s 
need to keep history in her vista, but temporarily let its laws slip through her grasp to 
imagine a different possible future.   
On the other hand, the vacancy marked by the hermit’s lack of epitaph also 
figures a kind of non-knowledge that poses a problem for the subject and ideology.  
Smith’s quasi-conceptual basis of aesthetics and justice always begins from a point of 
non-knowledge—the moment before the understanding and imagination might be 
harmonized—a place where the subject is already dissolved with the hopes of leading to a 
new kind of non-determinative subjectivity.  Simon Malpas argues that this “cut” 
inherent to the structure of Kantian knowledge disables “the systematic knowledge-based 
thought of modernity … and ideology” (13).  Other women writers will develop Smith’s 
idea about non-knowledge to different ends, translating the idea of an a priori gap 
between understanding and imagination into their own philosophical and poetic stances.  
For Smith, this vacancy is unlike Wordsworth’s “infinitude” in the way that it 
destabilizes systematic meaning structures.  She strives not for idealistic possibilities but 
for a knowledge that will not be bound by conceptual, national, or market orthodoxies.  
Without the hermit or his final words, we too are suspended in a position of vacancy with 




Mary Robinson’s Diverse Mind:  From Oblivion to Idiocy 
 
The relationship of form, or the “constructive principle,” to the materials of the 
work (to its themes, the conceptual mass, but also to the words themselves) is the 
initial problem for the “open text,” one that faces each writing anew.  Can form 
make the primary chaos (the raw material, the unorganized impulse and 
information, the uncertainty, incompleteness, vastness) articulate without 
depriving it of its capacious vitality, its generative power?  Can form go even 
further than that and actually generate that potency, opening uncertainty to 
curiosity, incompleteness to speculation, and turning vastness into plenitude? […] 
Form is not a fixture but an activity. (47) 
—Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry  
 
 
Mary Robinson was surely the hippest writer of her generation, a close follower 
of fashion, political and poetic fads with enough panache to retain an aura of fame 
throughout her life.  Her feel for novelty, whether Della Cruscan poetics or Revolutionary 
fervor, allowed her to make her way into various groups and schools.  As many 
contemporaneous critics of her poetry liked to point out, she was dexterous at imitating 
trends set by other writers.   
Although we have never professed an admiration for the Della Crusca 
school, the pupils of which appear to us to be no other than a kind of 
imitators of poets, yet it is due to Mrs. Robinson to say, that she possesses 
great fertility of imagination, delicacy of sentiment, and a just ear for 
harmony and varied modulation of numbers.  There is a stiffness, 
constraint, and affectation, in the models on which our British Sappho 
studies to form her style and manner:  but in these, as in her other poems, 
she gives proofs of genius capable of producing greater excellence, if it 
had been better directed.  (qtd. in Selected Poems 385) 
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According to this reviewer of Robinson’s Sappho and Phaon in the English Review, 
though the writer might show the inklings of poetic dexterity, she still studies under the 
tutelage of other poets.  Based on Lucy Newlyn’s persuasive model of Romantic 
women’s poetics, most scholarship on Robinson has continued to see her writing as an 
echo, whether imitating Della Cruscan poetics, Robert Merry’s Revolutionary odes, the 
vogue for sonnets, novels of sensibility, or Wordsworth and Coleridge’s experiment with 
ballads.78  Scholars most often connect this ability to don and discard identities and 
fashions in both her poetry and her unconventional personal life to her time as a hailed 
stage actress. Robinson has become the poster girl for Romantic theatricality, a model 
that places a premium on performativity and multiplicity.79  Both paradigms of echo and 
theatricality assume that at the heart of her poetry Robinson imitates the world around 
her, fashioning a poetics of surfaces rather than depths.  As Stuart Curran has suggested, 
                                                
78 In Reading, Writing and Romanticism, Newlyn discusses Robinson’s echoing of 
Coleridge’s project in “To the Poet Coleridge,” a poem written in response to his “Kubla 
Khan” (254-56).  Though Newlyn reads the exchange as Robinson hedging her bets 
between a poetic collaboration with Coleridge and one of rivalry, there is the sense that 
Robinson does not add anything substantive to the poetic conversation.  W. N. 
Hargreaves-Mawdsley’s history of the Della Cruscans, The English Della Cruscans and 
Their Time, depicts Robinson as a latecomer and subsidiary member of that school.  In 
her article “From Lyrical Ballads to Lyrical Tales:  Mary Robinson’s Reputation and the 
Problem of Literary Debt,” Ashley J. Cross discusses the problem of the Lyrical Tales’ 
literary debt to the Lyrical Ballads, arguing that Robinson attempted to link her volume 
to the male poets’ book in order to insert herself into male literary history and to ensure 
her literary legacy. 
79 Judith Pascoe forged this influential, historicist model of Robinson in her ground-
breaking Romantic Theatricality.  Julie Schaffer, Sharon Setzer, and others have followed 
suit in their focus on Walsingham, a novel where one of the main characters cross-dresses 
as a man in an attempt to claim an inheritance.  These scholars have rightly read the novel 
as destabilizing gender relations and stable notions of subjectivity in favor of a more 
performative model.  Though feminist critics have read Wollstonecraft as originating the 
notion of performative gender roles, Pascoe argues that Robinson takes her model from 




“Robinson is concerned primarily with lyrical effect, the surface,” an effect that reveals 
“a vacuity in signification at the heart of modern culture” (17, 13). 
  These narratives about performativity, however, miss the ways in which 
Robinson’s poetry is engaged in making certain philosophical and poetic claims about 
multiplicity.  Her “superficial” formal play, as well as her questioning of unified, stable 
identity are part and parcel of a much larger project to build a model of the mind that has 
the capability of generating or responding to psychological and formal diversity.  Like 
Charlotte Smith, Robinson begins with the problems that embodied experience presents 
for women of the 1790s—namely, sensibility, with its repetitive languishing in painful 
emotion as a sign of women’s stunted poetic and social roles.80  Though she never had a 
chance to read Smith’s “Beachy Head,” she was clearly a student of the older poet’s 
sonnet revival.  Robinson similarly attempts to circumvent sensibility through the 
temporary cessation of feeling and thought, but she ultimately embraces sensation as a 
productive epistemology.  Where Smith rejects sensation for a Kantian, quasi-conceptual 
space of futurity, always open to whoever or whatever comes to fill it, Robinson works to 
suspend mental and poetic habituations by flooding them with an unmanageable plethora 
of new sensations, ideas, and, most importantly, poetic forms.  Unlike Smith, who 
substitutes hospitality for consumption, Robinson works toward rampant production, 
paradoxically arguing for the most radical kind of invention through the trope of the 
                                                
80 The best narrative to detail the turn against sensibility in the 1790s is G. J. Barker-
Benfield’s The Culture of Sensibility, especially the chapters on Mary Wollstonecraft.  
Claudia Johnson also touches on this subject in her chapter on Wollstonecraft in 
Equivocal Beings, arguing that Burke’s conservative depiction of Marie Antoinette in 
Reflections on the Revolution in France co-opted sensibility for the conservative cause.  
While writers like Wollstonecraft and William Godwin are generally understood as 
having misjudged the backlash against sensibility, I would argue that a savvy writer like 
Robinson was already engaged in a critique or revision of the discourse on emotions.  
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Enlightenment idiot, deprived of society’s beneficence and abjected to the margins of 
society.   
Drawing heavily from empiricist theories of knowledge and psychology, poems 
like “Sight” (1793) and Sappho and Phaon (1796) attempt to reset the mind’s 
associations through moments of oblivion, or radical forgetting, that then clear the ground 
for a barrage of new sensory information.  In her sonnet sequence, Robinson stages the 
rejection of the sonnet of sensibility as a defunct mode of lyric stasis and imitation, a 
crucial step in ending Sappho’s single-minded, oppressive passion for Phaon.  As 
Robinson’s poetry develops, she shifts from this model of the mind based on 
Enlightenment psychology and begins to experiment with formal solutions that offer a 
similar, but more material model through language.  As early as Sappho and Phaon, she 
turns to the Enlightenment trope of idiocy to figure Sappho’s stunted emotional and 
intellectual growth.  Her poetics reach an apex in her final volume, Lyrical Tales, and 
other poems from the last years of her life, in which she uses the trope in combination 
with the ballad form to promote formal variation.  Together, the idiot’s stuttering, 
nonsensical speech and the ballad’s refrain transform imitation or echo into an additive, 
generative poetic technique.  
These formal experiments constitute a referendum on the poetics of the 1790s and 
help us supply an alternative narrative about the development of poetry and poetic forms 
during the Romantic period.  Robinson juxtaposes two kinds of poems:  those that aim for 
a poetic transcendence and those poems that create psychological difference and formal 
variation.  Or to put it differently, she contrasts vacant or static lyricism that preserves 
moments isolated in time and space with a poetics of vacancy that unleashes repetition as 
 
101  
incremental, difference.  By creating contingent alternatives to poetic and intellectual 
habituations, Robinson offers a model different from the lyricism of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge and from the popular poetics of sensibility and domesticity.  Her technical 
strategies reconceptualize feminist aesthetics and the thinking subject outside the terms of 
either reason or sensibility.  
This thread of thinking finds another iteration in some important twentieth-
century feminist poets.  If Keatsian paradox descends through Wallace Stevens and John 
Ashbery, plotting the uses of paradox and irony to fragment and question the poetics of 
subjectivity, Robinson presents a different route around the Romantic egotistical sublime 
and lyrics based on teleological moments of epiphany.  She foreshadows poets like 
Gertrude Stein and Lyn Hejinian, whose use of repetition, echo, parataxis, seriality, and 
insistence build what Hejinian calls an “open text.”  Many feminist scholars have 
remarked on women writers’ propensities to refuse narrative (or figurative) closure 
precisely because the teleological trajectories open to them are often unappealing or 
entrapping.81  Though many poems, Romantic and otherwise, tend to yield up their own 
contradictions and interpretive variations, particularly under a deconstructionist lens, 
Robinson’s poetry courts not aporia, as Smith’s does, but a range of psychological and 
formal differences.  Her poems become sites not only of dialogism but of what Theodore 
Adorno, discussing Holderlin’s late lyrics, described as “aconceptual synthesis” (130).  
Forged by linguistic techniques like parataxis and seriality, Holderlin’s poems resist 
synthetic meaning through “a constitutive dissociation […] [that] gently suspends the 
traditional logic of synthesis” (130).  Robinson similarly presents textual moments that 
                                                
81 See especially Judith Roof’s Come, As You Are:  Sexuality and Narrative and Famous 
Last Words:  Changes in Gender and Narrative Closure, edited by Alison Booth. 
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allegorize and enact reading as dissent and difference in poems that take as a main 
preoccupation the refusal of unitary meaning.  Moreover, the resistance to hegemonic 
interpretation signals Robinson’s desire to think about how poetics might provide models 
for resisting normative political and social structures, including gender discrimination as 
well as the various Leftist plans and discourses that occluded women even as they 
promoted “universal” equality and freedom in the decade following the French 
Revolution.82 
Through this poetics, Robinson attempts to circumvent what Jerome McGann, in 
The Romantic Ideology, has chastised as the tendency toward synthesis and reconciliation 
in Romantic male poets and their readers.  Robinson’s Sappho provides an excellent 
example of a female figure who longs for Romantic union, reconciliation, and romantic 
synthesis with her lost lover, and the sonnet sequence serves as a critique of Sappho’s 
fatal trajectory.  Her reviewers, as well as our own contemporary scholarship, largely 
miss this point, that Sappho’s mimicry of the sonnet of sensibility and her longing for 
reconciliation—her poetic and cultural habituations—are exactly the problems that 
Robinson wants to vacate.  Because Robinson views poetry as generating variation that 
refuses synthesis, it is even more tempting to characterize her experiments as depicting a 
kind of continuous change, what McGann terms as Romantic ideology’s emphasis on 
“creative process” (30).  Her poems resemble what McGann characterizes as Byron’s 
“spontaneity,” or the poet’s effort “to make the flow of language the encompassing 
totality of immediate experience” (30, 128).  Robinson is certainly working toward the 
                                                
82 For example, in William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s, Saree Makdisi 
calls the radical, intellectual Left “hegemonic,” in its plan to stamp out plebian, 
communitarian politics in favor of Painite universal rights or Godwinian gradualism.  See 
his chapter, “Fierce Rushing.” 
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kind of change that might produce new knowledge and free the mind, yet the sensations 
she explores cannot be sublated into ego-driven despair nor described as the tonal 
fluctuations in the satirical mode of a single narrator’s voice.  Her revolutions of formal 
and psychic states strip various characters of their habituations, leaving them ravaged, 
raving, or otherwise fractured and abject.  Robinson does not plot an escape route from 
despair, and her women and children are not redressed in Edmund Burke’s tradition, 
Helen Maria Williams’s Revolutionary robes, or Smith’s Kantian conceptuality.  Instead 
they remain ragged figures of both alterity and mental difference.  It is their exclusion 
from society that drives them to idiocy and engenders a different way of thinking about 
alterity and poetic articulation.  
Rather than comparing Robinson to Byron’s totality of immediacies, it makes 
more sense to locate Robinson as one of the many Romantic poets who were working 
toward A. O. Lovejoy’s idea of plenitude, a concept that McGann claimed might stem the 
tide of the Romantic ideology.  As Lovejoy put it long ago, the Romantics “believed not 
only that in many, or in all, phases in human life there are diverse excellences, but that 
diversity itself is of the essence of excellence; and that of art, in particular, the objective 
is […] the fullest possible expression of the abundance of differentness that there is, 
actually or potentially, in nature and human nature, and […] perhaps never capable of 
universalization” (293).  Robinson does not derive her idea of diversity or plenitude from 
the German Romantic tradition that Lovejoy discusses in The Great Chain of Being; 
rather, she develops it from her own, partially native, empiricist notions about how 
experiences motivate reflection. 
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The empiricist lens helps to emphasize the role of sensations and desire in 
Robinson’s ideas about change and freedom, as well as the more material conditions for 
thought.  Though McGann and others have attempted to privilege feeling over reason as a 
way to accrue new value for women’s writing, it is helpful to use several theorists to 
emphasize the more nuanced ways that sensation and desire operate as modes of thinking.  
As opposed to Jacques Lacan’s idea that repetitive behaviors merely hide the more 
important originary trauma, Gilles Deleuze’s notion of radical difference created through 
repetition—which he takes from Hume—stresses variation as precisely the point.  
Repetition as difference expresses the creative potentiality of diversity as a string of 
ontologically separate entities or sensations.  Because Deleuze’s early idea of difference 
eventually gives way to his rhizomatic ideas about immanence, which arguably slips into 
a Romantic ideology through his concepts of becoming and continuous change, it is more 
helpful to understand the consequences of difference as repetition through two other 
theorists working loosely with Deleuze:  Hélène Cixous and Georgio Agamben.83  The 
French feminist theorist argues that the explosive expression of polymorphous desire 
leads to a heterogeneous “production of forms.”  Cixous helps us understand how 
Robinson’s representations and characters yield up a collection of contradictory formal 
structures and sensations operating within the same poem, unlike a kind of continuously 
evolving creative process.  Alternatively, Agamben helps to reframe Robinson’s project 
with language as one about the potentialities for language, one that includes resistance to 
writing or articulation.  He elucidates Robinson’s deft maneuvers with idiocy that provide 
a writer with the ability to retard old meanings and create others.  Viewing Robinson in 
                                                
83 Still, see the Deleuzian-inspired readings of Romanticism in the Romantic Circles 
Praxis volume, Romanticism and the New Deleuze (January 2008). 
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this way, her poetics counter both Wordsworthian transcendence and Smith’s Kantian 
futurity with a material heterogeneity, an empirical bevy of sensations and formal 
opportunities, or what we might say is the repetitive idiocy of a deep multiplicity.  
Oblivion and Robinson’s Perverse Empiricism 
Like other writers engaged in Revolutionary politics of the 1790s, Robinson 
begins the decade by wondering how prejudice and habituated associations hinder people 
from achieving the Revolutionary ideals of social equality and freedom—especially of 
mental liberation.  Many of Robinson’s early 1790s poems explicitly explore a model of 
the mind that uses the empiricist models of Locke, Hume, and Burke to wreak havoc on 
memory, custom and habituation.  Though she engages with Lockean psychology’s 
concept of the mind as “dark room” to be filled with the light of reasoned knowledge, 
Robinson’s poems often demonstrate that the mind sometimes comes to knowledge 
through temporary moments of darkness that reset its functions and its knowledge base.  
Appropriating language from her early Della Cruscan fluorescence and from the language 
of sensibility, Robinson sketches repeated moments of oblivion that lead to rapture or 
bliss, which at this point in her career she defines as the transcendent height of 
sensation.84  Pivoting off the empiricist notion that sensation and empirical experiences 
                                                
84 Though Hargreaves-Mawdsley does not have much to say about Robinson, his study of 
the Della Cruscan movement shows that Robinson was getting the concepts of oblivion 
and rapture from her experimentation with this group.  In particular, many of his 
examples document Robert Merry and Hannah Cowley using the popular rhetoric of 
“oblivion” or apathy and “rapture” or ecstasy in their poetic exchange between “Della 
Crusca” and “Anna Matilda.”  Both Merry and Cowley often use these terms in separate 
poems, first writing of their melancholic depression at being neglected or in despair and 
then responding to the other’s poem with the language of rapture (160-2). One might 
argue that Robinson takes these models and unites the two states of feeling in dialectic. 
The entire project of Della Cruscan language might be seen as a project of rapture, where 
numerous overwrought descriptions are piled together to cause the reader a powerful, 
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engender ideas, she inverts empirical theories of knowledge and builds a concept of the 
mind that is constituted, at least in part, by a series of rolling blackouts that vacate stale 
sensation and thought.   Mental and bodily freedoms are constituted not through an 
escape into a mental world of ideas, but through the periodic cessation of feeling and 
thought.  
Her revolutionary fervor is most well known through poems like “Ainsi va la 
Monde” (1791) with its final image of blissful Freedom dressed in a “rainbow vest” 
figuring the bright, diverse light that enables visionary sight.  Her later volume Sight, 
Solitude and The Cavern of Wo (1793), however, provides a primer on those darker states 
of mind that, like oblivion, are inextricably bound to the production of Enlightenment 
knowledge.  By 1793’s post-Revolutionary disappointment, moreover, these figures of 
darkness may represent a Romantic skepticism about rationality.  The book begins with 
“Sight,” an ode dedicated to John Taylor, oculist to the King, editor of The Morning Post 
and Robinson’s longtime friend.  Remarkable not only for its reproduction of stock 
Enlightenment and Revolutionary figures, this poem markedly engages with 
Enlightenment psychology.  Though Robinson explicitly repudiates oblivion’s blankness 
as the result of affective and intellectual depression, the poem repeatedly returns to 
meditations on oblivion, a move that implicitly belies her reliance on mental blankness as 
an unwanted but necessary means to new knowledge.   
                                                                                                                                            
ecstatic sensation.  Robinson imbues this language with much heftier references to 




The speaker begins by describing the gift of sight and the light that helps man sort 
through his “intellectual maze,” yet even her initial descriptions of light already work in 
conjunction with the darkness: 
  Transcendent gift! but for thy light divine, 
  Oh!  what a chaos were the mind of MAN!  
Compos’d of atoms, exquisitely fine, 
Each moving in a dark obstructed sphere 
Forlorn, and undelighted!  (11-15)  
Robinson’s model of the mind is very much like Locke’s “dark room” detailed in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding:  “the understanding is not much unlike a 
closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible 
resemblances, or ideas of things” (II.XI.17).85  Transcendent light allows the reader to see 
creation’s “bright diversity of charms” (19), but only after they are defined against the 
“dark obstructed sphere,” that represents a lack of knowledge, like oblivion (32).  “Sight” 
still describes oblivion in fairly negative terms, and transcendent sight and rapturous light 
are the foregone endpoints of the poem.  Yet even these depictions suggest that light can 
only enter the picture if it has a void to fill.  If, as Susan Stewart has argued, poiesis arises 
to “counter the oblivion of darkness” (2), then Robinson conversely creates darkness in 
order to emerge from it.   
  Like another of Robinson’s poems, “To Apathy,” the description of “Oblivion 
horrible” (26) takes part in the flip side of the cult of sensibility, the desire for 
                                                
85 In the Broadview edition of Walsingham, Julie Schaffer notes how Robinson draws on 
the epistemological and educational theories of Locke as she first describes the 
protagonist’s tenacious memories and impressions of his childhood home (47n1). 
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indifference, for mental and physical numbness, or forgetfulness.86  This “melancholy 
blank” (32) appears a bit like the mature adult returning to Locke’s tabula rasa through 
the sleep, depression, and periodic moments of ignorance through which the mind cycles 
during the poem.  Though oblivion may represent stasis and a profound lack of 
knowledge, Robinson’s periodic return to the “blank page” has striking implications for 
the ways the mind might use blankness as the grounds for new knowledge: 
Nor yet alone the misery extreme 
Of the dread gloom opake involves his mind; 
The longing for that SOMETHING unknown, 
Whose pow’r he feels, diffusing its warm touch 
O’er every sensate nerve! that POW’R which marks 
The varying season in their varying forms, 
That tells him there is YET a sense untry’d, 
Ungratified, yet fraught with heavenly bliss  (76-83) 
This passage pointedly grapples with Locke’s ideas about knowledge, sensation, and 
experience.  Experience, in Locke’s epistemology, provided the basis for knowledge and 
was first and foremost accumulated through sensation and then, afterwards, by reflection 
on those sensory perceptions.  Locke, like Hume after him, pondered the consequences of 
sleep, forgetfulness, and oblivion to human consciousness, considering how one could 
attest to being the same person if consciousness and previous experience were interrupted 
                                                
86 See for example Francis Greville’s “Ode to Indifference,” a piece of which Robinson 
uses for her epigraph to her “Ode on Rapture,” and also many of Smith’s poems that 
allude to opium use.  Charlotte Sussman’s article “The Art of Oblivion:  Charlotte Smith 
and Helen of Troy” discusses Smith’s turn to nepenthe (and opium) as antidotes for too 
much sympathy.  Robinson also took opium, as Martin J. Levy most fully discusses in 
“Coleridge, Mary Robinson and Kubla Khan.” 
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or lost.  For Robinson, however, the cessation of feeling and thought in that “dread gloom 
opake” may shut down current perception but strategically allows for “that 
SOMETHING unknown” to creep into the mind. Oblivion forms a radical kind of 
forgetting that allows human consciousness to remain intact, deleting certain ideas while 
inventing others.  As Locke argued, Liberty is defined by “the power to think or not to 
think … according to the preference or direction of his own mind” (II.XXI.7), and 
Robinson’s poem highlights the extent to which forgetting might be freeing.  In his 
chapter on “Identity and Diversity,” Locke inadvertently suggests how oblivion might 
help change a man’s mind:  “Absolute oblivion separates what is thus forgotten from the 
person, but not from the man” (III.XXVII.20).  Though it will not change the overall 
identity of a man, lost memory might change the way he thinks about himself and the 
world around him.  For Hume, variation in an expected result changes the assurance or 
probability of a customary event.  So, in “Sight” oblivion’s form of radical forgetting 
alters the mind’s habituations.  For Robinson, the unreliability of memory and 
experiential forms of knowledge invite variation and change that have the potential to 
alter probability and custom. 
 It is necessary to point out that while the poem repeatedly dwells in these 
moments of oblivion, it also spends a good deal of time detailing the lush wonders of 
nature’s varying forms, which represent rapture, or the array of sensations and ideas that 
compose a healthy landscape, as well as a healthy mind.  The poem climaxes and ends, 
however, when the rainbow of materiality merges into the white light of Enlightenment 
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“sight” that may blind and stupefy as much as it illuminates.87  Not unlike Shelley’s 
“shape all light” in “The Triumph of Life,” by the end of the poem, light seems to 
transmute into a blinding form of oblivion: 
 Such are the horrors, such the pangs acute, 
  That shroud the DARKEN’D EYE, whose mortal sense, 
  Consign’d to one unbless’d and mournful night, 
  Can by ETERNAL DAY alone be cured. 
  Where the dim shade shall vanish from its beams, 
  And, bathing in a sea of endless light, 
  The renovated orb, awoke from DEATH, 
  Shall snatch its rays from IMMORTALITY!  (212-19) 
Bathed in a “sea of endless light,” the speaker is frozen in a moment of rapture and 
ecstasy, a lyrical moment that eerily resembles absolute darkness.  The speaker can, at 
least in this final moment of bliss, feel or see nothing but light, a state that precludes 
every other emotional variation but transcendent enlightenment.  As the inverse of 
darkness’s blank slate, immortality’s eternal day figures the tyrannical propensity for 
knowledge to become too sure of itself.  This blinding rapture lyricizes the world to 
                                                
87 In this sense, Robinson’s figurative use of light foreshadows Percy Shelley’s use of 
light imagery in “The Triumph of Life,” particularly his figure of the “shape all light,” 
though Shelley may also be parodying the counter-revolutionary position that equated the 
Revolution with the Enlightenment.  It also resembles Paul de Man’s arguments 
“Blindness and Insight,” especially in “The Rhetoric of Blindness,” where de Man argues 
that the writer is often blind to his own rhetoric, which the reader and critic attempt to 
uncover.  This formulation in Robinson’s early work foreshadows the propensities of her 
later work to encourage her own readers to be suspicious of reigning rhetoric (like that of 
overwrought sensibility) and to include oppositional situations or arguments within the 




death, as the transcendent lyrical moment inadvertently promotes temporal and 
ideological stasis.  This regressive transformation of rapture into transcendence may 
happen inadvertently in “Sight,” but by 1793, Robinson may also be surreptitiously 
parodying the French Revolution’s religion of Reason, which had been blinded to its own 
excesses during the Terror and reign of Robespierre, not to mention France’s declaration 
of war on England by early 1793.88  By merging any “diversity of charms” into a unified, 
teleological white light, rapture—whether millenarian or Revolutionary—conceals the 
rainbow that a normal (periodic, non-eternal) day might reveal.  The speaker ends up 
sightless and dumb in an idealized, transcendent space that has pulled away from the 
material, sensory, variegated natural world.  Light’s necessary err into blindness begs for 
the kind of oblivion that might dissolve reified associations and refresh the grounds of 
knowledge.   
 This periodicity is accentuated and enabled by Robinson’s choice of blank verse, 
what would come to be the ultimate poetic form of lofty contemplation in works like 
“Tintern Abbey” and “Beachy Head.”  Though we might assume that Robinson’s non-
rhyming, non-stanzaic verse would be the perfect poetic form for engaging with the kinds 
of diversity she later more effectively enacts with the ballad, in “Sight” the sprawl of the 
blank verse invites this periodic and dialectical relationship between oblivion and rapture.  
Paradoxically, without any structural repetition, Robinson’s verse still has a difficult time 
creating difference.  Instead, blank verse becomes teleological through its vertical and 
horizontal rhythms, which create a largely linear momentum and structure.  The building 
                                                
88 For this reading of the French Revolution blind to its own excesses through metaphors 
of light, see Orrin N. C. Wang’s “Shelley Disfigured” in Fantastic Modernity and W. J. 
T. Mitchell’s Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. 
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thrust climaxes at the moment of transcendence, when the white light of ideal sight 
dominates the rest of the poem.  In the end, the poem fails to find an appropriate model 
for diversity and variation, vacillating between the blankness of oblivion with its absence 
of sensation and a totality of thought dominated by Enlightenment reason. 
 
Sappho’s Stupid Sonnet and the Freedom of Oblivion 
 When Robinson returns to this problem again in her 1796 sonnet sequence 
Sappho and Phaon, she concentrates on the tendency for habituated emotions and 
thoughts to become tyrannical and suffocating, precluding any rapturous array of 
experiences.  The epiphany of the sequence occurs when Sappho realizes that she needs 
oblivion to excise certain addictive mind-sets, a reversal of Robinson’s skeptical attitude 
in “Sight.”  Oblivion eventually serves as both an antidote to her single-minded passion 
for Phaon and, even more problematic for the poet, a cure for the stock poetic form of the 
sonnet that stunts and retards a woman writer’s poetic growth or freedom.  These 
habituations deter Sappho from the coveted bliss or rapture—now a non-prescriptive 
variation of sensations, ideas, and poetics, rather than the white light of epiphanic 
knowledge.  Jerome McGann argues that through Robinson’s reimagining of poetics as a 
form of passion that chastises its unreceptive male reader, “Sappho becomes a 
Promethean figure who will inaugurate a new age of enlightenment and higher ‘Reason’” 
(123).  While McGann is right to point out that Sappho’s use of affect is purposely 
excessive in order to break through emotional and intellectual convention (130), the 
sonnet sequence in fact portrays how repeatedly languishing in the same sensations and 
perceptions stifles the mind.  In staging the impossibility of Sappho’s rapture through her 
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Romantic reunion with Phaon, Robinson instead illustrates a different possibility in 
Sappho’s suicide, an allegory about the uses of oblivion as a means of shocking 
Sappho—and her readers—into different ways of thinking and feeling.  
As a poetic manifesto, moreover, the sonnet sequence’s adumbration of oblivion 
points to Robinson’s argument with the hold sensibility had over the lyrical sonnet and 
women’s writing in the 1780s and 90s.89  Critiquing the sonnet’s tendency to reify, 
consolidate, and totalize emotions, her sequence troubles any singular, driving emotive 
resolution or restitution and instead inspires her to more intellectual, poetic goals.  The 
poem documents the failure of her earlier models and demonstrates how the poetic might 
intervene in public discourse.  As Jason Rudy has argued and as “Sight” explores, 
Robinson figured the lyric as a form of electricity or light that would jolt readers into a 
universal mindset. 90  This universality partakes in Revolutionary ideals of universal 
freedom and communication, which, after the Terror and the Napoleonic wars, seemed 
even less likely.  Robinson’s later poems, such as the Sappho sequence, document the 
failure of lyric rapture as a means of unifying the public or public debate, and instead we 
begin to see Robinson taking up a more diffident version of the public sphere.91  Rather 
                                                
89 Robinson herself was skeptical of the sonnet’s vogue and overuse, as she testifies in her 
introduction to Sappho and Phaon.  The sonnet had become a genre of sensibility ever 
since Smith’s immensely popular Elegiac Sonnets, a model that many women writers 
used to voice passion, sympathy and melancholy.  For the variety of women using the 
sonnet form to work through questions of sensibility, see Daniel Robinson’s “Reviving 
the Sonnet:  Romantic Women and the Sonnet Claim” and Paula Backscheider’s chapter 
on women and the sonnet form in Women Poets and Their Poetry:  Inventing Agency, 
Inventing Genre. 
90 I take this idea from Rudy’s chapter on Robinson and Felicia Hemans, “The Electric 
Poetess,” part of his forthcoming book on electricity and lyric poetry in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
91 Though Adriana Craciun has discussed Robinson’s views of the ideal public sphere 
rendered through the free, public press and Robinson’s contributions to The Monthly 
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than universal assent, the lyric begins to aspire to a model of dissent and competition of 
ideas undermining the hegemony of sensibility and other discourses that restricted debate.  
 The Sappho sequence opens with a sonnet that envisions ideal rapture, which 
Sappho associates with Phaon, but which remains the province of poetry: 
  Favour’d by Heav’n are those, ordain’d to taste 
     The bliss supreme that kindles fancy’s fire; 
     Whose magic fingers sweep the muses’ lyre, 
  In varying cadence, eloquently chaste! 
  [. . .] 
     For thou, blest POESY!  with godlike pow’rs 
  To calm the miseries of man wert giv’n; 
     When passion rends, and hopeless love devours, 
  By mem’ry goaded, and by frenzy driv’n, 
     ‘Tis thine to guide him ‘midst Elysian’ bow’rs, 
  And shew his fainting soul,— a glimpse of Heav’n. (1.1-4, 9-14) 
According to Sappho, supreme bliss ignites the imagination and produces poetry with 
“varying cadence.”  Here two excited emotional states oppose each other—bliss, which 
produces fruitful variation, and frenzy, which is uncontrollable because it comes to 
dominate every other sensation.  Poetry’s varying cadence should be able to calm 
frenzied passion and lead the lover to transcendent bliss. 
                                                                                                                                            
Magazine, I would argue the Robinson moves past this civil, idealized view of the public 
debate toward one that chafes against the public sphere’s tendency to come to hegemonic 
consensus and to consolidate power structures.   
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 Sonnet 3, entitled “The Bower of Pleasure,” depicts this ideal world, which 
refuses the tyranny of a single emotion or perspective.  In the “tangled shade,” protected 
from the “blazing torch of noon-day light,” (1, 2) Sappho paints a picture of rich, material 
nature in motion: 
     The birds breathe bliss! light zephyrs kiss the ground, 
  Stealing the hyacinth’s divine perfume; 
     while from pellucid fountains glitt’ring round, 
  Small tinkling rills bid rival flow’rets bloom! 
     HERE, laughing Cupids bathe the bosom’s wound; 
  THERE, tyrant passion finds a glorious tomb!  (9-14) 
Nature operates on all the senses here.  The tyranny of passion, which Sappho will 
outline in greater detail in sonnet 6, is put to rest where a multiplicity of physical 
sensations competes for attention.  Following the empiricists, Robinson suggests that a 
variety of sensory stimulation also engenders an abundance of ideas.  The scene takes 
place in the shade, invoking Locke’s dark room as a mind whose emptiness allows for the 
rich play of ideas rather than the white light of a single, blinding ideology.   
 The figure of “rival flow’rets” strongly suggests that bliss operates as an affective, 
intellectual, and formal countermeasure, an ideal that she will not actually develop until 
her experimentations with ballads at the end of the decade.  In “Spenser’s Ravishment:  
Rape and Rapture in The Faerie Queen,” Katherine Eggert has argued that Spenser’s 
Bower of Bliss in Book II of the Fairie Queen, to which Robinson alludes with the 
“bow’r of Pleasure,” offers an important, alternative model of reading.  Rather than the 
forceful penetration of the reader by a phallic text, the rapture of the Bower offers a 
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“suffusion of delight” and a “multiplicity” of readings (3).  Robinson, like many other 
writers of the period, takes a page from Spenser’s book of copia, a technique that places 
her among those writers of the eighteenth century who viewed his verse as excessive and 
protean, as Greg Kucich has demonstrated.   
Though Sappho can imagine this kind of plenitude, she cannot actualize it as long 
as she remains addicted to Phaon.  Robinson contrasts this host of possibilities with 
“tyrant passion” or, as she describes in sonnets 17 and 32, the “thraldom” of romantic 
love.  Sonnet 6 most fully articulates this univocal feeling:  “to fix the tender gaze” or “to 
chant one name in ceaseless lays/ To hear no words that other tongues can say” (1, 5-6).  
At this point Sappho begins to realize that her passion—a passion for finding bliss with 
Phaon—has become a monologic thought, limiting her emotional and intellectual vision.  
Again, in empiricist terms, because love will allow her only to perceive one emotion, and 
one set of sensory stimuli, her ideas cannot develop.  Nor can her poetry, as she admits 
that she is trapped singing Phaon’s “one name in ceaseless lays.”  Sappho knows, even at 
this point early in the sonnets, that she may be doomed to sing the same tune over and 
over again.   
As the rest of the sonnets demonstrate, her love for Phaon stunts her mental 
capabilities, as she becomes caught neurotically thinking the same thought and feeling 
the same feelings over and over again.  Though she begins her complaints of despair over 
the probability of never rekindling Phaon’s love around sonnet 20, she truly sinks into an 
affective hell after she leaves Greece for Italy.  Pursuing her lover, this change of 
landscape not only heightens the frantic pitch of Sappho’s pleas for Phaon’s return, but it 
also brings the imagery of oblivion into the poem.  The physical movement marks a shift 
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in sensory and perceptual terrain that offers the dual possibilities of seeing Phaon again 
and forgetting him.  As Sappho states in sonnet 23:  “Let one kind word my weary woes 
repay,/ Or, in eternal slumbers bid them rest” (13-14).  Though she still stridently yearns 
for romantic reunion, her ultimatum suggests that her best chances for recovery are in 
forgetting Phaon.  That she cannot highlights the tenacity of habituated memory.  Each 
time Sappho looks anywhere she sees signs of Phaon:  “For me no spring appears, no 
summers bloom,/ No Sun-beams glitter, and no altars burn!/ The mind’s dark winter of 
eternal gloom,/ Shews ‘midst the waste a solitary urn” (10-13).  Her perceptual abilities 
have been stunted by her obsession with Phaon, and it begins to dawn on her that her 
mind itself is a wasteland while “mem’ry still, reluctant to depart” haunts her (28.5).   
It is no stretch to say that Sappho’s inability to get over Phaon has made her an 
idiot.  In describing the Greek poet’s addiction to habituated memories, Robinson is 
implicitly drawing from the Enlightenment discourse of idiocy, a discourse she typically 
perverts.  In Locke’s discussions, savages and animals (such as parrots) are inhuman 
precisely to the extent that they can not acquire language or especially memories.  Idiocy 
occurs because savages can not take their sensory experiences and then use reason to 
reflect upon and store them in the mind (Locke Book II, Chapter XI, Section 12).  As 
opposed to the inability to process sensory information, Sappho becomes dumb, in both 
senses of the word, when she can only repeat and regurgitate the memories of Phaon she 
already has. Sappho’s idiocy stems from her inability to develop new sensations or 
reflections because her perceiving mind is blocked by those memories that insist on 
overlaying themselves on every perceptual terrain.  At this point she needs something 
more radical than either reason or sensitivity to help her conceptualize new experiences. 
 
118  
Sappho, moreover, is explicit about the toll her emotional state takes on her 
writing.  At the same time, Robinson uses the anachronistic sonnet to lodge a referendum 
on the poetry of sensibility that dominated much women’s writing in the early 1790s.  
The relationship between Sappho’s emotional state and her stunted poetic potency is 
spelled out most incisively in a late sonnet, “To the Muses,” just before Sappho decides 
to commit suicide. 
  Prepare your wreaths, Aonian maids divine, 
  To strew the tranquil bed where I shall sleep; 
  In tears, the myrtle and the laurel sleep; 
  And let Erato’s hand the trophies twine. 
  No parian marble, there, with labour’d line, 
  Shall bid the wand’ring lover stay to weep; 
  There holy silence shall her vigils keep, 
  Save, when the nightingale such woes as mine 
  Shall sadly sing; as twilight’s curtains spread.   
There shall the branching lotos widely wave (39.1-10) 
This sonnet is most striking for the part the lyric mode plays in the tyranny of imitation.  
The Parian marble, which bears the narrative of Sappho’s journey from Greece to Italy, is 
missing from the scene, and instead Erato, the muse of lyric poetry, twines the myrtle and 
laurel plants.  Lyric poetry itself takes the plants that should signal love, devotion, peace, 
and writing and twists them into an ornament for Sappho’s deathbed.  The death scene is 
dumb to any story but the mute symbols of Sappho’s woe.  Without other kinds of 
testimony, the dead plants become a metonymy for the poet, just as the nightingale’s sad 
 
119  
song replaces her poetry.  The “holy silence,” which should make the viewers of 
Sappho’s life-in-death receptive to her story, instead fills them with stunted and stupid 
signs of her despair.  In the end, instead of inspiring any grand realization and emotional 
outpouring in Phaon, this repetitive, lyric mode imprisons both Sappho and the reader in 
stagnant feeling.  Just as multiplicity could not be adequately represented by 
Enlightenment ratiocination in “Sight,” Sappho and Phaon demonstrates just how 
suffocating and single-minded sensibility—and the poems it adduces—can be. 
Rather than providing the multiple opportunities for interiority that she longs for, 
Sappho’s sonnets rehearse decades-old emotional content.  Robinson says as much in her 
introduction to the sequence, passing some harsh judgment on “the non-descript 
ephemera from the heated brains of self-important poetasters, all ushered into notice 
under the appellation of SONNET!” (146).  Robinson may simply be looking to separate 
herself from the poseur sonneteers by advocating that sonnets be written with strict 
adherence to traditional forms.  The other possibility, though, is that her sequence 
performs and works through the rejection of the sonnet of sensibility.  There were a 
variety of sonnet forms Robinson could have chosen to use for her sequence.  She resists 
the closing couplet of a Shakespearean sonnet and opts for the six-lined, alternating 
rhyme of a Sicilian sestet.  The Italian form necessitates more rhymes but might 
potentially have provided her with a greater degree of formal openness and diversity.  
Unlike Charlotte Smith, whose sonnets abound in formal variation, however, Robinson 
uses the same form for every sonnet, closing down the possibilities for variation except 
within the strict scheme of her chosen Italian stanza.  While Sappho’s use of imitation in 
this sonnet bars her from real creativity, Robinson’s management of Sappho’s repetition 
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may signal the beginnings of Robinson’s appropriation of imitation for self-critique.  
Modern readers are often tripped up by this distinction, taking Sappho’s stagnant feeling 
for Robinson’s poetry, rather than as a self-reflexive assessment.  It is this knowing 
imitation that vacates the sonnet, and the devolution into sorrow and despair ultimately 
opens a path beyond sensibility through the shock of oblivion.  Only when Sappho falls 
deeper into oblivion and finally hits rock bottom does she find the potential to forget 
Phaon and transform herself. 
Although Sappho had attempted to “WAKE!” from her poetic and mental 
monotony in sonnet 33 (33.1), it is only after this sonnet attesting to Sappho’s lack of 
poetic power that she can move toward a revelation about the necessity for oblivion, 
which she achieves in sonnet 40.  The intervening poems are filled with pleas to “let 
black Erebus succeed” Venus’s ray (35.6), and Robinson narrates Sappho succumbing 
deeper into a state of oblivion in order to awake to a more permanent revelation:   
  On the low margins of a murm’ring stream, 
  As rapt in meditation’s arms I lay; 
  Each aching sense in slumbers stole away, 
  While potent fancy form’d a soothing dream; 
  O’er the Leucadian deep, a dazzling beam 
  Shed the bland light of empyrean day! 
  But soon transparent shadows veil’d each ray, 
  While mystic visions sprang athwart the gleam! 
  Now to the heaving gulf they seem’d to bend, 
  And now across the sphery regions glid; 
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  Now in mid-air, their dulcet voices blend, 
  “Awake!  awake!” the restless phalanx cried, 
  “See ocean yawns the lover’s woes to end; 
  Plunge the green wave, and bid thy griefs subside.”  (40.1-14) 
When passion’s dominance has been muted through the oblivion of sleep, Sappho’s fancy 
is once again potent and can effectively describe the process that will lead her to a 
visionary moment.  Not unlike the beginning of Shelley’s “Triumph of Life,” Sappho 
embarks on her revelatory experience through the haze of distorted, semi-conscious 
perception.  This quasi-hallucination between waking and sleep finally calls her to 
“Awake! awake!” and at last breaks her loose from the thought patterns she has been 
stuck in throughout the entire sequence.  Robinson’s epiphany is provoked first by sleep 
and then by “transparent shadows,” as if her mind is reverting back again to Locke’s 
“dark room.”  Even more dramatically, however, the pattern resembles Edmund Burke’s 
own reading of “Locke’s opinion concerning darkness” in A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Sublime and Beautiful.  In contrast to “custom” which “reconciles us to everything,” 
Burke argues, “Black will always have something melancholy in it, because the sensory 
will always find the change to it from other colours too violent” (149).  Putting aside the 
overt racism of the passage, we can note how Burke attributes this shock to the 
alternation of darkness and light, which causes the eye to dilate painfully (146).  
Sappho’s own dark vision dilates her mind, awakening her to “mystic visions” that lead 
her to the “heaving gulf” of the deep.  
Though we can easily read Sappho’s revelation as a decision to commit suicide 
and give up on a world where Phaon does not love her, given the extent to which a 
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discourse about the mind dominates the sonnet sequence, the suicide might be read 
primarily as a figurative and poetic gesture.  Sappho’s resignation of herself to the 
unknown deep composes a visionary moment where the most extreme formulation of 
oblivion also composes the most radical form of bliss—an ecstasy that transports Sappho 
beyond the memories that have dominated her subjectivity.92  Standing on the “dizzy 
precipice” in the sequence’s penultimate sonnet, Sappho finally learns the use of 
oblivion’s forgetful lack of knowledge: 
  While o’er my breast the waves Lethean roll, 
  To calm rebellious Fancy’s fev’rish dream; 
  Then shall my Lyre disdain love’s dread control, 
  And loftier passions, prompt the loftier theme!  (43.11-14) 
Sappho may be thinking of her poetry’s life beyond the grave, but the lines make even 
more sense when taken as a statement about oblivion’s role in expunging her idiocy and 
memory in order to change her perceptions, her ideas, and ultimately her poetry.  Suicide 
often doubled as a Romantic trope for freedom from an either-or situation, beginning 
with Goethe’s Werther.  Robinson extends this trope as not only a figure for female 
agency, but also as a gesture of final grounding in a series of moments of oblivion that 
compose the plot of the sonnet sequence.  Like Smith’s hermit, Sappho sets her sights on 
a wide, open gulf that frees her from the gender-bound ties of memory and sensibility.   
                                                
92 Kari E. Lokke, in her book on Romantic women’s novels and transcendence, argues 
that narratives like Sappho’s—particularly Germaine de Stael’s Corrine—represent a 
transcendence of passions where “rejection of the ‘absolute power’ of one idea or feeling 
will come to serve as a program of political and socio-cultural liberation as well” (27).  
While the ends of my argument about Sappho are somewhat similar, I view Robinson as 




Looking toward a host of “loftier passions” and “loftier themes,” Robinson takes 
the plunge into a wider, more fraught poetics that begins to move toward multiplicity, 
diversity, and dissent.  She does this most materially when she sketches a way for 
Sappho’s desire to move beyond the single object of Phaon.  In doing so she resembles 
Hélène Cixous, who figures erotogeneity in “Laugh of the Medusa” as a polymorphous 
desire that launches “a production of forms, a veritable aesthetic activity, each stage of 
rapture inscribing a resonant vision” (2040).  In the end, Sappho and Phaon looks toward 
the polymorphous possibilities for Sappho’s desires, possibilities that will literally 
expand her experiences and “production of forms.”  Moreover, these desires of Sappho, 
up in the air as they are at the end of the poem, repudiate any kind of unified form or 
identity.  Cixous similarly describes her new woman as having the “gift of alterability” 
(2053).  Sappho’s poetics and subjectivity are, in the final sonnet, envisioned as both 
thrown into question and freed from former constraints.  How Robinson realizes this kind 
of feminine aesthetics while rejecting the epiphanic trajectory of oblivion will be the 
preoccupation of her later works. 
Rapture as Formal Diversity:  Repetition, Difference, and the Uses of Idiocy 
 At this point in her career, Robinson begins to shift away from a dialectical 
struggle between oblivion on the one hand and rapture or bliss on the other and moves 
toward a way for vacancy to inhere inside a poetics that simultaneously promotes bliss, 
diversity, and variation.  She accomplishes this by tying her ideas about radical 
empiricism to formal experimentation, yet what is perhaps most interesting is how this 
mental and poetic diversity arises in conjunction with—and as a result of—the repetitive 
articulations of several idiot boys.  As was the case with Sappho, Robinson defines the 
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idiot by subverting traditional Lockean and Enlightenment discourse on idiocy and 
knowledge.  Rather than depicting animals or savage boys whose brains are too empty to 
record and remember sensations and experience, Robinson’s idiots are dumb because 
they cannot rid themselves of old memories, habituations, or prejudices.  The examples 
after Sappho, however, become more like idiot savants whose vacant brains provoke 
them into stuttering random differences and new sensations.  This paradox is heightened 
by Robinson’s turn from more lyrical forms to the ballad as the prime measure of this 
plenitude.  In the wake of the antiquarian revival, the ballad in the eighteenth century was 
thought to preserve cultural memory and literary bardic heritage at the same time it was 
the site for rampant if accidental divergence in the form of variants. 93   The paradox 
surrounding the ballad as both a storehouse of cultural memory and as a generator of 
multiplicity is exactly the tension Robinson highlights in the figure of the idiot whose 
repetition in the later poems starts to manifest minute differences.  
In particular, the structure of the balladic refrain helps Robinson focus her 
attention on the difference between the repetitive, vacant lyric, such as some of Sappho’s 
memory-bound, static sonnets, and a lyric that becomes a site for a cascade of 
incremental, formal difference and psychological heterogeneity.  While using Deleuze 
might help draw out some interesting ideas that Robinson was developing about the uses 
                                                
93 Ballad collecting gained steam in the mid eighteenth century with Thomas Percy’s 
Reliques (1765).  Percy notoriously attempted to produce originary and authorial versions 
of many traditional ballads.  Other editors, like Joseph Ritson, or much later, Frances 
Child, would pointedly collect a number of ballad variants in their collections, helping to 
shape an understanding of each ballad as a collection of tales and tunes circulating around 
a generalized plot or trope.  One might go so far as to argue that Robinson was a part of 
the new vanguard of ballad editors who sought to highlight the ballad’s instability as one 
of its most interesting characteristics.  Nick Groom recounts Percy’s editorial practices in 
The Making of the Reliques. 
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of poetic repetition, the salient link between Deleuzian repetition as difference and 
Robinson’s model of idiocy is that they both work from Hume’s ideas of repetition, 
association, and habit to explore variation, distinction and change.  In his book Difference 
and Repetition, Deleuze uses Hume to argue, “Habit draws something new from 
repetition—namely, difference” (73).  Both Deleuze and Robinson essentially set out to 
delineate and argue with the following Humean dictum:  “Repetition changes nothing in 
the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it” (qtd. 
in Difference and Repetition 70). 
Rather than erasing habit altogether, Robinson now explores the possibility of 
pushing past habit’s monotony through verbal over-production.  This newer model 
crucially develops structural changes in the materiality of her verse, which in turn 
instigates change in both the contemplating mind and the objects it ponders.  Her 
insistence on the materiality of her poetics as well as idiocy’s empirical basis acquits her 
poetics of being merely an escape into a metaphysical mind.  The link she establishes 
between the material body of verse and varying psychological perspectives undercuts the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism that helps to install ideology.  Moreover, her poetry’s 
fractional variations present a model for social change with a new means of viewing the 
category of “woman” as only one of many modes of alterity.   
 Before examining her most fruitful experiments with ballads in Lyrical Tales, it is 
useful to look at an earlier example where Robinson is already thinking through how the 
ballad’s peculiar characteristics might help her to establish a model for change and 
freedom.  In her novel Walsingham (1797), Robinson interpolates poetry—including 
many ballad or ballad-like poems—as many did women novelists of the time.  Rather 
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than simply intensifying lyrical or sentimental moments in the prose, her poems, 
particularly the ballad, collect and put into conversation thematically similar narratives 
running through the text.  In this experiment with the ways prose and poetic genres 
remediate and compete with each other, more allegorical and metaphorical poems are 
often pitted against the eponymous protagonist’s self-absorbed, sentimental, hegemonic 
first-person narrative.  Like Sappho, whose tyrannical passion and memory of Phaon 
make her immune to any other perceptions, Walsingham’s over-wrought sensibility 
likewise makes him blind to other characters, plots, or perspectives circulating in the 
novel.  The poems he writes or copies down into the text of the confessional novel often 
parody his blindness to these other narrative or emotive threads.  In this way 
Walsingham, like Sappho, becomes a figure for a kind of emotional monotony or idiocy.   
Walsingham’s poems, moreover, become paradigmatic of textual idiocy, a mode 
of vacancy that critiques dominant narratives and supplies other variants or points of 
view.  While most scholarship on interpolated poetry has argued that the poetry serves as 
a means to reinforce and extend a particular character’s depth and sensibility, Robinson 
seeks the benefits of pitting different textual materials against one another.94  In an article 
about the interpolation of poetry into Ann Radcliffe’s novels, Mary Favret argues that the 
similarity of lyric moments to adjacent prose moments in the text reveals the extent to 
which poetry and prose genres were becoming incestuous and identical—a situation, she 
argues, which forced writers like Wordsworth to make claims about the superior nature of 
poetry in the “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads.   If imitation marks one avenue available 
                                                
94 Gabrielle Starr’s book Lyric Generations explores how the lyric mode builds “round 




to women writers who wanted in on the lyric boys’ club, it represents only one part of the 
story about how women like Robinson intervened into literary aesthetics at the turn of the 
century.  Rather than an effusive mimicry of prose descriptions, Robinson’s poems 
develop textual idiocy as a form of remediation.  Walsingham’s poetic repetition of 
descriptive and narrative content opens up gaps and differences in parallel textual 
moments, ultimately offering poetry, rather than prose, as a site of reflection and 
dialogism. 
Many of the poems Walsingham first writes as he tells the story of his childhood 
do follow Favret’s model of imitation.  For example, he writes “Imitation of Spencer” 
[sic], as he reflects back on the early days of his youth spent in the Welsh countryside 
that he has just narrated.  He describes himself as a “mountain weather-beaten wight” 
who cannot help but indulge in chivalric values and rustic life.  Similarly, the sonnets in 
this early part of the novel also tend to mimic the emotional state that he presents in 
prose.  After a particularly humiliating encounter with his cousin, Walsingham escapes to 
a portico and describes a lively summer pastoral scene (134).  He proceeds to translate 
this scene almost exactly into verse, using a volta in the couplet to juxtapose his own 
woeful mood with the cheerful summer landscape, the aristocratic grounds that allegorize 
his cousin’s entitled gaiety.  While these poems might reinforce Walsingham as a 
sensitive narrator exiled from his own family, his poems’ belaboured repetition of 
emotional content tends to refract his sensibility as self-pity. 
It is no coincidence that Walsingham’s poetry clashes most forcefully with his 
prose narrative after he moves to London and begins to imitate the excessive appetites of 
the aristocracy even as he censures them.  No longer a young rustic at one with nature, he 
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begins to write poems that ironize his complicity in urban life and that inadvertently 
collate the situations of many characters in the novel aside from himself.  The most 
poignant example comes just after the supposedly sensitive Walsingham flirts with, 
rapes, and then jilts his landlady’s daughter, Amelia Woodford.  This “pupil of nature,” 
with his sensitive sympathy and his natural lust, epitomizes the double entendre of the 
novel’s subtitle in a sonnet he writes just after this episode (351).  The poem quotes a 
recent conversation recounted in the text between Walsingham and his friend Mr. Optic 
who informs him that Amelia “lives; but in so pitiable a state, that it would be happiness 
to die!” (301).  A confused Walsingham then writes the poem with this closing line, “For 
since ‘tis hell to live—‘tis HEAV’N to die!” as he laments both her “destruction” but also 
his own role as an outcast from society.  The sonnet implicitly compares the situations of 
both Amelia and Walsingham as melancholy sufferers, yet whereas Amelia eventually 
does expire from the shame of her rape, Walsingham never dies from being an outcast in 
aristocratic London or Bath.  By mocking the universalizing gesture of the sonnet of 
sensibility and its language of pleasurable death, the poem likewise satirizes 
Walsingham’s selfish quotation of Amelia’s real agony for a situation that is really 
incomparable.  Poems like this one create textual moments outside the first-person, self-
pitying vantage point of Walsingham and provide the reader with a mechanism that 
encourages them to take stock of various characters and contrast Walsingham’s dubious 
actions with his sympathetic rhetoric.  If Walsingham is stuck in a certain mode of 
sensibility, his poems create a site of reading that entices readers to move toward a wide 
range of perceptions and ideas about the narrative events. 
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Perhaps no poem in the text allegorizes these interpretive moments with such 
force than the ballad that he copies down for the reader just after running into a 
highwayman who is another outcast society boy and Walsingham’s brother in disguise.  
The landlord of an inn tells Walsingham “The Doublet of Grey” just before he is about to 
cross the heath that supposedly is home to the ballad’s haunting ghosts.  The old, local 
ballad recounts the story of an aristocratic girl who falls in love with a peasant of whom 
her family disapproves.  She eventually disguises herself in a doublet to protect her 
forbidden lover and dies by his side, haunting the countryside.  Narratives of disguise and 
haunting—especially by women—abound in the novel:  Miss Woodford, Sir Sidney, and 
Lady Devlin all disguise themselves and haunt Walsingham in various ways due to their 
unrequited love.  Moreover, many of the men engage in disguise, including Walsingham 
and the young highwayman, in their own attempts to make themselves worthy for their 
lady loves.  The ballad’s allegorical mode, rather than serving as a mere showcase for 
Robinson’s talent in imitating yet another style of poetry, highlights certain narrative and 
thematic strains in the novel, encouraging readers to compare and contrast different 
characters who have taken up their own doublets of grey.  This comparison challenges 
certain interpretations Walsingham has been pushing on the reader.  He continually 
chastises women for their deceptions; most pointedly Walsingham holds Amelia 
responsible for disguising herself at a masquerade as his love interest, Isabella, a move 
that results in Walsingham kidnapping and raping her.  Yet Walsingham also hid his true 
identity from Amelia and her mother to make himself appear a proper gentleman.  By 
contrasting Amelia’s disguise with that of other characters, including Walsingham, the 
ballad becomes a space of reflection and judicious reading. 
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Poetry thus becomes the point of dialogism with the power to mute Walsingham’s 
first-person prose confession.  Robinson lures the reader to counterpose the protagonist’s 
idiocy with the textual idiocy of repetition as remediation, ultimately urging an 
understanding of the novel outside Walsingham’s jurisdiction and perception.  She 
creates a kind of textual bliss of “varying cadences” by using the ballad as a means of 
provoking readers to light upon the multiple parallel narratives available in the novel.  
These diverse textual experiences provide readers with varying sensations and reflections 
on a single topic like disguise, and this opens a gap in any notion of unitary subjectivity.  
These interpolated lyrics thus remediate incremental narrative and thematic differences, 
which then create strategic spaces, voids, or ellipses in the text and the way the text 
makes meaning.  In turn, a multitude of narratives can be inscribed on the same poetic 
moment, leaving the reader to make a number of linkages among events, people, and 
outcomes.   
Moreover, these fissures between allegorical poems and the somewhat more 
realistic novel create cognitive gaps between metaphorical and narrative meanings.  
Temporary moments of non-knowledge work in two ways:  first, through a textual 
remediation that offers competing forms of knowledge; and second, through the literal 
space between narration and lyric, a space that provides a temporary cessation of 
language or sensation.  This kind of undecidability creates a space for readers’ own 
reflections—on both Walsingham and the formal dynamics of the novel.  Just as 
Robinson was able to critique Sappho’s inability to experience variegation in nature, 
these textual moments resist the tyranny of the first person perspective, and, perhaps 
more importantly, the hegemony of sensibility over young female readers.  Finally, this 
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technique may represent Robinson presenting a solution to various arguments about the 
novel’s dangerous effects on its young female readership.  Rather than either policing 
young women’s behavior or imbuing them with a subversive excess of sentiment and 
sensibility, Robinson’s novels supply women with a means of halting narrative that in 
turn that will help them generalize, analyze, and think for themselves. 
If Walsingham provides a readerly model for thinking through sentimental novels, 
Robinson’s later poems emphasize the ballad’s generative properties that produce a kind 
of textual idiocy and a thought process outside pure reason.  Like the volume it emulates, 
Lyrical Ballads, 95 Robinson’s last literary effort, Lyrical Tales, represents her own 
theoretical enquiry into the popular ballad genre, taking aim at Wordsworth’s plan to 
rehabituate the minds of men through the simplicity of rustic customs and language.96  
Wordsworth sets out to lyricize the ballad, paradoxically using the form’s narrative 
structure in the service of writing poems with teleological trajectories that lead readers to 
an epiphanic moment of lyric transcendence at the end of a rustic story.  Robinson 
focuses on different features of the ballad:  its tendency to rewrite itself with each 
iteration, its seriality and repetition and, most acutely in these last poems, the ballad’s 
refrain.  These tactics allow Robinson to reject lyric transcendence as she engenders 
variation both in the minds of her characters and through the poems’ formal structures.  
This use of variation and multiplicity leads to a different—and more complicated—brand 
                                                
95 See Ashley J. Cross’s article on Lyrical Tales. 
96 Adriana Craciun argues that Wordsworth may have been influenced by Robinson’s 
democratic view of the public sphere, “and perhaps composed his own countervision of 
art—nativist, introspective, and masculine—in some respects as an alternative to 
Robinson’s celebration of London as a cosmopolitan and (proto)feminist sphere of public 
art” (19).  As I have already suggested, I would argue that Robinson is taking the 
opposite tack, resisting the hegemony of the public sphere by enacting a form of reading 
that is differential, antagonistic, and not built on a model of rational, reflective thinking. 
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of vacancy as cognitive, political, and material potentiality, a vacancy whose production 
depends upon moments of decreation, pause, or ellipsis. 
Both poets employ the figure of the idiot to help them derail the Enlightenment 
narrative about how reflective thinking leads to social progress and linguistic 
achievement.  Enlightenment philosophers like Condillac and Rousseau considered 
savage boys as both signs of a mind vacated of memory and language and also as test-
cases for theories about how language and knowledge come to fill man’s originary vacant 
brain, sending him down the path to civilization.  While Wordsworth uses the idiot as an 
example of what can happen when man’s mind is vacated of reason and becomes 
receptive to the educative bounty of nature, Robinson portrays the idiot as a savant whose 
utterances formulate a kind of thinking that is neither primarily rational, emotional, or 
naturalistic. Although Robinson and Wordsworth are working against the same 
Enlightenment standard and using the same Enlightenment tropes, and though Robinson 
is clearly working from Wordsworth’s earlier volume, she was already exploring the uses 
of idiocy in the Sappho sequence and Walsingham.  It is in Lyrical Tales, however, that 
Robinson first envisions the idiot as a productive, rather than stunting model for thought.  
In these poems she moves past poetic repetition as a reification or even a critique of 
language and thought and instead highlights the non-coincidence of the idiot’s repetition.  
It is exactly this non-coincidence that in turn produces unique singularities.  Her idiots 
allegorize thought as a radical, generative act of creation, and their contingent output not 
only randomly constructs language outside socialized language and the social structures 




Three late poems in particular crystallize how Robinson’s idiots become 
allegories of poetic vacancy and also spell out how the idiot as a figure of exclusion 
might revises the political discourse of the 1790s.  Additionally, these final poems circle 
around how Robinson, as a woman writer, finds in language a model for materiality that 
aspires to transpose itself onto the social world—a more creative and excessive version of 
embodied reality.  Unlike Wordsworth’s work, where one poem can stand as a 
synecdoche for his whole career, Robinson’s multiple, repetitive corpus forces readers to 
read several poems at once to understand the various and sometimes conflicting aspects 
of her argument with empiricist, Enlightenment rationality as well as sensibility.  
“Deborah’s Parrot” serves as the best example of how idiocy becomes a model for the 
poetics of vacancy.  It offers readers a parrot who cannot sing lyric poetry but whose 
prating wreaks havoc on the domestic sphere and whose cawing produces variants of the 
same text.  A poem composed after Lyrical Tales but certainly part of that larger project, 
“The Savage of Aveyron,” develops Robinson’s intervention into the philosophical 
discourse of idiocy and its political implications.  The balladic refrain uttered by a savage 
abjected by society helps Robinson to dispute both communitarian politics and the 
universal rights discourse dominating the Left at the end of the 1790s.  In her final 
poems, Robinson fuses the political and the linguistic as she focuses on resisting any kind 
of conceptual synthesis or normative stance.  The late poem “To the Poet Coleridge” 
depicts her richest poetic display of language’s impersonal materiality.   
 Repetition abounds in Lyrical Tales through the volume’s abundant use of rhyme 
and anaphora often employed as signs of abjection and madness, but it especially occurs 
through the narrators’ refrains.  The “Poor Singing Dame” lives only to “louder, and 
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louder, repeat her old Song” (26).  The undiscerning Maid in “The Mistletoe” asserts her 
dominance over a rival for a gallant’s heart by telling the whole village that “we’ve been 
there twice before,” that is, kissing under the mistletoe.  “Mistress Gurton’s Cat” dies 
twice before the Mistress truly grieves for her catty friend.  Many of these poems, 
particularly those about animals and women, use the trope of doubling or of female 
rivalry within society to allegorize a repetition that typifies habituated characters and 
poetics.  These examples stand in tension with other poems about women and children on 
the outskirts of society, and that employ refrains encompassing multiple positions based 
on a logic of accumulating, differential variation.   
Robinson makes this transition in perhaps the most meta-poetic poem in the 
volume, “Deborah’s Parrot.”  The poem describes a rivalry between the spinster Debbie 
and her prating parrot.  As a bird who cannot sing but only mimics, the parrot can be read 
as another sign of stunted women’s poetry.  The parrot does quite a number on the 
townsfolk by gossiping and prating:  “sometimes told an ancient Dame/ Such tales as 
made her blush with shame!” (53-4), but his mischief results mostly from imitating his 
mistress’s stock phrase:  “But chiefly he was taught to cry,/ ‘Who with the Parson toy’d? 
O fie’” (57-58).  This refrain occurs twice in the poem, first to instigate spinster Debbie’s 
practical jokes on young maids.  Once Debbie marries, the neglected parrot turns on his 
owner by reciting the line in front of her new, possessive husband, who then beats her 
into submission.  Despite the fact that the accusation causes many women a good deal of 
trouble, it is nonsense.  Like Locke’s famous parrot in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Debbie’s parrot speaks without reason (Book II, Chapter XXVII, 
Sections 9 and 10).  His mind is vacant except for the memory of a single phrase.  It is 
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difficult to tell who is more daft:  Debbie, her parrot, or the townsfolk who believe the 
parrot and create meaning from the bird’s blather.  If the parrot represents the parody of 
lyric songbirds like the nightingale, the poem itself satirizes the final epiphany of 
Debbie’s husband.  It derides any transcendent textual moment or meaningful 
interpretation adduced from vacant repetition. 
This poetic gesture implicitly mocks Wordsworth’s uses of idiocy and the lyric in 
Lyrical Ballads such as “The Idiot Boy” or, proleptically, “There was a boy,” which was 
published in the 1800 edition.  Despite the narrative adventure of “The Idiot Boy,” 
Johnny’s idiocy essentially enables Wordsworth to collapse the ballad narrative into a 
final moment of lyrical, transcendent experience with the natural world.  Sent by his sick 
mother on a journey for a doctor, the boy gets lost in the woods and eventually has to be 
retrieved by her.  When she finally finds him and asks where he has been, he replies: 
  “The cocks did crow to-whoo, to-whoo, 
  “And the sun did shine so cold.” 
  —Thus answered Johnny in his glory, 
  And that was all his travel’s story.  (460-63) 
Though it looks almost as if the cocks are asking “To who?”, their crowing is every bit as 
nonsensical as the parrot’s repetition.  Like Debbie’s husband and the other listeners who 
ignore all other evidence but the parrot’s performance to make sense of his talk, Johnny’s 
vacant mind allows him to bypass the “gross stimulants” of the ballad narrative he has 
just experienced, as well as its information and contexts.  He finally arrives at what 
Avital Ronell calls “the silent experience of poetry … an ungraspable event” (275).  For 
Ronell, Johnny’s non-signifying “to-whoo, to-whoo” represents a privileged kind of 
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poetry, a moment of non-understanding or what she describes as “vacantly glacializing 
ecstasy” (277).97  Ronell is not the only Wordsworth scholar who reads his idiots as 
staging a turn from Enlightenment reflection or ratiocination. Alan Bewell argues that 
Wordsworth explicitly rejects Condillac’s and Rousseau’s arguments that the idiot 
modeled an originary human nature deprived of memory and reason.  For Bewell, 
Johnny’s vacant mind becomes receptive to a quasi-religious, pre-linguistic nature, with 
its non-rational, amazing educational power (65).   
Robinson had already begun to question the dramatic, reflective light that would 
lead to Enlightenment transcendence in such poems as “Sight.”  However, in Sappho and 
Phaon and especially in Walsingham, Robinson turns around to question the counter-
Enlightenment receptivity to “natural” feeling like sensibility, which might also lead to a 
revelatory educational—and conceptually synthetic—moment.  In these poems, she 
patently refuses to privilege the lyric ecstasy of pre-linguistic feeling, probably because 
women had for so long been subordinated as silent keepers of domestic feeling.  Though 
she explores similar moments of non-signifying, idiotic language to represent instances of 
                                                
97 Ronell, in her book Stupidity, thoroughly discusses the Romantic idiot, particularly 
Wordsworth’s idiot boys (246-77).  In an article about Wordsworth’s vacancy, Joseph 
Viscomi argues that in the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth uses “mental vacancy” to refer to 
“the tranquility induced by nature’s sedating sounds, which vacates and prepares the 
mind to receive nature’s impulse” (44).  Wordsworth’s characters and his reader are thus 
made receptive to an “immanence” that also includes the “self-emptying necessary to 
receive the grace of God” (44).  Viscomi shows how Wordsworth uses multiple narrators 
to create this dialogic space and also employs natural objects, like the Yew tree in “Lines 
left up on a Seat in a Yew-tree,” to rail against proscriptive aesthetic discourses like the 
picturesque that limit a traveler’s ways of seeing nature.  While these tactics resemble 
Robinson’s use of personas like Sappho and her employment of various kinds of poetic 
materials in dialogue, the end of Wordsworth’s vacancy still seems to be a kind of 
transcendence provided by nature, however receptive his speakers might be.  In these late 
poems, Robinson’s vacancy is not created through nature’s soothing qualities, nor does it 
create the possibility for what seems to be a primarily transcendent experience of God. 
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non-understanding, she pointedly resists leaving her animals, orphans, and abject women 
adrift in the “suspension of occurrence: a caesura or syncope” (Ronell 276).  Robinson’s 
use of the ballad sidesteps both Bewell’s counter-Enlightenment version of 
Wordsworthian poetics and Ronell’s de Manian, aporetic reading of idiocy.  Her 
innovation in the Lyrical Tales is to employ moments of non-understanding as a point of 
departure for a different kind of thought, based on neither reflection nor receptivity but 
on an experimental and necessarily random, constructive form of articulation.  She 
neither rehabilitates idiots as pre-cursors to human development through reflection nor 
privileges them as uniquely dumb and sensitive to nature.  Debbie’s parrot, like other 
idiots in Lyrical Tales, models a unique kind of contingent creation that seemingly only 
occurs when a subject loses its sentimentality and its wits.   
 Thus there is a second way to understand the parrot’s mimicry, one that competes 
with his nonsensical repetition.  The parrot’s refrain may insinuate the pleasures and 
dangers of a repetition that can be interpreted in different ways with each telling.  Though 
the parrot might be restricted in its language, he does seem to manifest intelligence and 
agency when he purposefully repeats the stock accusation “loud as he was able” in front 
of Debbie’s new husband.  The first time the parrot’s accusation is spoken, in the last line 
in the fifth stanza, the reader is patently told to disregard its meaning as an act of 
repetition randomly aimed at any person present to receive its message.  The rumor 
circulated by “a false and canting preacher” shows its true colors as non-knowledge.  Yet 
the actual repetition of the line in the poem, again taking the place of the ballad refrain at 
the end of the stanza, is both false and true:  false because Debbie did not toy with the 
Parson but true because this new iteration is directed at a new object and has been 
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received differently by a new listener.98  Simply put, repetition as refrain works to 
undermine its status as secure knowledge even as it takes on multiple meanings. 
The parrot’s speech act both mimics and resists Debbie’s authority and her 
language by making it at once mean something and evade meaning.  Viewed in this way, 
Debbie’s ownership of an exotic pet might be read as a sign of her bourgeois conspicuous 
consumption and affective desire, while the parrot, as a figure of the subaltern, colonial 
object who speaks from the margins, voices its own desires for a different kind of 
freedom.  In addition to drawing on Locke’s version of the parrot, the poem also alludes 
to the many parrots and popinjays in traditional ballads who act as figures of both sexual 
freedom and morality.99  In ballads like “Lady Isabel and the Elfin Knight” and “Young 
Hunting,” parrots often serve as the keepers of secrets about their mistress’s lapsed 
virginity, or their murder of the man who has seduced them, and these birds are often 
silenced by bribes or by force.  In Robinson’s ballad, the subaltern parrot refuses this 
traditional silence and speaks in a roundabout way.  He punishes Debbie for her ruthless 
gossiping by falsely accusing her of licentiousness.  Though nonsensical, the punishment 
does accrue meaning when it calls out a larger claim for justice.  As a figure for minority 
                                                
98 Since the parrot is actually tattling gossip or rumors, one might also use rumor theory 
to explain the parrot’s changing repetition.  Rumor theory argues that each new telling of 
a rumor changes its meaning but does not rewrite the text.  Recent studies of oral poetry, 
like Homer’s, also takes this view that the poet’s multiple iterations are not variants but 
instead compose a “multiform” text. 
99 See Barre Toelken’s “What the Parrots Tell Us That Child Did Not; Further 
Considerations of Ballad Metaphor.”  For a good discussion of parrots in early modern 
writing see Bruce Boehrer’s “‘Men, Monkeys, Lap-dogs, Parrots, Perish All’ Psittacine 
Articulacy in Early Modern Writing.” Laura Brown also has a good discussion of the use 
of animal imagery, especially the parrot, in discourses touching the abject in Fables of 
Modernity:  Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth Century, particularly her 




discourse, like Deleuze’s stutter or Homi K. Bhaba’s mimicry, the refrain both resists and 
changes meaning through its iteration.  The subaltern parrot’s speech imitates its master’s 
idiocy (particularly Debbie’s false consciousness about her own place in society and her 
purported control over language) such that it violently reveals both the tyranny of the 
master and the oppressive structures of the master’s language.   
Not unlike the recitation of ballads themselves, the repeated line takes on new 
meaning with each iteration and every audience.  Once again, this “asythetic concept” of 
the ballad and its altering repetition stands in contrast to another of Wordworth’s ballads, 
“There was a Boy.”  In that poem, it is the silence interspersed between echoes of the 
boy’s animalistic mimicry that eventually allows nature to “enter unawares into his mind” 
(22).  If the boy Winander experiences some sensational moment of either immanence or 
transcendence, Debbie’s parrot creates a chaotic space of vying meanings from thought 
produced by compulsive articulation.  This vacancy of secure meaning might seem to 
claim too much for a dirty bird’s stupidity in gossiping about girls gone wild.  Yet this 
model of knowledge—thought as a type of periodic non-thought created through 
language’s contingency—underscores Robinson’s search for a thinking subject not tied to 
reason, feeling, nor the struggle between the two so typical of the late eighteenth 
century.100 
                                                
100 It might be interesting to consider Robinson’s fraught friendship with Mary 
Wollstonecraft, which has usually been explained by the latter’s possible jealousy over 
William Godwin’s attentions to the beautiful, charismatic former actress, in terms of the 
two women thinkers’ differences on reason and education.  Whereas Wollstonecraft 
famously advocated for the education of women through masculine reason in order to 
earn them a place in the public sphere, Robinson argues for a kind of de-education via 
moments, forms of non-knowledge, or instances of conflicting thought.  In this way 
Robinson’s vacancy, as a retardation of thinking, likewise contrasts with Charlotte 
Smith’s uses of reason and aesthetics as judgment.  Both poets, however, emphasize the 
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Robinson’s experiment with the ways the refrain both vacates and contingently 
constructs new meaning comes to fruition in a poem that most directly deals with the 
Enlightenment discourse of idiocy.  Published in the year after her death, “The Savage of 
Aveyron” (1801) is a companion poem to “All Alone” from Lyrical Tales, and the earlier 
poem is a rewriting of Wordsworth’s “We are Seven.”  Both the savage, whose mind has 
been stunted by an early childhood trauma, and the speaker, after coming into contact 
with the boy, idiotically repeat themselves through the poem’s pattern of refrains.  The 
speaker is itinerant and wandering in “the mazes of a wood” (1) when she meets a savage 
boy who can only communicate by shrieking and is drawing notches in a blasted tree, 
crying, “Alone!”  At first, Robinson’s savage boy exhibits the signs of lyric repetition and 
affective intensity that characterize Wordsworth’s Johnny.  The boy can count the three 
beats needed to put together any kind of metrical foot, he can shriek as if in final, ecstatic 
revelation, and he can say “alone,” the verbal sign of lyric solitude.  The boy’s recitation 
of “alone” both enacts the theme of a lyric even as it explains its own rhetoric as a poem 
with the pretense of solitude, written to be overheard.101  As signs of the lyric, these 
gestures trap the boy in his savage state, but Robinson refuses to let the mimicry stand in 
for poetry.   
                                                                                                                                            
necessity of contingency for vacancy’s power in refiguring the thinking subject and its 
place in the social, normative world. 
101 I take this idea about the lyric from Sarah Zimmerman in Romanticism, Lyricism and 
History.  She, of course, takes the idea of overhearing from John Stuart Mill’s essay on 
lyric poetry.  Zimmerman argues that the lyric was a very public, social genre, written to 
be overheard and to employ its audiences in social and personal reflection.  Robinson 
seems to argue something similar by having a boy cry “alone”—a gesture that both 
articulates his solitude and his wish to have an audience who will not only hear him but 
also participate in reconstructing his story. 
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This poem supplies two tactics for rescuing the boy from his idiotic, vacant 
repetition.  On the one hand, the ballad’s narrative retroactively attempts to account for 
the boy’s savagery.  On the other, the poem uses a refrain, composed of a final quatrain in 
each stanza that calls into question those causal tales and provides an even greater space 
for forming difference rather than explaining it away.  The poem’s stanzas are each 
composed of three ballad quatrains (abbacccdeffe), with the final quatrain serving as the 
refrain.  The most stable form of the repetition begins in the second stanza, after the 
speaker meets the boy: 
  Then, mazy woods of AVEYRON! 
  Then, wilds of dreary solitude! 
  Amid the thorny alleys rude 
  I sigh’d to be—a traveller alone.  [sic]  (36-39). 
During the first half of the poem, the refrain generally keeps the final rhymes and in the 
same order:  Aveyron, solitude, rude, alone.  Just after the mid-point of the poem, the 
refrains begin to vary along with the narrative the speaker is trying to invent, as she gives 
the boy a back-story to explain away his primitive mind.  Succumbing to the ballad’s 
narrative bent, she participates in the Enlightenment tendency to engage in hypothetical 
histories of idiots (Bewell 57-64).  This injection of narrative into the tale temporarily 
interrupts the poem’s established pattern of varying the refrain’s final line and instead 
varies the quatrain’s final couplet.   
After she relates how the boy’s mother was accosted and killed by forest ruffians, 
she offers this refrain: 
  When in the woods of Aveyron 
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  Deep in their deepest solitude 
  Three barb’rous ruffians shed their blood, 
  And mock’d, with cruel taunts, her dying groan.  (132-5) 
These variants incorporate the boy’s tale into the poem, inviting both explanation and 
sympathy for the murder of the boy’s mother, an act that is ultimately responsible for his 
savage state.  Most of these stanzas preserve the rhymes “Aveyron” and “solitude,” 
allowing Robinson to vary Aveyron’s solitude even more greatly because she has an 
entire quatrain in which to play.  In this stanza, for example, the woods become the site of 
gore and groaning.  As the narrative attempts to redeem the boy’s humanity, its variation 
of the refrain multiplies the differing sensations—and gothic desires—exhibited in the 
poem.  The violence also suggests the narrator’s difficult but necessary move in allowing 
other characters to inhabit the refrain, allowing the most diverse of alterities to manifest 
themselves. 
The refrain’s linguistic force, however, becomes even more dramatic when the 
refrain pulls away from the narration, and parts of the poem begin to seem as if the 
explanatory tale had been added after the initial experience with the boy, to make sense 
of the automatic, repetitive writing done as the narrator is infected with the boy’s idiocy.  
The savage boy compels a wild sort of repetitive yet revolving contemplation in the mind 
of the speaker, as the last line of the larger refrain repeatedly echoes ever so slightly.  
After hearing the boy’s first shriek, the speaker states, “I thought myself alone!” (12), but 
after deciphering the boy’s yell as “Alone! alone!” (20), she changes her stance to “I 
wish’d myself—a traveller alone” [sic] (27).  Watching him rush freely around the 
woods, the speaker responds:  “I sigh’d to be—a traveller alone,” (39), but after realizing 
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the boy cannot speak, she decides “And wish’d to be—a traveller alone” (50).  The 
remainder of the poem contains more variations:  “I thought myself a traveller—alone” 
(63) and again “I wish’d to be—a traveller alone” (87).  The speaker’s changing ideas 
about herself are plotted through her shifting articulations of the refrain’s main verb:  
“wish’d” “sigh’d” “thought” and “Waiting to seize,” all of which obliquely signal desire, 
lament, expectation, fantasy, self-reflection, self-doubt, and fear.  At times, this 
successive catalogue of sensations does build on the narrative trajectory of the poem, 
using the additive situations that occur in each of the narrative stanzas to provoke varying 
emotional responses.  At the same time, the speaker’s articulations take on the repetitive 
quality of the boy’s utterances and add to it a measure of contingency that changes the 
refrain with each stanza.  Unlike the causal explanation of the story, which manages to 
explain why the boy is an idiot, the speaker’s refrains present the boy as something more 
than an object of sympathy and pity. 
Robinson highlights this contrast between these tactics of story and refrain with 
the poem’s ending, which finishes with a variation of the refrain that brings it full circle, 
provoking comparison with its first iteration:  
Till, mazy woods of AVEYRON, 
Dark wilds of dreary solitude 
 Amid your thorny alleys rude 
I thought myself alone. 
And could a wretch more wretched be, 
More wild, or fancy-fraught than he, 
Whose melancholy tale would pierce AN HEART OF STONE.  (168-74)   
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In the poem’s very first refrain, the speaker had originally claimed “I thought myself 
alone” because no one could be “as weary of the world as me” (12, 14).  This final 
iteration of the line marks the distance the refrain has traveled throughout the poem.  In 
the first iteration, she refers to the fact that her wretched state has been literally 
interrupted by the savage boy’s presence.  By the end of the poem, she is not alone 
because her loneliness has been filled by her own changing responses to the boy.  The 
tyranny and solipsism of loneliness has been replaced by a host of sensations, thoughts, 
and characters.  Thus the tale is helpful less for its explanatory power in ascribing reasons 
and causalities for the boy’s sad state than for a narrative’s dialogic ability to evoke 
multiple thoughts about a single subject.  Robinson’s narrator ends up imitating the boy’s 
“fancy-frought” articulation, producing a host of unrefined sensations, in spite of her 
narrative attempts to substitute a story for the boy’s idiocy.  Even as a coherent 
explanation gets narrated, it is undermined by the contingencies and instabilities of the 
speaker’s balladic refrain.  Though at the end of the poem she may come back to her 
original refrain a changed spectator, the refrain’s seriality, in contrast to the 
instrumentality of the hypothetical narrative, emphasizes a chain of linguistic and 
psychological responses that cannot be sublated into a dialectic between despair on the 
one hand and immediacy, sensory ecstasy, or epiphany on the other.  Unlike Don Juan’s 
constantly shifting tone that McGann sees as the Byronic version of Romantic ideology, 
the speaker of this poem has not escaped into her head.   
At the same time, the injection of the hypothetical history does import into the 
poem a crucial political and social valence that the refrain then works on and transforms.  
As much a poem about exclusion as differential variation, the story takes pains to show 
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how unseemly groups of men, when left to their own devices and “natural law,” end up 
radically excluding members of society.  This exclusion, however, is necessary for what 
Deleuze would call “deterritorialization” or the abjection that produces something like 
Cixous’ resistance to normativity.  The speaker’s real and continued encounter with the 
savage boy produces a different version of otherness.  Together the idiot, the speaker, and 
the presumed listener with his heart of stone present an array of alterity manifested in the 
changing ways the speaker attempts to conceptualize the state of being alone.  Perhaps 
not quite Deleuze’s radical difference, the spectrum Robinson presents in Lyrical Tales 
comes close to what Elizabeth Grosz has described as Deleuzian Feminism:  “a radical 
antihumanism that renders animals, nature, atoms, even quasars as modes of radical 
alterity” (179).  Rather than the binary distinctions between woman and man or man and 
animal, the savage of Aveyron helps Robinson measure people as a potential collection of 
differences. 
 This political stance, moreover, straddles two important strands of post-
Revolutionary politics, rejecting both 1790s communitarian politics such as those taken 
up by Blake or later Wordsworth as well as the individualist universal rights discourse 
tendered by Paine and other leading radical intellectuals.  In the wake of the 
Corresponding Acts Society of 1799, which effectively sent radical, leveling groups 
underground until after Waterloo,102 Robinson’s subversive idiots dispute any 
communitarian solution to political, social, and intellectual inequality.  The group 
violence that leads to the murder of the savage’s mother can be read as representative of 
the male brutality unleashed by the French Revolution and the start of the Napoleonic 
                                                
102 See Edward Royle and James Walvin, English Radicals and Reformers 1760-1848 
(91-2) for an account of the government’s attacks on the democratic societies. 
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age.  In “The Savage of Aveyron,” the communitarian thinking of the Corresponding 
Societies is analogous to other instances of groupthink turned totalitarian, for example, 
France’s “democratic” war-mongering under Napoleon or the Terror’s mass paranoia.  
The gothic gore in many of Robinson’s later poems often comes not from a single 
patriarchal threat but from group action.  Debbie’s parrot blatantly uses its mimicry to 
undermine both the bourgeois community that vengefully punishes its unchaste women 
and also his smaller, domestic community.  Likewise, the refrains vocalized by the 
speaker of “The Savage” bar the reincorporation of the savage or his witness into any 
kind of normal society.  Exiled on the margins of life—and often on the edges of the 
nation—Robinson’s characters do not even participate in Wordsworth’s vision of a 
counter-public sphere.103  Moreover, in Lyrical Tales, communities tend to become 
particularly totalitarian in their reading of social situations.  Debbie’s fellow villagers 
collectively believe the parrot’s prating, and they punish deserving and undeserving 
objects alike.  Similarly, the speaker of “The Savage” defends herself and the savage 
against stock interpretations of idiocy, which act just as violently as the band of 
marauders to reduce the boy and the speaker to mere figures of insanity.   
Neither do Robinson’s depictions fall easily into the Lockean discourse of 
individual liberty or universal rights.  These Tales almost always describe characters that 
are not quite individuals and cannot easily be sublated into the universality of mankind—
either legally, emotionally, or intellectually.  As a kind of savant, the idiot cannot lay 
                                                
103 For a reading of the Lyrical Ballads as offering a rural counter-public sphere in the 
wake of the disappointments of both the French Revolution and Wordsworth’s own 
attempts at popular literature, see Joseph Byrne’s manuscript on the Joseph Johnson 




claim to the reason or education that would entitle him to sovereign self-liberty.  He 
stands as a foil to the Enlightenment view of the individual progressively developing 
through linear time.  Paradoxically, the universality claimed in human rights discourse 
covers over differences and abjects those who cannot be fit into the system—such as the 
“savage” African slaves, American Indians, and other victims of imperial bands of 
ruffians.  Outside society yet still subject to it, Robinson’s characters engage in linguistic 
over-production as a means to rewrite the thinking subject as an open text.   
Her poems imagine these idiots neither as exiles critiquing the society that has 
rejected them nor as individuals staking their proprietary, progressive claims for justice, 
but as figures whose idiocy creates a vacuum of normativity where creation and 
contingency are once again possible.  Robinson’s political agenda, perhaps like the New 
Left, is occupied with those unique acts of articulation that can only happen outside 
regnant political structures in the deterritorialized space they help to create.  By reading 
the poem, readers, too, have the opportunity to be infected by the savage’s and the 
speaker’s stuttering speech acts and to mimic their deterritorialized state.  In a kind of 
reverse linguistic mimicry or sympathy, listeners, by repeating the refrain themselves, 
may become more like the savage and radically participate in minority discourse and the 
perspectives it offers.  For Robinson, these desperate, bare utterances only produced in a 
state of exclusion are the poetic avant-garde. 
 Moreover, the view that women are one among many modes of radical alterity 
helps us to understand why Robinson does not develop the idea of multiplicity through 
the body.  We might assume that, as a woman writer, she would naturally focus on 
women’s bodies—rather than language—as a means of critiquing the hegemony of the 
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British government and its domesticity at the turn of the century.  That she focuses more 
on the way refrains alter the “body” of language, or its materiality, may be a testament to 
Robinson’s own increasingly useless body.  As biographer Paula Byrne has argued, 
Robinson turned to poetry when she contracted rheumatic fever and, unable to circulate 
through the bon ton anymore, resorted to roving the public literary sphere.104  We could 
just as easily account for the shift, however, by saying that Robinson’s performances in 
the world of fashion quickly grew old.  Her poetry reveals the possibility that there was 
more multiplicity to be had through the alterable body of language than those 
cumbersome and all too fateful narratives surrounding the gendered body, with its stock 
roles of crone, mother, ingénue, and fallen woman.   
We can find this linguistic richness in “The Savage of Aveyron,” particularly 
through Robinson’s rewriting of the idiot as a productive linguistic trope.  While the 
speaker’s refrain disrupts the universalizing gesture of the narrative for politicized 
alterities, the caesuras in each refrain mark gaps that play with the materiality of 
language, and not simply in a superficial way.  If the melancholy tale of the mother’s 
murder pierces a listener’s lack of sympathy, his “heart of stone,” the refrain insists on 
penetrating a listener’s unresponsive brain by using the speaker’s own cognitive 
confusion to isolate different sensations.  The pause figures not merely the blank, lonely 
state of Johnny or the Wordsworthian Romantic poetry of lyrical ecstasy but a brief 
instance of non-understanding from which the speaker recovers herself only by 
                                                
104 For Robinson’s transformation from a public performer to a poetic one, see Paula 
Byrne’s chapter “The Ride to Dover.”  Byrne describes Robinson’s contraction of the 
fever, which provokes a mistaken account of her death while she is in exile on the 
continent in “Exile.”  This figurative death helps her to recreate herself as a Della 




rearticulating her position through the course of a subsequent stanza.  Like the many 
other instances depicting the cessation of sensation and thought in Robinson’s writing, 
the use of the caesura represents a cognitive gap in the speaker’s thinking about the 
savage boy, a gap that replicates (or stutters) the boy’s own non-understanding of his 
state, and in turn propels the speaker to attempt a new linguistic combination.  This wild, 
“fancy-fraught” discharge of sensations and thoughts not only provokes reflection but 
narrows the gap between savage, speaker, and listener by placing each participant 
somewhere in the mix of sensory responses.  In this way, the speaker channels the boy’s 
idiocy into a vacancy that doesn’t simply cause a flood of sensations, as did oblivion, but 
instead works to distinguish differences. 
The caesura also plays with the texture of the refrain in an even more material 
way, by inserting moments where not only meaning but writing itself is interrupted.  As 
Ronell suggested through her de Manian reading of Wordsworth, these ecstatic blanks 
could be read as the aporetic nature of language, which refuses signifying propositions 
for an experience of language’s “materiality,” its inhuman, mechanical automatism.  
Though the speaker’s cognitive and linguistic pause may contingently produce language 
that the speaker has no control over, Robinson’s idiotic repetition may signal not aporia 
but euporia, or a material richness.105  This is a point made by one of the most recent 
interpreters of Deleuze’s stutter, Giorgio Agamben.  Discussing language’s materiality, 
he writes:  “The aporias of self-reference thus do not find their solution here; rather they 
                                                
105 In his review of Agamben’s Potentialities, Leland Deladwrantaye’s makes this very 
contrast, between de Man’s materiality as aporia and Agamben’s reading of materiality 
through Deleuze as euporia (7-8). 
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are dislocated and […] transformed into euporias” (217).  He later goes on to explain 
euporia in terms similar to Robinson’s use of the caesura: 
The interruption of writing marks the passage to the second creation[….]  
The creation that is now fulfilled is neither a re-creation nor an eternal 
repetition; it is, rather, a decreation in which what happened and what did 
not happen are returned to their originary unity … while what could have 
not been but was becomes indistinguishable from what could have been 
but was not.  (Potentialities 270) 
Here Agamben proposes repetition as partially a “decreation” that un-makes actuality for 
a state of potentiality.  The poem’s caesura decreates both the speaker’s language and 
thought just as the savage’s idiocy decreates his own story and his Enlightenment 
“individuality.”  In these poems, vacancy is best explained not as an absolute lack of 
either memory or progressive knowledge but as a kind of passive yet creative potential.106  
Both the boy’s and the speaker’s idiocy contingently generate articulations and pauses 
that through the malleable nature of language, produces cognitive and psychological 
plenitude.  Vacancy thus inheres in and generates the potentiality of open texts. 
Robinson most dramatically demonstrates this formulation in one of her last 
poems, “To the Poet Coleridge” (1800).  To do this, she moves past her contortions with 
                                                
106 The philosophical thread leading to Agamben’s notion of potentiality, as I have 
mentioned, has to do with Aristotle’s ontological distinction between potentiality and 
actuality.  Deleuze first tried to steer clear of this distinction by focusing on, for example, 
the refrain’s ability to “harness nonsonorous forces such as Duration and Intensity” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 327).  The refrain allows Deleuze to point out a way of being that 
sidesteps the usual distinction between matter and form, instead focusing on the process 
of flows, intensities, and densities.  Agamben takes up this argument but instead wants to 
view potentiality as a state of pure materiality prior to an actuality that concretizes matter 
and form.  Robinson comes closer to this second position because of the way she views 
language as containing these possibilities and impossibilities in a very material way. 
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the stanzaic structure of ballad-like poems, or the return and repetition of the refrain, and 
turns to experiment more drastically with both stanza and rhyme, ending up with what 
she describes in the poem’s last lines as “Minstrelsy, SUBLIMELY WILD!” (70). 107  
Much has been written about this poem as part of Robinson and Coleridge’s poetic 
conversation, and scholars have most often focused on the power dynamics between the 
                                                
107 Throughout Lyrical Tales Robinson consistently distorts, stretches and expands the 
traditional ballad quatrain (abcb), either by adding extra couplets or quatrains to the 
stanzaic pattern.  Working from the natural variation inherent to the quatrain in folk or 
popular verse, her additions run a large gamut.  Some poems vary the ballad stanza by 
adding whole quatrains or more.  To list a few:  “The Haunted Beach” uses abaabdedde, 
“The Poor Singing Dame,” abcbcdcd, and “Edmund’s Wedding,” ababccdd.  Each of 
these poems tells a story about haunting, and the ballad structure itself seems to be 
haunted by a shadow stanza.  In “The Haunted Beach,” a mariner is haunted by crimes he 
committed long ago; “The Poor Singing Dame” haunts the aristocratic landowner who 
threw her in jail to silence her song; and “Edmund’s Wedding” tells of a soldier who 
deserts his regiment because he cannot stop thinking of the lover he left for war.  These 
extensions of the ballad mostly allegorize how an excess of memory traps characters in a 
nostalgia for times past and older, simpler values.  Other poems work more explicitly 
from the ballad stanza, such as “The Trumpeter, an Old English Tale,” which uses an 
aaabcccb stanza, inserting two extra couplets into the original form.  The extra lines 
make sense in a poem that compares the gluttony and boasting of a “gay British King” to 
the real deeds claimed by a commoner, whom the king eventually promotes as his 
trumpeter.  These couplets contrast the excess of the King’s gluttony with the trumpeter’s 
freedom of speech.  Surprisingly, the addition of a couplet into the ballad stanza 
allegorizes a certain amount of freedom from nostalgia and aristocratic social structures.  
At the far end of the spectrum are those poems that begin with some nod to ballad 
structure but are then extended or interrupted with rhyming couplets.  The first and third 
stanzas of “Deborah’s Parrot” begin with quatrains before trailing off into rhyming 
couplets; “Poor Marguerite” has stanzas composed of all rhyming couplets.  One of 
Robinson’s major distortions of ballad forms might be characterized as the injection of 
the eighteenth-century couplet, with its capacity for repetition, difference and satire, into 
the nostalgic ballad or folk quatrain.  The poems about alterity, resistance, vacancy, or 
fruitful variation always seem to use couplets to enforce the formal play with repetition 
and difference.  The sheer array of rhymes presents a host of variation arrived at through 
the incremental repetition of sounds that differ ever so slightly.  These formal variations 
of the ballad stanza allegorize the kind of excess that expands the possibilities for 
memory and perception. 
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younger male writer and the older poetess.108  “To the Poet Coleridge” responds to a copy 
of “Kubla Khan” Coleridge had shown Robinson, and the woman poet certainly mimics 
some of the male poet’s language.  Set in the context of Robinson’s larger project, 
however, we might read Robinson as using this mimicry to stake a claim about vacancy.  
Going even further than “The Savage of Aveyron,” this poem uses a paratactic quatrain 
as the refrain circulating through a poem with a notably diverse formal structure.  This 
final expression of vacancy does not simply inaugurate a new formal heterogeneity, but a 
potentiality and plenitude that includes the refusal of writing.  This kind of material or 
idiotic excess generated through poetry ultimately leverages the randomness of 
“inhuman” language against the normativity of socialized language as a means of finding 
potential in moments of linguistic exclusion that echo instances of political and social 
exclusion in earlier poems.  
 Robinson responds to the excessive, pleasurable, and sensory landscape of “Kubla 
Khan” by repeatedly dwelling on those caves and domes that help to produce sensory and 
intellectual excess.  The following refrain circulates in her poem: 
  With thee I’ll trace the circling bounds 
  Of thy NEW PARADISE extended; 
  And listen to the varying sounds 
  Of winds, and foamy torrents blended. (5-9) 
                                                
108 Most commentators still view Robinson as reacting to and imitating Coleridge’s 
Romanticism, while Coleridge uses Robinson’s notoriety even as he slights her 
amateurish verse.  Her “Ode Inscribed to the Infant Son of S. T. Coleridge, Esq.,” though 
written about Derwent, responds to Coleridge’s poem including his son Hartley, “Frost at 
Midnight,” and Robinson’s “To the Poet Coleridge” responds to a copy of “Kubla Khan” 
he had shared with her.  There is no conclusive evidence to explain why Coleridge 
showed Robinson a poem he was so protective about, though Martin Levy has suggested 
it was because both used opium and had drug-induced poetic experiences. 
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Only after this extended space has been apportioned can wind and water rush into the 
rocks, hills, and streambeds, creating the varying rhythms and constant motion of the 
natural world.  The poet repeatedly describes caves of ice, a deep dell, or fields as spaces 
bounded by and with imagination and the physical world: 
  Spirit divine!  with thee I’ll trace 
  Imagination’s boundless space! 
  With thee, beneath thy sunny dome, 
  I’ll listen to the minstrel’s lay 
  Hymning the gradual close of day; 
  In Caves of Ice enchanted roam, 
  Where on the glittering entrance plays 
  The moon’s-beam with its silvery rays; (26-33) 
Both sunny dome and caves of ice represent voids that create and encourage playful, non-
determinate matter.  Gaps in the mind correlate to caverns in the physical landscape, yet 
unlike the “mental blank” of “Sight,” here Robinson pictures Locke’s “dark room” as one 
that must necessarily remain empty to house fluctuating, variable perceptions that 
provoke thought.  Waves of light and sound fly, float, and meander through the resonant 
caves and spaces of nature, but more importantly, like the refrain itself, it is the visible 
and audible echoes that generate variations of matter. 
The refrain and complex rhyming likewise disclose the poem’s formal structure as 
an echolalia that compiles elements of sonnet stanzas and rhyming couplets, as well as 
ballad quatrains and refrains.  This poem fluctuates dramatically by distorting any 
regularity to its shape.  The seriality and repetition in the ballad-like poems reaches a 
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wilder pitch here as the refrain becomes completely paratactic, arriving at unexpected 
moments among stanzas composed of differing numbers of quatrains and rhyming 
couplets.  The poem starts out with two quatrains of an alternating rhyme scheme, as if 
Robinson begins the poem with the first half of a sonnet.  After the stanzaic break and 
what would be the sonnet’s volta, the rest of the poem seems to answer with a wildly 
variable poetic structure.  Lines 9 through 12 present another quatrain, immediately 
followed by a rhyming couplet:  “I’ll mark thy sunny dome, and view/ Thy Caves of Ice, 
thy fields of dew!” (13-14).  What would be the end of the sonnet—the poet’s act of 
marking the dome and cave as spaces bounded for imaginative play—is succeeded by a 
barrage of rhyming couplets, occasionally interrupted with the refrain.  Perhaps not 
incidentally, the poem continues until it cycles through twenty-six separate rhyme 
schemes, ending with the picture of Coleridge’s phantasmic, visionary maid: 
  She sings of THEE, O favor’d child 
  Of Minstrelsy, SUBLIMELY WILD! 
  Of thee, whose soul can feel the tone 
  Which gives to airy dreams a magic ALL THY OWN!  (69-72) 
Robinson may be speaking directly to Coleridge here but her address echoes not only his 
hyper-aural “Kubla Khan” but also her own development toward a poetic collection of 
sensations and differences.109  The poet blatantly resists the sonnet, couplet, or quatrain as 
a formal norm, using each structure to resist any reifying form.  Like Sappho’s turn 
                                                
109 Daniel Robinson’s essay, “From ‘Mingled Measure’ to ‘Ecstatic Measures’:  Mary 
Robinson’s  
Poetic Reading of ‘Kubla Khan’,” explores the rhythmic variations that Robinson used to 
compose “To the Poet Coleridge.”  Daniel Robinson argues that the female poet’s 
ambition was not to imitate the male poet’s rhythmic dexterity but to challenge it with her 
own metrical prowess and combinations. 
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toward “loftier passions” and “loftier themes,” Robinson’s feminine poetics—which 
Coleridge tries but cannot channel—approaches Cixous’ heterogeneity of pleasure, 
forms, and aesthetic activity.  Both the cycling through of rhymes that at times vary from 
each other only by a few consonants as well as the structuring of a poem that resembles 
many forms—including the formless—emphasizes her own wild experimentation with a 
host of paratactic singularities.  Excess in Robinson’s hands does not become a tyrannical 
Kubla Khan who abjects the wailing woman or silences the damsel with a dulcimer.110  
Instead, her vacancy necessarily entails silence, cognitive confusion, and open spaces that 
might create a bevy of material singularities:  “Thy caves of ice, loud repeat/ Vibrations, 
madd’ning sweet” (66-7), vibrations that help to manufacture a poetics “ALL THY 
OWN” (72).  One might say that the idiocy of nature, which has no memory and can 
neither be blind nor insightful, finally produces its own multiplicity.  
The great irony of this poem may be how Robinson plays with the idea of  
“imagination’s boundless space.”  The refrain repeatedly expresses the paradox that the 
poet will “trace the circling bounds” of the new paradise, of imagination’s extension, 
which of course has no bounds.  This tracing would enclose or mark off a certain portion 
of the imagination in order to depict it with the lushness of Coleridgean aural and 
philosophical intensity.  Yet Robinson’s act of tracing, particularly her description of the 
various domes and caves, actually creates open-ended structures that entice the 
production of thoughts, ideas, and sensations as much as they mark the blank domes and 
caves that also represent the refusal of writing or materiality.  This bounding represents 
                                                
110 See Timothy Fulford for this reading of “Kubla Khan.” 
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and enacts the boundless, and perhaps explains why Robinson ultimately refuses blank 
verse as the structure for her poetic open form.  
Unlike the caveats issued by Lovejoy against differences becoming reified in 
ideas like nationalism and racism or those by Laclau about differences becoming 
equivalent and universal,111 Robinson’s vacancy entails a kind of writing produced by an 
over-productive mind churning out uneven, contingent possibilities, including the 
interruption of thought and writing.   Later women poets, such as Felicia Hemans, will 
spend more time thinking through the tendencies of diversity to overwhelm or to cripple 
thinking with cognitive overload.  Instead, Robinson’s excesses use the flexible matter of 
language to produce an ever-proliferating series of potentialities that resist synthetic 
closure or universalizing gestures.  This idea of linguistic production does not rescue 
those excluded from society but instead offers their unique vantage points through 
idiocy’s verbal potentiality.  Countering both active reasoning and sensibility’s authentic, 
immediate knowing, she finds in the empiricist, passive mind a model for mental passive 
resistance and random creativity. 
                                                
111 See Lovejoy (311-14) and Ernesto Laclau, “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to 




Felicia Hemans’s Ruined Minds, Cognitive Overload,  
and the Emptiness of the New World 
 
“Oh! where can ruins awe mankind, 
Dark as the ruins of the mind?” (II.153-4) 
—Felicia Hemans, “The Widow of Crescentius” 
 
Recent debates about Felicia Hemans—perhaps the most written about female 
poet of the Romantic period—still have yet to settle major anxieties about her “domestic 
patriotism,” as Francesco Crocco has recently termed Hemans’s ambiguous political 
allegiances.  Crocco and others see Hemans as a tool of the British empire, her poems 
narrating stories about older empires in order to “refurbish” Britain with Grecian or 
Roman models for its conservative, nationalist, imperial agenda.  In this model, women, 
especially women writers, gain a special though limited role in the public sphere touting 
patriotic duty from the safety of the domestic hearth.112  Feminist scholars, or those 
engaged in the project of recovering women’s writing have countered with a more 
redeeming view of Hemans’s political project.  Nanora Sweet, Diego Saglia, and Jeffery 
Robinson, to name a few, view Hemans’s historicist poetry as refuting those imperial 
values with either republican self-determination or bourgeois cosmopolitan 
intellectualism.  Sweet, Saglia, and Gary Kelly pointedly argue that Hemans was engaged 
in building the tenets of liberal ideology that secured the free-thinking individual as the 
cornerstone of the modern, liberal state.113  These attempts to characterize her domestic 
                                                
112 See Crocco’s “The Ruins of Empire:  Nationalism, Art, and Empire in Hemans’s 
Modern Greece” and David Rothstein’s “Forming the Chivalric Subject:  Felicia Hemans 
and the Cultural Uses of History, Memory, and Nostalgia.” 
113 Gary Kelly’s “Death and the Matron:  Felicia Hemans, Romantic Death, and the 
Founding of the Modern Liberal State” is the seminal work that argues Hemans’s figure 
of death helps to cement the individual as the basis for the modern liberal state.  Many of 
 
158  
values as part of an ideological project, abetting either Tory conservatives or Whig 
merchants, mistake her pointed use of both these positions in her works.  Rather than 
assessing Hemans’s political alliances to gain a view of her poetry as a political project, 
her poetry demands its readers to pit these political stances against each other precisely to 
interrupt the power of ideology altogether. 
Her poems accomplish this disruption not through the recovery of lost narratives 
about female heroics, which has often been Hemans’s selling point for more sympathetic 
scholars,114 but through a rhetoric of cognitive and mental breakdown.  At crucial, 
dramatic moments in her poems, characters become paralyzed in trance-like states, 
overwhelmed by the emotional and political weight of their situations.  Characters as 
early as “The Widow of Crescentius,” who stands agape as her husband is hanged, 
exhibit mental paralysis resulting from a cognitive overload of the brain’s ability to 
process perceptual data or any kind of sensory experience.  This material problem 
productively helps to undermine reified conceptual thinking, positing interstitial moments 
outside the hegemony of ideologies, which ultimately present the opportunity to change 
them.   
In this way, Hemans posits mental dysfunction as a method of rerouting 
thought—or stopping it altogether.  This model of the mind draws from both 
                                                                                                                                            
Sweet’s articles seek to reframe Hemans as working against conservative, Tory, 
nationalist discourses, but the best is “History, Imperialism, and the Aesthetics of the 
Beautiful.  Hemans and the Post-Napoleonic Moment.”  See also Robinson’s “The 
Poetics of Expiration.” 
114 Hemans’s Records of Woman is the classic text for this reading, but see also Tricia 
Lootens’s ground-breaking “Hemans and Home:  Victorianism, Feminine ‘Internal 
Enemies,’ and the Domestication of National Identity,” Paul Westover’s “Imaginary 
Pilgrimages:  Felicia Hemans, Dead Poets, and Romantic Historiography” as well 
“Natural and National Monuments—Felicia Hemans’s ‘The Image in Lava’: A Note” by 
Isobel Armstrong.   
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contemporary brain science of the nineteenth century and post-Kantian philosophies of 
the mind, and her native epistemology essentially bridges English materialism (and its 
ties to the Enlightenment empiricist legacy) and continental conceptuality.  As Hemans 
was writing, some British scientists were beginning to propose a model of what we now 
call the pre-Freudian unconscious, based on the ways in which motor or material 
perceptual events may occur unconsciously yet can be revealed through trance-like 
states.115  Even as she was in contemporary conversation with brain science, she also 
seems to have been interested in something similar to G. W. F. Hegel and William 
Whewell’s post-Kantian approaches to consciousness and to the nature of thought itself.  
Though Hemans might agree with both philosophers when they argue that sense data is 
always already perceived through conceptual categories, her cognitive overload attempts, 
though sometimes fails, to free women and other exiles of society from oppressive 
conceptual habituations.  My argument about Hemans’ balancing act between the mind-
brain and mind-world problems is an attempt to demonstrate how, for Hemans, brain 
problems might intervene in both issues of consciousness and its effect on our 
relationship to the world. 
In the course of vacancy’s history, Hemans’s brand of non-thought essentially 
bridges Charlotte Smith’s Kantian aporias and Mary Robinson’s empiricist multiplicity.  
She brings the two together into a vacancy that attempts to erase conceptual habituations 
through a similar kind of mental blankness as Robinson’s, and, like Smith, ultimately 
sees vacancy in abyssal spaces of a vibrant landscape, which through its topographical 
features suggest new cognitive forms.  Yet for Hemans, vacancy ultimately rests the 
                                                
115 For a recent and thorough account of the proto-Freudian unconscious in Romantic 
texts, see Joel Faflak’s Romanticism and Psychoanalysis:  the Burdens of the Mystery. 
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cognitive shock that happens when abstract thinking is imposed upon sense experience, a 
crux that always retains a trace of something unrepresentable, which cannot be 
conceptualized or placed into the symbolic order, a feminine lack that remains skeptical 
of signification.  For this reason it is useful to read parts of Hemans’s poetry through 
Slavoj Zizek’s recent post-Kantian, cognitivist account of Hegel, and his ideas of 
negativity, or the capacity of consciousness to undermine its own rationality.  Zizek’s 
reading in particular can help us to explore how Hemans juggles materialist science and 
philosophies of thought without being subsumed into Hegel’s classic dialectics.   
Additionally, in terms of vacancy’s political implications, Hemans certainly 
follows in the footsteps of poets writing about revolution.  Though very early in her 
career, Hemans certainly writes poems in support of war and imperial efforts, beginning 
at least with Tales, and Historic Scenes, in Verse (1819), Hemans begins to represent 
violent revolution as a troubled solution to the imperial age of Napoleon.  In “The Widow 
of Crescentius,” this occurs as the widow transmits her ruined mind to the tyrant Otho 
through her poisonous drugs and minstrelsy, as a psychic, interpersonal contagion that 
eventually topples the patriarchal regime by ruining its leader’s mind as well.  Since one 
of these blocking agents is intoxicating poetry, Hemans allegorizes poetry as a cognitive 
meme, a bottom-up insurgency for social and political change.  Her poetic techniques, in 
particular the morass of footnoted historical data, mimic this transmission but direct it to 
the reader, who, in turn, has her own preconceptions shattered when she becomes 
overwhelmed with historical information.   
When Hemans writes “The Forest Sanctuary” (1825), after the Mediterranean and 
South American revolutions have taken place, violent cognitive overload gives way to a 
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more peaceful form of vacancy that consists of roaming the open spaces of the New 
World to keep the mind free from phallic sign systems.  As the Spanish protagonist 
stumbles on the scene of his childhood friend being burned at the stake, he is thrown into 
a moment of cognitive overload that propels him to convert from Catholicism to 
Protestantism.  He essentially exchanges his Old World mind for a free-thinking and 
individualized, New World religiosity.  The poem continues as the Spaniard immigrates 
to North America, where Hemans presents the after-effects of his cognitive overload as 
the counterfactual history of a Spaniard in sixteenth-century New England, complicating 
any easy English colonial claim to America’s imaginary.  Like Hemans’s use of dashes to 
emphasize cognitive gaps in the speaker’s thinking, the forest sanctuary represents a 
vaginal space, momentarily free from imperial discourse.  Hemans’s play with unmarking 
the landscape and combating the symbolizing power of language helps us to understand 
feminine lack in a new way, even as she updates her earlier cognitive overload in a model 
where vacancy inheres.  Attempting to replicate the pause before necessary cognition or 
conceptualization that might lead to ideology and territorialize the New World, Hemans 
develops a mode of thinking that resembles mind-emptying meditation.  While the widow 
of Crescentius only endures vacancy as a by-product of imperial trauma, the Spaniard 
finds a self-reliant way to stimulate the cessation of thought.  Vacancy, for Hemans, 
offers a means of managing ideology, as a method of getting out from under both 
conservative and liberalist ideologies of her day.  
 
The “thought overwhelm’d” Widow 
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Set as the opening poem in her 1819 volume Tales, and Historic Scenes in Verse, 
“The Widow of Crescentius” was published several months before the Peterloo massacre, 
and the poem, as well as many others in the volume, has as its major preoccupation 
revolution by unlikely members of society.116  Though most poems in the volume use 
similar representations of frenzied, impassioned regime change alongside characters who 
become shocked into trace-like states as a result, “The Widow of Crescentius” is 
exemplary in the way it evokes the figure of the mind as the object or starting point for 
this chaotic social change.  The two-part poem tells the tale of the Roman consul 
Crescentius who is overthrown and murdered by the Pope-backed tyrant, Otho.  
Occurring in the last four years of the tenth century, the events in the poem resonate with 
the formation of the Second Coalition against Napoleon, in 1798, which included Naples 
and the Papal states.  After witnessing her husband’s death, Crescentius’s widow, 
Stefania, dresses as a boy minstrel in Otho’s train and eventually murders him before 
committing suicide herself.  The narrative poem, however, spends a good deal of time 
describing both the ruined Italian statuary dotting the countryside and its correlative in 
the destruction of Stefania’s mind.  Both parts of the narrative poem climax in lyrical 
moments dwelling on this damage:  part one ends by detailing Stefania’s paralysis while 
part two deals with Otho’s ruination at her hands.   
                                                
116 In the second edition, published in 1824, “The Widow of Crescentius” loses the lead 
spot to “The Abencerrage,” perhaps, as Susan Wolfson suggests, because the latter 
poem’s subject of Spain, would “appeal to contemporary interest in Spanish nationalism” 
(90).  Another reason may be that Hemans had already revised her ideas about revolution, 
muting the idealistic structure set out by “The Widow” and instead proffering the failures 
and ambiguities of the multicultural imperial politics set forth in “The Abencerrage.”  For 
a good reading of Hemans sketching gender and racial ambiguities through the Muslim-
Spanish conflict in the latter poem, see Saglia’s Castles in Spain (279-93). 
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 Although the poem does describe Crescentius’s own “calm” bravery at enduring 
his bitter fate, its entire first part leads up to Stefania’s reaction as she watches her 
husband’s execution: 
  Yes, in the wildness of despair, 
  She, his devoted bride, is there. 
  Pale, breathless, through the crowd she flies, 
  The light of frenzy in her eyes: 
  But ere her arms can clasp the form, 
  Which life ere long must cease to warm; 
  Ere on his agonizing breast 
  Her heart can heave, her head can rest; 
  Check’d in her course by ruthless hands, 
  Mute, motionless, at once she stands; 
  With bloodless cheek and vacant glance, 
  Frozen and fix’d in horror’s trance; 
  Spell-bound, as every sense were fled, 
  And thought o’erwhelm’d, and feeling dead. 
  And the light waving of her hair, 
  And veil, far floating on the air, 
  Alone, in that dread moment, show 
  She is no sculptured form of woe.  (249-66, emphasis mine) 
Denied the comfort and stability of her husband’s body, the widow is physically 
restrained from action by “ruthless hands.”  Without his soothing touch, her “wildness” 
 
164  
and “frenzy” effectively paralyze her.  The signs of her femininity—her hair and her 
veil—wave in the wind, their external motion contrasting with her internal, mental trance.  
If her hair and her veil show that “she is no sculptured form of woe,” if she does not 
display a kind of melancholy or despair frozen in time, then the question becomes what 
state of mind does the “spell-bound” widow represent? 
 At first glance, the widow’s trance state resembles those that Mesmer and his 
disciples used in public displays of hypnosis and phreno-mesmerism beginning in the 
mid-eighteenth century and re-popularized in the 1820s with Spurzheim and Galt’s 
phrenology.  The passage, however, does not suggest that either the martyred Crescentius 
or his nemesis Otho has induced Stefania into a hypnotic state, nor does the passage use 
language denoting the presence of animal magnetism or magnetic fluid.117  Neither does 
the spell-bound widow seem to figure the kinds of gothic or fairy enchantment present in 
Keats, for example, because there is nothing dreamy about the experience.  If the widow 
has been vacated of sensation “with bloodless cheek, and vacant glance,” her brain 
paradoxically is still frenzied and wild:  “thought overwhelm’d.”  Thus Hemans is 
describing something closer to contemporaneous accounts of both the brain and the mind 
caught in thought.  Specifically, the widow is an apt example of materialist ideas of the 
complex and overwhelming cognitive powers of the brain, as well as continental theories 
about how the mind might navigate—or fail to navigate—between a priori concepts and 
the barrage of sensory input.  Though these models are often seen as antithetical, both 
touch upon the propensity for the brain or mind to work itself into states of sensory or 
                                                
117 See Victorian Literary Mesmerism for a good compendium on mesmerism and its uses 
in literature.  For a thorough history of the rise of materialist science in the early 
ninteenth-century, see the introductory chapter of Richardson’s British Romanticism and 
the Science of the Mind. 
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cognitive paralysis, and these accounts can help to explain the poem’s important 
interstitial moments, like the widow’s slack-jawed trance.   
In their historical accounts of brain science, both Alan Richardson and Jonathan 
Miller have brought to light nineteenth-century versions of a pre-Freudian unconscious, 
which was thought to be revealed by trance-like states.  They argue that writers beginning 
with Coleridge drew on contemporaneous formulations of the unconscious that were not 
based on the later Freudian model of repression of emotional content, but rather a more 
materialistic, cognitive unconscious.  In this model, much of the brain’s cognitive 
processes—perception, memory, and sensation—occur automatically and not necessarily 
with conscious awareness or volition.  As Miller argues, activities associated with 
consciousness happen in part unconsciously not so much because latent content is 
repressed but because brain activity occurs more quickly and effectively without 
conscious supervision.  Moreover, he suggests that in the nineteenth century “the 
hypnotic trance […] exposed the action of these unconscious processes.  By artificially 
paralyzing the will, a broad layer of automatic action was now made conveniently 
visible” (par. 39).  While Miller documents ideas of cognition as they develop from 
mesmerism and phrenology into less supernatural and more physiological brain science, 
Richardson argues that Coleridge and other Romantic writers “were aware of the 
‘alternate’ unconscious outlined by Miller, more productive than repressive, working to a 
large extent independently of the conscious subject, rendering the mind a theater of 
instinct, emotion, and desires as well as of reason, perception, and ideas” (58).  Such 
states as Coleridge’s hallucinations, De Quincey’s reveries or Hemans’s trances reveal 
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the machinations of a consciousness not always self-apparent to the thinking subject.118  
Rather than the intersubjective sexual and political dynamics working through mesmeric 
hypnotism, Hemans’s trances represent a single mind acting on itself, attempting to 
cognize the various and sundry thoughts and sensations bubbling up during moments that 
are emotionally and intellectually difficult to process.   
Displaying such “unconscious cerebration,” a term used to describe this bottom-
up, non-volitional cognition,119 Stefania becomes a woman whose mind is full of 
thoughts, fragmented and uncollated into conscious awareness or specific ideas.  This is 
not to say that she is subject to her unconscious any more than she might be subject to 
suddenly unrepressed passions.  Rather, Stefania’s mind becomes “ruined” precisely at 
the moment when the host of unconscious perceptions and sensations are revealed to her 
consciousness.  When she cannot act and her will is suspended during Crescentius’s 
murder, then she becomes “thought o’erwhelm’d,” paralyzed by the morass of sensations 
that have begun to overload her brain:  “When consciousness again shall wake,/ Hath 
now no refuge but to break” (273-4).  The “wake”/”break” rhyme helps to refract the 
sequence of events in which the soon-to-be widow is first made aware of her unconscious 
thoughts, which then puts her mind at an impasse.  It is important to note that Hemans 
does not demonstrate these myriad perceptions but instead only alludes to Stefania’s 
“wildness” and “frenzy,” or those states of mind that disable her from processing the wild 
frenzy of sensory experience.  Hemans will shed this bit of mimetic fallacy in later 
poems, yet it is clear that she does not want readers to assume that the widow has 
                                                
118 See especially Richardson’s chapter on “Coleridge and the New Unconscious” (58-
65). 
119 As Miller notes, this term was coined by Benjamin Carpenter, whose first works of 
physiology appeared in 1839. 
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crumbled in despair when she warns:  “She is no sculptured form of woe.”  The problem 
here is not that Stefania cannot live without her husband but that she cannot cognize the 
turn of events that has installed a vicious, imperial tyrant over the rightful, republican 
Roman consul. 
The brain science schema additionally helps Hemans to blur the difference 
between reason and affect, compiling them as perceptions and sensations that might lead 
to either thought or feeling.  Moreover, instances of cognitive paralysis—as opposed to 
hysteria—present women as being just as capable of feeling and thinking as men.  One 
upshot of the materialist model, as Richardson has argued, is that brain-based versions of 
the mind helped to underwrite a more universal rather than a gendered view of the brain 
itself, at least initially.   
A good case in point of this gender dynamic occurs in “The Abencerrage,” a 
poem that first appears in the 1819 volume but replaces “The Widow of Cresecentius” as 
the title poem in the 1823 edition.  In that poem, it is the male protagonist, Hamet, who 
falls into a trance, only to have his imperial prerogatives shattered.  Set during the 
Muslim wars of the fifteenth-century, as imperial Spain attempts to recapture Moorish 
Grenada, the poem depicts star-crossed Muslim lovers from different tribes.  When 
Hamet tells his lover Zayda that he has made a pact with Spain against her tribe, he falls 
into a trance, “awe-struck and amazed,/ In silent trance awhile the warrior gazed” (II.349-
51).  This occurs not as he watches his brothers die but as he looks upon Zayda, “In form 
so fragile that unconquer’d mind” (356).  Unlike Stefania, Zayda already possesses an 
“unconquer’d” mind that resists both Spanish imperial hegemony and tribal ideology that 
would prevent her from being with Hamet.  He, unlike Stefania, however, has to 
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experience this perceptual overload twice for it to destroy his imperial fantasies.  Later in 
the poem, this idea of “unconquer’d, uncontroll’d […] unsubmitting thought” exists only 
as “lofty dreams […]/ Where tyranny is near” (III.278, 282, 285-86).  The unarranged, 
uncontrolled mind is antithetical to tyranny’s lofty dreams, which insist on fitting every 
perception into its conceptual, ideological system.  Though Zayda’s mind displays an 
infectious cognitive resistance, Hamet refuses to relinquish his lofty dreams until Zayda 
dies, which finally ushers in a more permanent cognitive ruination.  It may be that 
Hemans eventually places this poem in the second edition’s privileged spot because 
males like Hamet need to experience the revolutionary trance-state much more than 
women, who are often already undone by imperial ideologies. 
The material unconscious, nevertheless, seems a somewhat apt figure for 
women’s lopsided role in the public sphere when it represents hidden power.  As Miller 
writes:  “if the situation calls for a high-level managerial decision, the Unconscious will 
freely deliver the necessary information to awareness” (par. 56).  High-level wives like 
Stefania (or even Zayda) could be seen as stealthy providers of information or uncommon 
perceptions to a husband and public executive.  In terms of a gendered division of labor 
in the brain, after the masculine will has been stymied by the failure of its imperial plots, 
the feminine material archivist of information is able to infiltrate the ideological 
superstructure and change it from the inside out.  When the trance-state suspends the 
impetus to act, the widow, as a high-level wife, is revealed to have access to both the 
unconscious and conscious material.  Hamet never incites a revolution as Stefania does, 
and Hemans seems to argue, at least in the dialogue between the two poems, that it is the 
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onus of women to bring action and ideology critique together, if only under the auspices 
of state disaster. 
If Stefania is stunned by her husband’s death, it paradoxically allows her a 
moment outside thought altogether, which effectively supplies her with the possibility of 
refiguring both her reactions to and her thoughts about such extraordinary events.120  
Hemans presents a model of distancing similar to our own contemporary cognitive 
behavioral models, which theorize that feelings are not innate but only come into being as 
we cognize sensations and perceptions into specific feelings, particularly through the 
language we use to describe emotions or thoughts.  Cognitive psychologists argue that we 
develop emotional and intellectual analyses based on behavioral patterns of cognition, 
and we might also label these patterns ideology, or ideologically conditioned 
responses.121   
In these paralytic moments, the tale’s usual history—the stories for all these 
poems were taken from well-known histories—is likewise stunted and rewritten.  
Hemans’ “historic scenes” stem the usual patterns of narrating such tales by stopping 
narrative action with the poetics of the trance state.  While, as Jason Rudy has argued, 
later in her career Hemans becomes heavily invested in poetic techniques that help her 
portray feminine historical figures with lyrical, if emotionally controlled, subjectivity, 
                                                
120 Jason Rudy, in his article “Hemans’s Passion,” similarly argues that Hemans was 
renown during her own time for an “aesthetic of restraint” that muted passion in favor of 
“reasoned feeling” (5, 4).  He demonstrates how Hemans used formal techniques, 
especially the narrative gloss on poems like “Arabella Stuart” “to frame and give 
structure” to the series of emotional monologues that follow (11). 
121 See for example, popular behavior therapy handbooks such as Windy Dryden and 
Michael Neenan’s Essential Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (2000), Albert Ellis’s A 
Guide to Rational Living (1975), and Martha Davis’s The Relaxation and Stress 
Reduction Workbook (1997).  Many of these teach distancing techniques to refute a 
patient’s “irrational ideas.” 
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these poems attempt to distance readers from narrative or history with shocking lyrical 
moments.  The ensuing pauses act as a referendum on the received understanding and 
worn-out narration that occur when well-known stories are told.  Through the poetics of 
vacancy, Hemans’s remediations of older histories seek to undo given ways of 
understanding those plots, characters, and themes. 
Even more than simply laying bear the inner-workings of the unconscious, these 
moments of paralysis have the startling ability to redirect thought itself.  This point is 
Hemans’s final figurative gesture at the end of the first part of the poem, when she states 
that the widow’s mind is not just figuratively but literally or materially ruined: 
  But in the glow of vernal pride, 
  If each warm hope at once hath died, 
  Then sinks the mind, a blighted flower, 
  Dead to the sunbeam and the shower; 
  A broken gem, whose inborn light 
  Is scatter’d—ne’er to re-unite.  (279-84) 
After Stefania’s husband dies, she is left destitute.  The blown flower image here is 
certainly evocative of notions of ruined femininity such as hysterical deaths or ritual sati 
that had women following their husbands to the grave.  Nanora Sweet has discussed 
Heman’s repeated use of the blown rose image as an emblem of feminized, historical 
evanescence, but the passage emphasizes the extent to which the widow’s tragic state 
occurs because her “mind” “sinks.”  The second metaphor, the broken gem with its light 
imagery, transfers the tenor of the passage from an emphasis on the destruction of nature 
or natural femininity to the disruption of reason.   
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Many poems in the volume are dominated by light imagery, most often in the 
form of destructive, revolutionary flames, which are analogous to the frenzied or 
overwhelmed visages of the poem’s characters.  Zayda’s unconquered light eventually 
becomes a “wasted,” “burning glow” (III.449), and “The Wife of Asdrubal” ends with the 
suicidal widow who “Lifts one appealing, frenzied glance on high,/ Then deep midst 
rolling flames is lost to mortal eye” (67-68).  This light imagery figures both 
inflammatory insurgency but also the dissipation or destruction of mental clarity.  In “The 
Widow of Crescentius,” the mind’s light—that classic Enlightenment metaphor for 
reason or ratiocination—fragments into shards of various and conflicting thoughts or 
erupts into an uncontrollable frenzy of perceptions.  While from the point of view of the 
1790s Revolutionary agenda, this scattering or immolation is a tragic figure for the failure 
of the Enlightenment, the widow of Crescentius’ ruination is a necessary shock that will 
smash the ideological system itself into shards. 
If Stefania’s mind has been shattered, she paradoxically teeters between knowing 
too much and knowing nothing at all.  While hallucinations or reveries in De Quincey 
and Coleridge allow poets to construct fantastical meaning, Hemans’s trances function to 
block cognition and in doing so refuse conceptual thought or those imperial “lofty 
dreams” that ascribe meaning to Crescentius’ murder. 122  If cognitive overload leads to 
conceptual blockage, it is because Hemans’s model of the brain converges with a model 
of the mind.  With the Enlightenment imagery of the ruined mind as scattered light, 
Hemans invokes an important connection between the materialist ideas about the brain 
                                                
122 See for example, Frederick Burwick’s “Romanticism as Cognitive Process,” which 
argues that male Romantic poets used a “top-down” model of cognition where visual 
perception was shaped by non-volitional memory as much as sensory data. 
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and current philosophical discourses about the mind.  In the wake of the Kantian legacy, 
many philosophers of the early nineteenth century were attempting to bridge the gap 
between English empiricist doctrine on the one hand, with its epistemological reliance on 
sensory experience, and continental philosophy on the other, with its positing of 
transcendental categories arrived at through subjective reasoning and judgment.  Rather 
than discounting perceptual data, Hegel in Germany, Charles Peirce in America, and 
Whewell in England sought to reconcile sensory perception of the world with the mind’s 
ability to conceptualize ideas.123  Though Hegel, Whewell, or Peirce may not have 
influenced Hemans directly, she works through similar problems in her verse.  It is 
difficult to ascertain whether or not she read Kant, but it is unlikely that she was 
unfamiliar with him.  She read avidly in German and was intimately familiar with works 
by Coleridge, Goethe, Madame de Staël, and Schiller among others, writers who were 
influenced either by Kant or by German Idealist thought.124   
                                                
123 Richard J. Berstein makes this point about Peirce in an essay comparing John 
MacDowell to Hegel.  MacDowell is a contemporary British philosopher attempting to 
reconcile Hegel with analytical philosophy, particularly through MacDowell’s reworking 
of Kantian receptivity and spontaneity, or the sensory world and the mind’s 
conceptuality.  Bernstein points out that MacDowell reads Hegel through a post-Kantian 
lens, much like Peirce’s own post-Kantian ideas (19).  It may be helpful to note that the 
philosophic community is still split in its views of Hegel.  The quintessential Romantic 
philosopher was long regarded by many as a metaphysician, whose idealism and theories 
of the absolute reconciled Kant’s noumenal and phenomenal realms.  More recently, 
many philosophers have begun to account for a more critical Hegel who accepts Kant’s 
critique but rather than putting pressure on the subject’s need to access the noumenal, 
concentrates instead on the subject’s understanding.  MacDowell is only one of many 
contemporary philosophers who read Hegel as a post-Kantian, the most important of 
whom is Robert Pippin.  My argument here is that Hegel, along with Peirce, Whewell, 
and Hemans were all engaged with the epistemological problems that Kant had made so 
vital. 
124 Hemans’ epic poem about the mind, The Forest Sanctuary, which I discuss below, 
especially reveals the poet’s tarrying with continental thought, with its epigraphs from 
Schiller and Coleridge.  Though Hemans’ Italian and Spanish influences have been well-
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In England, though a bit later than Hemans was writing, Whewell advocated for a 
return to Baconian induction as a means to renovate the scientific method.  To do this he 
formulated the concept of “colligation” in which conceptual inferences or intuitions 
might be tested by sensory or experiential data.125  Not unlike Whewell, Hegel was 
attempting to retool Kantian epistemology by claiming that though conceptual knowledge 
could not be verified by immediate experiences of the world, sensory data ultimately did 
shape and pre-figure those claims.126  Both Hegel and Whewell end up on the side of 
conceptuality, however mediated or legislated by the self-authorizing subject.  Slavoj 
Zizek, in his cognitivist reading of Hegel, argues that it is abstraction or 
conceptualization that resists the unseemly barrage of sensory information or perceptions 
Hemans portrays:  “This is where Hegel comes in, with his praise of the infinite negative 
power of abstraction that pertains to understanding:  consciousness is possible only 
through this loss, this delay with regard to the fullness of immediate experience—a 
‘direct consciousness’ would be a kind of claustrophobic horror, like being buried alive 
with no breathing space” (Parallax View 241).  Hegel’s abstraction leaves out the wealth 
of sensory data that might interfere with conscious decisions or conceptualization, even 
as it belies the hegemonic tendencies of abstraction.  In “The Widow of Cresentius,” 
Hemans’s moments of paralysis enact precisely this “claustrophobic horror” of “direct 
consciousness” and cognitive over-abundance.  Zizek points out that “the function of 
                                                                                                                                            
explored by Nanora Sweet, her German reading has not been the subject of much 
scholarly investigation. 
125 The best account of Whewell’s epistemology, along with its political consequences is 
Laura J. Snyder’s Reforming Philosophy.  Snyder argues that Whewell’s rehabilitation of 
Kant and a priori conceptuality, in the face of J. S. Mill’s democratic utilitarianism, went 
hand in hand with Whewell’s aristocratic politics. 
126 For a good summary of post-Kantian readings of Hegel, see Simon Lumsden’s “The 
Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel.” 
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blocking is an elementary function of consciousness,” but for Hemans, the fullness of 
immediate experience induces a different sort of blockage, creating so much brain 
activity as to block the mind’s ability to conceptualize, which in turn refigures the 
relationship between mind and world.127  Not until “The Forest Sanctuary” will she begin 
to explore fully the shock that the imposition of conceptuality places on sensory 
experience as a kind of Hegelian negativity, which disrupts ideology by producing those 
moments when consciousness dwells within the imperfect fit between abstraction and 
sensory data.  
This “claustrophobic horror” also implicates some interesting political nuances in 
Hemans’s system of revolution.  If ideological concepts are disrupted by brain activity, 
the frenzied brain’s commotion figures a kind of bottom-up overthrow of tyrannical and 
aristocratic ideological and political structures, or perhaps simply the disruption of 
hegemony.  Hemans refutes conceptual tyranny for its conceptual hegemony, perhaps due 
to the aristocratic aura of Kantian philosophy, yet her moments that stop thought dead in 
its tracks cannot simply be made to fall into line with experiences, which also need to be 
collated and conceptualized into Humean common sense, Burkean habits, or J. S. Mill’s 
prescriptions.  As Laura Snyder points out, Mill adopted a position reconciling 
Bentham’s empiricism with Coleridge’s inductive philosophy precisely because 
                                                
127 Colin Jager, in “Can We Talk About Consciousness Again?” raises the important 
question about the relationship between the traditional Romantic concerns over the mind 
and the world and more recent debates, in both literature and neuroscience, about 
consciousness and the relationship between mind and brain.  Jager also astutely points out 
that Richardson’s research about nineteenth-century brain science often stops short of 
offering interpretive schemas about how consciousness works in literature, at which point 
scholars have often reverted to continental philosophy.  My argument tries to explain how 
Hemans proactively uses the way brain science stumps interpretation to rethink certain 
problems in continental philosophy. 
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deductive empiricism and categorical idealism tended to regard frequent experiences as 
the way things should be, not simply the way things were due to bad habits.  Hemans’s 
poems repeatedly point to moments that vacate thought altogether whether inductive or 
deductive, empiricist, or idealist.    
Stefania is an aristocratic upstart, yet the myriad sensations clogging her mind 
might be read as a figure for the masses, like those at Peterloo, which attempted to wrest 
control from an aristocratic oligarchy.  As Stefania hurries to her husband’s execution, 
the poet’s descriptions of the crowds coming to watch the gruesome event seem to 
foreshadow the form that the widow’s brain dysfunction eventually takes. 
 She traverses in breathless haste; 
 And by the tombs where dust is shrined, 
 Once tenanted by the loftiest mind, 
 Still passing on, hath reach’d the gate 
 Of Rome, the proud, the desolate! 
 Throng’d are the streets, and, still renew’d, 
 Rush on the gathering multitude.  (I.174-80) 
Rome’s literal and figurative desolation—it is no longer occupied by lofty minds—exists 
in paradoxical relations to the multitudes that fill the city’s streets.  Likewise, Stefania’s 
mind is about to be emptied by the shock of Crescentius’ death even as it is filled with a 
host of rushing perceptions. 
“The Abencerrage” also often stops its story of Hamet and Zayda to picture the 
swarms of Muslims armed in battle and consequently absent from the joyful, peaceful 
banquet hall.  As in “The Widow of Crescentius,” empty spaces often allude to 
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overwhelming, chaotic fields of battle, as the crowded physical battlefields correspond to 
the conceptual overload that will overthrow imperial ideologies.  At first the narrator 
says:  “Avenging crowds have lit the mighty pyre/ Which feeds the waving pyramid of 
fire” (I.156-55).  About a hundred lines later, the speaker similarly describes the mind of 
Hamet’s foe, Abdallah:  “Of thought that ill th’ indignant heart can veil/ And passion, 
like the hush’d volcano’s power/ That waits in stillness its appointed hour” (I.246-48).  
Both the angry mobs and Abdallah’s own brain muster a chaotic, inflamatory force, 
which will attempt to combat the Spanish army and vacate Grenada of its imperial power.  
In these poems, Hemans describes both mind and mob with a material power to route the 
status quo. 
In the second part of “The Widow,” it is the physical and figurative refusal of 
conceptual cognition that eventually topples the poem’s tyrant, activating the political 
and ethical stakes of Hemans’ epistemology.  In effect, the wife’s usual role as loving 
companion is destroyed as Stefania, out for revenge, cross-dresses as a minstrel in Otho’s 
train at the beginning of part two of the poem.  This subterfuge may represent the 
necessity of a woman poet who must don the cloak of anonymity in order to get attention 
as an artist, as Sweet suggests.128  However, the second part of the poem takes as its 
subject the transmission of cognitive confusion that rails against conceptual normativity 
in general when it pointedly deconstructs ideological categories such as gender.  As a 
young boy, Stefania comes to represent a certain kind of androgyny or polymorphous 
sexuality sometimes associated with adolescence, and we might therefore read Stefania’s 
transformation into the boy-minstrel, “Guido,” as the facial and bodily signifier of 
                                                
128 For this reading see Sweet’s “Hemans’s “The Widow of Crescentius”:  Beauty, 
Sublimity, and the Woman Hero.” 
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cognitive confusion, particularly over gender and sexuality.  As an embodiment of 
uncertainty, Guido’s role as minstrel is to transmit the contents of his mind—its 
ruination—to his listeners, particularly Otho, but also to the larger reading audience.   
As part two begins, Otho, guilty and melancholy over the murder of Crescentius, 
has been roaming the outskirts of Rome and looking for solace in nature or in his new 
minstrel’s songs.  Stefania, disguised as Guido, a ruminative Byronic figure, likewise 
wanders along the Tiber’s banks singing “[s]o wild a grandeur in each tone,/ ‘Tis like a 
dirge for empires gone!” (201-02).  Before heading to the poem’s murder-suicide 
denouement, Hemans pauses to describe Stefania as Guido, once again concentrating on 
the state of woeful Guido’s mind: 
  Oh! where can ruins awe mankind, 
  Dark as the ruins of the mind? 
   
  His mien is lofty, but his gaze 
  Too well a wandering soul betrays: 
  His full dark eye at times is bright 
  With strange and momentary light, 
  Whose quick uncertain flashes throw 
  O’er his pale cheek a hectic glow: 
  And oft his features and his air 
  A shade of troubled mystery wear, 
  A glance of hurried wildness, fraught 
  Whate’er that thought, still, unexpress’d, 
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  Dwells the sad secret in his breast;  (153-68) 
Stefania, even as a cross-dressed boy, is still described with a “hectic glow” and a wild 
glance.  Her fraught appearance may be signs of mourning, the despair she feels over her 
own degraded position, or the guilt she feels as she plots another human being’s death.  
Yet the mystery and frenzy in her appearance may again be signs of cognitive chaos.  
Those thoughts “still, unexpress’d” fester in her breast precisely because she cannot 
conceptualize them—an act most often done through language itself.  She does, however, 
emote them musically: 
  In music’s eloquence alone; 
  His soul’s deep voice is only pour’d 
  Through his full song and swelling chord.  (170-2) 
What Guido cannot communicate through language he can transmit through the extra-
linguistic vibrations of his chords.  Here Hemans makes an interesting if implicit 
distinction between poetry and music.  While poetry’s rhythmic and aural qualities have a 
certain kind of music, they are always formed through discursive, socialized, ideological, 
rhetorical language.  Music’s “eloquence” and “full song,” on the other hand, have the 
capability of transmitting unconceptualized sensation.  This typically Romantic notion of 
expressive music evokes something like Hegel’s “dark night” of abyssal, immanent 
subjectivity.   It also appears similar to mesmerism’s use of liquid or animal magnetism 
to captivate (or seduce) people into a trance.  In Hemans, however, the idea is not to 
return from the abyss of pure subjectivity back into the conceptual and symbolic, nor is it 
intended to be coercive or manipulative, as much hypnosis was, especially on women.  
Instead, the widow passes along the neuronal deadlock, as a meta- or anti-meme.  In 
 
179  
effect, Guido’s songs facilitate the spread of the raw, chaotic perceptual data that Stefania 
had originally refused to colligate.  If Otho already appears troubled and confused at the 
beginning of part two, it may be because he has already been listening to Guido’s 
poisonous songs even before he is introduced to readers.  Stefania’s songs enable her 
literally to “awe mankind”—most notably Otho—with her “ruined mind.”   
In this way, the widow’s musical eloquence is a figure parallel to the actual 
poison she eventually puts into Otho’s drink to kill him.  In the final scene of the poem, 
Otho calls again for Guido’s song at a feast, and, in the same breath, he raises his goblet 
to banish his recent woe, unaware that both song and wine contain his death.  The idea of 
poetry as a drug that provokes thought or challenges habituated ideas is not an 
uncommon trope in early nineteenth-century writing.129  Shelley uses nitrus and nepenthe 
in Prometheus Unbound to vacate the mind of its social and linguistic habituations, and 
nepenthe in Keats often helps to stimulate or stagnate his fantastical sensory trips.  De 
Quincey famously confessed to opium addiction, which David L. Clark argues may be 
about the habituations of “infinite deliberation” (281).130  Similar to instances in both 
Shelley and Keats, Hemans’s liquid poison and music’s mellifluous eloquence allow for 
the easy consumption and ingestion of a substance that has the power both to stimulate 
and destroy consciousness through the excessive brain activity such drugs induce.  Both 
Keats and Shelley use drugs to vacate old ways of thinking about either Apollo’s human 
state or Asia’s submission to Jupiter’s tyranny.  Though Shelley depicts Asia as 
peacefully purveying revolutionary drugs in Prometheus Unbound, both poets eventually 
                                                
129 See especially Orrin N. C. Wang’s “Romantic Sobriety” for a full-bodied discussion of 
sobriety, intoxication and Romanticism. 
130 See David L. Clark, “We ‘Other Prussians’:  Bodies and Pleasures in De Quincey and 
Late Kant.”   
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seem to excoriate the violence certain mind-altering drugs inadvertently produce, as both 
Rousseau in “The Triumph of Life” and the poet in “The Fall of Hyperion” become 
paralyzed by drugs—and the knowledge—proffered by women.   
Hemans’s drugs, alternately, seem like a desperate but necessary ploy.  She 
purposely employs this contemporary trope, and we can see proof of this in how she 
alters certain details of the epigraph that she borrows from Sismondi, which narrates a 
general, historical account of the widow.  As Susan Wolfson points out in her editorial 
head note to the poem, Hemans changes certain “improper details,” namely the fact that 
Stefania disguises herself as a doctor but then seduces Otho and becomes his mistress in 
order to administer the painful poison (70).  This rewriting of the seduction plot into a 
story about drugs and music shifts the trope from one of sexual transmission (with its 
exchange of bodily fluids) to narcotic or poetic transmission.  With this change, Hemans 
most notably exonerates Stefania from any kind of sexual license yet, at the same time, 
transfers the metaphor’s tenor from the body to the mind and brain.  
Though Otho thinks that poetry (as well as drinking) should “banish all 
resembling woe” and lull his pain, they have the opposite effect when they literally and 
figuratively enflame his brain (230).      
  Now crimson’d with a hectic dye, 
  The burning flush of agony! 
  His lip is quivering, and his breast 
  Heaves with convulsive pangs oppress’d; 
  Now his dim eye seems fix’d and glazed  (239-43) 
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Stefania stuns him to death with her “hectic dye,” which finally brings on convulsive 
pangs in the breast of the villain.  Her unmanageable state of mind has finally transmitted 
itself to Otho, in the form of a painful paroxysm.  As she finally unmasks herself to the 
tyrant and his minions, Stefania has the last word in a final speech that includes these 
lines: 
  Deem’st thou my mind of reason void? 
  It is not phrensied,—but destroy’d! 
  Aye! view the wreck with shuddering thought,— 
  That work of ruin thou hast wrought!  (269-72) 
At the poem’s finale, the widow finally articulates what has been going on in her head all 
along.  She refuses to be seen as insane, out of control, or “phrensied” with violent 
emotion, and instead insists that her audience understand her mind as something that 
cannot be understood—as “destroy’d,” shattered into a mess of non-understandable 
perceptions.  She calls on Otho to look on her face as a sign of her ruined mind and “view 
the wreck with shuddering thought,” that is, to replicate this state of mind in his own 
brain.  The accusation itself becomes a performative act, as it overwhelms Otho—to 
death.  The word “wrought”—not unlike the phrase “hectic dye”—creates a crucial pun.  
It both connotes the act of artfully making something yet also references an older use of 
the word, meaning made rough or agitated.131  The paradox suitably describes the artful 
act of disquieting the mind, which might also describe Hemans’s poetics of vacancy in 
“The Widow of Crescentius.”    
                                                
131 Though, according to the OED, the participial use of this meaning was obsolete by 
1604, the adverbial use through the phrase “wrought up,” was still very much in use.  
This usage, in fact, has an entry by Hemans from “The Siege of Valencia”: “The 
deep..feelings wakening at their voice, Claim all the wrought-up spirit to themselves.”  
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Stefania touches on the radical consequences of her drug peddling in the poem’s 
final speech, where she addresses those who will be left to rule Rome: 
 Yet that around me shuddering stand, 
 Ye chiefs and princes of the land! 
 Mourn ye a guilty monarch’s doom? 
 —Ye wept not o’er the patriot’s tomb! 
 He sleeps unhonor’d—yet be mine 
 To share his low, neglected shrine. 
 His soul with freedom finds a home, 
 His grave is that of glory—Rome!  (295-302) 
Not only has the widow’s poison contaminated Otho’s mind, but those around them stand 
“shuddering.”  Stefania’s diagnosis comes in the next few lines when she contrasts the 
followers’ feelings about their dead dictator Otho with those sentiments they have about 
Crescentius, the widow’s murdered husband and rightful consul.  This cognitive 
dissonance provokes her into an encomium not only for Crescentius’s patriotism but also 
the Romans’ failure to properly monumentalize him.  Without a proper shrine, his soul 
paradoxically finds “freedom.”  In contrast to Roman tombs, with their defunct 
infrastructure, Crescentius’s unmarked grave actually bequeaths him an existence in 
history beyond institutional glorification.  Rather than understanding Hemans’s reiterated 
tropes of forgotten patriots, unwritten histories, and unmarked graves as a piece of history 
that she attempts to resurrect, the reader is directed to think of Rome as vacated of all 
leadership.  Its buried glory paradoxically offers the possibility of rethinking leadership, 
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as shuddering citizens and on-lookers have the opportunity to reevaluate their ideas of 
“patriot” and “freedom.”  
 The poem ends on a similar note of vacancy:  “We struggle, and we pass away,/ 
Like the wild billows as they sweep,/ Leaving no vestige on the deep!” (328-330).  On 
the surface, these final lines signify the erasure of Stefania from Roman history along 
with her uprising against the Pope-backed German dictator.  The poem could be read as 
the attempt to uncover from the dominant imperial history the republican story about a 
failed revolution.  Read as an allegory about how the mind works, however, the blank sea 
swept clean of these vestiges by the wild billows of history comes to signify less erasure 
and recovery than an historical or conceptual vacancy.  The wild billows, like the flames 
that signal the conflicting and quasi-unconscious processes of the mind, overwhelm 
historical conceptuality, or any narrative that might dictate historical meaning.  
 
Brainy Hemans:  Footnotes, the Poetic Unconscious, and Textual Overload 
Before she ends the poem on the outskirts of the Roman republic with the waves 
crashing down neuronal and mental vacancy, Hemans first dallies a bit with history in a 
more material way.  By attaching a slew of historical footnotes, she injects a morass of 
historical information into the poem, overburdening readers with the text’s unconscious.  
This reader-response technique involves readers directly in a synthetic experience and 
parallels Stefania’s own story, infecting them, somewhat mimetically, with what 
perceptual overload might look and feel like.  The footnotes refer the reader to episodes 
from Roman imperial history, complicating the number and kinds of narratives told about 
tyranny and freedom.  It is through the unfolding of the text’s unconscious that 
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conceptual and historical meaning for the reader is both reified and refused.  Hemans also 
pointedly uses the paratextual material to convey a complex notion of historicity, which 
rather than simply employing the historicist technique of using one history to understand 
another, constructs a web of references that offer competing historical claims as a means 
of vacating imperial histories.132    
The best examples of this textual overload occur at the very beginning of the 
poem, when Hemans starts by describing the “luxuriant glades” (1) of the Roman 
countryside, with a particular view to evoking the ruined monuments and statuary of the 
Roman empire.  Perhaps because Crescentius’s stand against Otho took place at the Mole 
of Hadrian, Hemans points to Hadrian’s tomb as an example of the Roman ruins she 
wants to typify in the poem. 
 Sunk is thy palace, but thy tomb, 
 Hadrian! hath shared a prouder doom, 
 Though vanish’d with the days of old 
 Its pillars of Corinthian mould; 
 And thy fair forms by sculpture wrought, 
 Each bodying some immortal thought, 
 Which o’er that temple of the dead, 
 Serene, but solemn beauty shed, 
 Have found, like glory’s self, a grave 
 In time’s abyss, or Tiber’s wave.  (I.43-52) 
                                                
132 For a reading of Hemans as a quintessentially historicist poet, see Ted Underwood’s 
“Romantic Historicism and the Afterlife.” 
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Two footnotes bookend this passage:  the first, attached to “prouder doom,” details the 
history and significance of Hadrian’s tomb and the second, attached to “Tiber’s wave,” 
comments on the Tiber’s role in helping to both wash away and recover the significance 
of Hadrian’s tomb.  Both notes deal with Roman statuary’s dual role as art and martial 
monument, and more importantly, how it might figure attitudes toward imperialism and 
conceptuality. 
 The footnote, providing some history of Hadrian’s tomb, reads as follows: 
The mausoleum of Hadrian, now the castle of St. Angelo, was first 
converted into a citadel by Belisarius, in his successful defence [sic] of 
Rome against the Goths.  “The lover of the arts,” says Gibbon, “must read 
with a sigh that the works of Praxiteles and Lysippus were torn from their 
lofty pedestals, and hurled into the ditch on the heads of the besiegers.”  
He adds, in a note, that the celebrated sleeping Faun of Barberini palace 
was found, in a mutilated state, when the ditch of St. Angelo was cleansed 
under Urban VIII.  In the middle ages, the moles Hadriani was made a 
permanent fortress by the Roman government, and bastions, outworks, & 
c. were added to the original edifice, which had been stripped of its marble 
covering, its Corinthian pillars, and the brazen cone which crowned its 
summit.  (Selected 78n6) 
The passage primarily concerns the transformation of various statuary, bronze, and other 
art decorations into weapons, used at various times to defend Rome from the conquering 
Goths and Spaniards.  Hemans goes so far as to quote Gibbon to make the point that these 
works of art, some of them famous even in the eighteenth century, were “hurled into the 
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ditch on the heads of the besiegers.”  In the hands of republicans protecting themselves 
against invaders, ornamental statuary becomes more useful for its materiality than for its 
formal, aesthetic qualities.  Art literally gets thrown on the heads of imperial marauders 
and becomes a suggestive allegory of Hemans’s cognitive overload, where the brain is 
showered with painful perceptions, or, in Otho’s case, is over-stimulated by drugs and 
poetry. 
 The footnote itself works in a slightly imitative way, as it overwhelms readers 
with a wealth of information about the relationship between Hadrian’s tomb and 
imperialism.  The syntax of the note poses the history of the tomb less as a linear 
progression from art as ornament to art as weaponry than as a non-hierarchical web of 
contradictory impulses.  That Hemans chooses Hadrian’s tomb as the site of this 
historicizing is not simply coincidental, since Hadrian famously presided over a major 
rebellion in Britannia, and then proceeded to build Hadrian’s wall.  The wall’s 
significance in British history itself has been debated as both a signifier of Hadrian’s 
imperial conquest and imposition of Roman rule in Britannia and also as a defensive 
structure against invading Caledonians.  Similarly, Hadrian’s mausoleum, as it becomes a 
citadel guarding against Goth and Frank attacks, signals both the beginning of the fall of 
the Roman empire in the West as well as its glorification.  The irony would not be lost on 
nineteenth-century readers that the tomb “now the castle of St. Angelo, was first 
converted into a citadel.”  The structure becomes a castle, a sign of aristocracy, by first 
being transformed into a military bastion.  Thus what seems to be a sign of the natural-
born rule of aristocratic privilege only becomes so through imperial conquest or 
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defense—which is strikingly similar to castles erected in England after the Norman 
conquest, an event not too distant from Otho’s invasion.   
The odd sequencing of the note further exacerbates the confusion as to what 
Hadrian’s tomb represents.  It first refers to the mausoleum’s construction, beginning in 
135, then to its transformation into a castle (in the fourteenth century), to its conversion 
into a citadel (536), to the recovery of the Faun of Barberini (in the seventeenth century) 
and to the Faun’s creation (second century BC) and finally its conversion into a fortress 
(fifth century).  This temporal hodge-podge not only defers any linear narrative about the 
tomb and its art but also confuses the three uses of the tomb for republican, imperial, or 
artistic purposes.  The tomb has been used as an imperial institution, a fortress against 
Gothic attacks, the site of Crescentius’ republican stand against Pope-backed tyranny, a 
castle during the middle ages, and finally a refuge for the Pope.  The temporal confusion 
in the footnote prevents the reader from privileging any one of these narratives that might 
stabilize the tomb’s meaning.  If anything, the note emphasizes the extent to which all 
imperial symbols, despite their aesthetic value, eventually get taken apart.   
The final sentence of the note enforces exactly this kind of cognitive play.  
Describing how the tomb first became a fortress, the sentence begins by explaining that 
the government added “bastions, outworks &c. […] to the original edifice.”  This additive 
logic is seemingly undermined by the “&c” but is then replicated in the next clause, 
which attests to the fact that the tomb had already been “stripped of its marble covering, 
its Corinthian pillars, and the brazen cone which crowned its summit.”  Though the note 
ends by conceptualizing the tomb as having its aesthetic attachments stripped, the final 
description acts to reinstall the covering, pillars, and the crowning cone.  Thus the tomb is 
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never seen in its “original” state, stripped of its ornaments, which the footnote also ends 
up recovering, though in parts, through the last clause of the sentence.  The “brazen cone” 
comes to signify less imperial tumescence than an unstable piece of national 
historiography constantly being erected, altered, and reconstructed.   
The passive voice adds to this instability by making the architecture seem to be 
almost changing on its own.  In this way, Hadrian’s tomb signifies a macrocosm of how 
the unconscious brain works, while the footnote serves as a microcosm of a textual 
unconscious that causes cognitive overload in readers.  Zizek summarizes this model of 
the brain in his discussions of cognition and freedom in a way that sounds close to what 
Hemans might be doing with her footnotes:   
It is the prominent doxa today that the microcosm of interacting agents 
spontaneously gives rise to a global pattern which sets the context of 
interaction without being embodied in any particular agent (the subject’s 
“true Self”):  cognitive scientists repeat again and again how our mind 
does not possess a centralized control structure which runs top-down, 
executing designs in a linear way; how it is, rather, a bricolage of multiple 
agents who collaborate bottom-up, that is, whose organization is shifting, 
“opportunistic,” robust, adaptive, flexible. (Parallax 241)  
Zizek’s summary of this flexible, shifting bricolage of multiple agents seems an apt way 
to characterize the way Hemans’s notes tend to act on the text itself, as well as a model 
for the way that material might contingently impinge on a train of conceptual thought.  
When the main text of the poem states that Hadrian’s tomb “might have shared a prouder 
doom,” rather than pointing directly to the historical or aesthetic signifier of that “prouder 
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doom,” the footnote refuses to construe that glory without question.  Instead, the note 
substitutes a host of different factual data and historical threads that resist any reifying 
concept connected to the tomb.  Like Zizek’s assemblage of multiple agents collaborating 
from the bottom-up, the Goth and Frank tribes effectively dismantle the tomb and the 
Roman empire in the West.  They, like Crescentius, represent the republican ethos, and 
perhaps even more drastically posit revolutionary activity as necessarily occurring 
chaotically, from the bottom up. 
 This conceptual resistance is precisely the subject of the next footnote, which 
superficially explains how the Tiber has acted as a grave for the fallen statuary, and by 
extension, a tomb for the glory of the Roman empire in the West.  Here Hemans attaches 
a quote from Madame de Staël’s Corrine, without any of the extra paraphrase or context 
that she used with the Gibbon quote.   
The most beautiful monuments of the arts, the most admirable statues 
were thrown into the Tiber, and are hidden beneath its tides.  Who knows 
if, to find them, one will not one day divert it from its bed?  But when one 
reflects that masterpieces of human genius are perhaps there in front of us, 
and that a sharper eye would see them through the waves, one feels that 
indescribable emotion that is ceaselessly reborn in Rome, under many 
forms, and that brings about one society for thought among physical 
objects, which everywhere else are mute.  (Selected 79n7) 
This excerpt from Corrine highlights not only the power of the Tiber and Rome’s 
monuments to evoke sentiment and thinking, but also evokes a meta-commentary on the 
process of reading itself.  To begin with, the main text of the poem helps us to read the 
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sculptures themselves as signifiers for thought:  “And the fair forms by sculpture 
wrought,/ Each bodying some immortal thought” (47-8).  The “wrought”/“thought” 
rhyme points out Hemans’s attempt to redefine just how thought works, but here it is the 
varied forms of sculpture that stir up, enliven, and embody various thoughts.  The 
passage in the poem ends with these immortal thoughts buried in the Tiber’s wave, but 
the footnote suggests that these objects are not hidden forever.  This contradiction 
implicitly asks the reader to consider again how something seemingly vacant is actually 
filled with a cadre of statuary that stirs up thought.   
In the context of the poem, de Staël’s question about whether or not future 
Romans might divert the Tiber to get a look at the statues buried beneath its waves 
figures the problem of whether and how they might resurrect certain thoughts from the 
graveyard of the mind.  The passage at first might seem to lend itself to a model of the 
Freudian unconscious, with the statues symbolizing the repressed historical memories of 
Roman defeat at the hands of Germanic tribes slowly dismantling the Western empire, 
but de Staël’s passage suggests otherwise when she decides that access to the statuary is 
restricted not because the art is submerged or even forgotten but because we are not good 
enough thinkers to see through the Tiber’s waves.  As an allegory about the pre-Freudian 
unconscious, the statues represent those unconscious and conscious cerebrations, while 
the waves figure that conceptuality that puts individual thoughts to death beneath a larger 
abstract pall.  Though the waves first appear as “time’s abyss,” in the footnotes, they are 
refracted as a figure for something like conceptuality that refuses us access to the “many 
forms” of thought, the many, sensory instances of material statuary that might allow 
readers access to a different kind of thinking.  By refusing to divert the river and instead 
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insisting that attentive readers see through it, de Staël’s quote prods those readers to use 
the footnotes to help see through the obvious conceptual, imperialistic veneer of the poem 
to the more complicated, material thoughts lying underneath it.  Though everywhere else 
these monuments (or thoughts and perceptual data) “are mute,” here—in this interstitial 
reading moment—they provoke “one society for thought.”  Like the waves in the poem’s 
final passage, here too the Tiber’s vacancy does not merely insist on a project of 
historical recovery from the river’s depths.  Instead, seeing through the Tiber’s waves at 
the beginning of the poem ultimately pushes readers to play with historical and cognitive 
contingency and to emerge at the shores of historical and ideological vacancy at the 
poem’s end, watching the waves sweep the surface of the mind clean. 
 
“The Forest Sanctuary” and the New World of the Mind 
Where “The Widow of Crescentius” uses drugs and a barrage of footnoted 
ancillary material to drive cognitive overload, “The Forest Sanctuary” turns to figures 
rooted in the New World of the Americas to critique the Old World’s reified brain and 
political architectures and, most importantly, to construct new, open spaces for thought.  
While the earlier poem was concerned with staging revolution, by 1825, Hemans is 
preoccupied with mapping new geo-political landscapes following the revolutions in the 
Mediterranean, Spain, and Latin America occurring in 1820-24.  While the first part of 
the piece in some ways replicates the widow of Cresentius’s cognitive overload when the 
unnamed Spaniard comes to consciousness about Catholicism’s “destruction of mental 
independence,” the second part of the poem documents the mental fallout of his decision 
to emigrate to the forests of North America.  This poem is less about the exigencies of 
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Spanish politics or religious upheavals than the “mental conflicts” of a Catholic Spaniard, 
a point that Hemans makes clear in her preface (Selected 269).  Though she is interested 
in the plight of the masses and the development of liberal ideology as it was being played 
out both through the Spanish revolts and the Spanish debate in the British periodical 
press, in this poem Hemans ultimately provides a commentary on ideology itself.  The 
New World presents the lure of a space that is free from ideology, and if Hemans remains 
self-reflexive about the propensity for characters to end up in new ideological structures 
as they capitulate to the romance of the New World, the poem ultimately provides 
interstitial moments that manage and struggle against—not get beyond—ideology.  
The poem plots the conversion of a sixteenth-century Catholic Spanish 
conquistador, who, after a traumatic homecoming, becomes a Protestant, American exile.  
As Wolfson points out, Hemans germinated the idea for the poem after reading the 
Letters of Don Leucadio Doblado, pseudonymously known as Joseph Blanco White, 
along with an article he wrote on the history of Spanish Protestantism in the Quarterly 
Review.133  A priest who eventually moved to England and converted to Anglicanism, 
White repeatedly calls Catholicism a “source of mental perversion” and an “insuperable 
obstacle to the improvement of the mind” (“Review” 241, Letters 59).  Similarly, in the 
manuscript version of the poem’s Advertisement, Hemans writes that the poem is 
“intended more as the record of a Mind, than as a tale abounding with romantic and 
extraordinary incident” (Selected 292n3, Hemans’s emphasis).  In other words, Hemans 
uses Catholicism as a model for the mind too steeped in patriarchal ideals and idolatry, 
                                                
133 Hemans and Doblado also frequently corresponded about Spanish literature.  See 
Wolfson’s note on the connections between the two authors, in her edition of Hemans’s 
Selected Poems (296n35). 
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putting forward Reformation-era Protestantism as a form of free thinking.  Not simply a 
narrative proselytizing Protestantism in the New World, “The Forest Sanctuary” plots the 
Spaniard’s conversion as a cognitive event that maps North America’s vacancy as a new 
kind of cognitive terrain. 
Hemans’s use of German Protestantism as a counterpoint to an ideologically 
conservative and claustrophobic Catholic Spain could be part of what Marilyn Butler and 
David Simpson have identified as a post-Waterloo, conservative use of German 
metaphysics.  Simpson locates de Staël, one of Hemans’s favorite authors, and Coleridge, 
who supplies one of the poem’s epigraphs, as two writers who helped publicize German 
organic metaphysics and proper religiosity as the ideological backbone of late-Romantic 
conservatives.134  As Sweet argues, however, de Staël’s Coppet salon represented for 
Hemans the politics of “disestablishment,” based on bourgeois intellectualism rather than 
intellectual clerisy.135  Diego Saglia has eloquently argued for both Italy and Spain as 
“displaced representations of liberal ideologies that were slowly emerging on the British 
political scene before 1832” (“Vespers” 366).136  Likewise, White’s use of Martin Luther, 
as well as Hemans’s own depiction of Spanish Protestantism, would seem to resurrect the 
radical Protestantism associated with Martin Luther, Kant, and the spirit of 1789.  The 
poem blatantly invokes a cosmopolitan spirit associated with disestablishment 
Protestantism that ties together the United States, Germany, England, and renegade 
Europeans.  Moreover, the nameless Spaniard represents a democratic or popular 
                                                
134 See Simpson (102-3), who discusses Butler. 
135 See her “‘Lorenzo’s’ Liverpool and ‘Corrine’s’ Coppet:  The Italianate Salon and 
Romantic Education.” 
136 Saglia’s comment is directed toward Italy as a model for liberal ideology, but he 
makes a similar argument about Spain in the introduction to Castles in Spain. 
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conversion of the mind available to any foot soldier who might turn against Spain’s 
ancient regime.   
While Hemans might be accused of drawing America as a romanticized space, her 
pointed use of history reveals her to be doing something more than simply installing an 
imperially-minded immigrant into an idealized second Eden and an American landscape 
too often seen as virgin land by nineteenth-century settlers.  The poem hails an unusual 
moment in sixteenth-century Spanish history, when “the German reformation made its 
first active and sincere proselytes at Seville” (246), as White narrates.  Set during the 
Inquisition under Phillip II, yet reminiscent of the dictatorial-style of rule instituted 
during the restoration of the monarchy under the return of Ferdinand to the throne in 
1814, the poem juggles Spanish-British relations in the sixteenth century—not the least 
of which is the religious conflict and the struggle for naval dominance between Phillip II 
and Elizabeth I—along with Spanish-British relations after Napoleon and the policies of 
both countries in the New World (North and South America) during both the sixteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  The position of the New World in the poem is a particularly 
complex one, as it straddles the so-called golden age of the Spanish empire, important 
English ventures to North America (such as Sir Walter Raleigh’s) in the sixteenth 
century, as well as in the nineteenth, the era of the Monroe doctrine in North America, 
the Latin American revolutions for self-determination, and the British turn from imperial 
control of the Americas to the governmental consolidation of their territories in India.  
Hemans is again constructing a complicated web of references that moves beyond a 
simple historicist contrast between different time periods.   
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Unlike the crushing historical overload that she developed with her footnotes in 
“The Widow of Crescentius,” however, this poem attempts to create counterfactual 
histories for historical actors.  Hemans specifically borrows from Isaac D’Israeli’s 
essays—the first modern version of counterfactual or virtual history—where he 
hypothesizes whether Protestant countries might have become Catholic had the outcomes 
of certain wars been reversed.  By writing a Spaniard into the North American imaginary 
of New England in the sixteenth century, Hemans figures America as Spanish imperial 
influence was beginning to fade, sometime around the defeat of the Armada, but before 
English colonists had begun to settle on the continent with their own imperial agendas.  
Her odd use of the Spaniard’s immigration suggests that the second part of the poem 
corresponds to a future that might have occurred in the North American past but did not.   
Though the Spaniard’s retreat to the Americas may signal the beginning of a new 
romance, filled with even more virulent ideologies about the saving graces of a 
deracinated frontier, this new vacancy also represents what happens to the mind after it 
resists old world ideologies through interstitial moments like cognitive overload.   The 
Spaniard straddles several hybrid identities—male and female, civilized and non-
civilized—and in doing so he begins to represent the shock between abstract concepts 
and isolated cognitive experiences.  Not unlike certain readings of Hegel’s negativity, 
Hemans finally posits America as a space that provides moments to manage ideology, 
through the character of the exile who cannot fully cognize perceptual events into an 
American imaginary or into conceptualized language.  In this way, vacancy comes to be 
structured around a productive lack of the symbolic, as the Spaniard escapes overwritten 
imaginaries and lights out for the territories, so to speak.  By learning a form of mind-
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emptying meditation, he tries to remain in the quasi-meditative space of the forest 
sanctuary and hold the pastoral in his mind as a sensory experience that refutes or delays 
ideological incorporation.   
As a retrospective retelling of the Spaniard’s mental conversion, the poem first 
describes the new-found forest sanctuary before returning to recount his traumatic 
homecoming.  As he stumbles upon an auto-de-fe, where his childhood friends, Alvar and 
his two sisters, are being marched to the stake, he uses the “wrought”/“thought” rhyme to 
signal that he is describing a cognitive event:  “They move’d before me but as pictures, 
wrought/ Each to reveal some secret of man’s thought” (194-5).  This “sullen mass” with 
its procession of people that each figure some thought, foreshadows the cognitive 
catastrophe that is about to occur when the narrator recognizes his childhood friends as 
Protestant victims of the Inquisition (190).  Though Hemans does take a few stanzas to 
frame the Spaniard’s relationship to Alvar and his crime of turning from Catholicism, the 
description of his reaction constitutes a moment of physical and cognitive paralysis:  “I 
could but gaze/ On him” (244-5, 249-50).  The narrator’s trance-like state induces a 
reverie about the two friends’ time together fighting native Indians in Peru, when he was 
struck down in battle. 
 But a lance met me in that day’s career, 
 Senseless I lay amidst th’ o’ersweeping fight, 
 Wakening at last—how full, how strangely clear, 
 That scene on memory flash’d—the shivery light, 
 Moonlight, on broken shields—the plain of slaughter, 
 The fountain-side—the low sweet sound of water— 
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 And Alvar bending o’er me—from the night 
 Covering me with his mantle!—all the past 
 Flow’d back—my soul’s far chords all answer’d to the blast. 
 
 Till, in that rush of visions, I became 
 As one that by the bands of slumber wound, 
 Lies with a powerless, but all-thrilling frame, 
 Intense in consciousness of sight and sound, 
 Yet buried in a wildering dream which brings 
 Lov’d faces round him, girt with fearful things! 
 Troubled ev’n thus I stood, but chain’d and bound  (253-268) 
Alvar’s appearance certainly provokes the Spaniard to remember his friend’s kindness 
and care for him at a moment of great physical danger.  It also offers the narrator a 
chance to consider and perhaps consolidate who he was in a past life.  At the same time, 
since the Spaniard is recalling how he lost consciousness after fielding a lance blow, the 
memory also mimics and evokes a moment of cognitive and sensory disorientation.  The 
top-down cognitive process of memory, which might provide him with a template for 
reacting to Alvar’s imminent death, ironically ends up replicating an experience of 
bottom-up mental chaos.  The lance blow lays the narrator unconscious, and when he 
awakes, it makes him susceptible to a flow of sensations that he had unwittingly 
absorbed, and subsequently they flood his conscious mind.  Thus the trauma of seeing 
Alvar tied to the stake both figures and acts like another blow to the Spaniard’s brain, 
bringing back into consciousness all these past sensations, as if they had never been 
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processed.  The lance blow not only instigates cognitive overload but also allegorizes 
how history or memory might likewise mimic the interruption of cognition.  The 
momentary gap in consciousness allows the subject to temporarily be free of thought, and 
when he awakes the rush of “direct consciousness” leaves him unable to process Alvar’s 
death as anything but unconscionable. 
In the next stanza, the Spaniard attempts to explain his paralysis or 
“powerlessness” as an “intense” “rush of visions” that overloads his consciousness with 
visual and auditory perceptions.  Richardson has described similar instances of blows to 
the head in Austen’s Persuasion, which, he writes, “mark the collision of conscious 
awareness with unconscious thoughts and feelings and the intense physiological 
sensations that accompany them” (102).  In Richardson’s account, Anne Eliott 
demonstrates a heightened rationality and sensibility, in a continuum from rational 
thought processes to instinctual, cognitive brain activity.  If Anne makes heroic the 
ability to deal with an intense influx of emotional sensations, unconscious volitions, and 
other perceptual data, Hemans’s Spaniard, like Stefania, is patently inept at processing 
unconscious thoughts that are made conscious.  Rather than viewing the Spaniard or 
Stefania as weak-brained (like Persuasion’s Henrietta), we might understand the 
paralysis and powerlessness as a means of shocking their brains and changing the way 
they process the world.  The Spaniard sidesteps virile, heroic action and instead comes 
away from Alvar’s death a changed man who refuses to support a state that polices 
religious ideology with death.  At this point he begins his transformation from a soldier in 
the Spanish military into a free-thinking American immigrant.   
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If the lance episode presents an image of phallic, patriarchal violence, it also 
serves as a death blow to the ancient regime.  The Spaniard’s defining cognitive event, 
his conversion to Protestantism, is eventually literalized as the crumbling of patriarchal 
towers, in a text laden with phallic figures of violence.  For example, we might contrast 
the lance’s blow with the “arrowy pillars of the firelight” (614)—the burning stakes of 
the Inquisition.  Hemans similarly musters other phallic imagery throughout the poem, 
beginning with an image of an oak tree falling prey to a rapacious vine several stanzas 
into the poem.  This, the narrator declaims in an alexandrine line, is “An image of man’s 
mind, land of my sires, with thee!” (99).  The narrator’s image of the strangled oak tree 
foreshadows the paradigm of patriarchal power succumbing to its own mental “bondage” 
of the serpentine vine of the Catholic religion, not unlike some of Blake’s illuminated 
imagery (95).  The tirade against the “image” in the mind specifically speaks to English 
distaste for Catholic idolatry as a sign system that imbues images with supernatural 
powers.  Though Hemans may be one of W. J. T. Mitchell’s iconoclasts, on a mission to 
stamp out the irreverent worship of idols, she would probably find iconoclasm distasteful 
for its own orthodoxies.137 
Just after the Spaniard flees from the scene of the auto-de-fe, he again uses 
another image of the material, phallic structures of the Spanish empire crumbling. 
 There are swift hours in life—strong, rushing hours, 
 That might do the work of tempests in their might! 
 They shake down things that stood as rocks and towers 
 Unto th’ undoubting mind;—they pour in light 
                                                
137 For discussions of Romanticism, idolatry, and iconoclasm, see W. J. T. Mitchell’s 
Iconology:  Image, Text, Ideology.   
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 Where it but startles—like a burst of day 
 For which th’ uprooting of an oak makes way;— 
 They sweep the colouring mists from off our sight, 
 They touch with fire, thought’s graven page, the roll 
 Stamp’d with past years—and lo! it shrivels as a scroll!  (480-9) 
This stanza dramatizes tempests and fire wreaking havoc on both the global macrocosm 
and the mind’s microcosm.  The strong, vacating winds “shake down” the towers 
signifying Spanish imperial power, just as the oak tree is uprooted.  Similar to many of 
Shelley’s metaphors in “Ode to the West Wind,” Hemans employs climactic forces of 
nature to figure the toppling of patriarchal and signifying systems.  These dramatize the 
contingency and life-altering changes such events cause, yet in Hemans they also figure a 
bevy of sensations that represents the clash between conscious and unconscious 
perceptions during moments of cognitive overload.   The deluge of weather, like the 
Spaniard’s unconscious, occurs without volition even as it seems to figure historical 
necessity.   
Even more to the point, the vacating winds and tempestuous times erase 
“thought’s graven page.”  The cognitive paralysis caused by Alvar’s death scene 
eventually acts to obliterate the writing in the mind, eroding patriarchal architectures by 
expunging thought, writing, and ultimately the knowledge they produce.  In this short 
phrase, Hemans reveals that she, like Shelley, conceives of epistemology as produced by 
writing.  Thought becomes habituated and problematic once it is “graven” or engraved 
into the mind.  Similar to Robinson, Hemans summons a violent and physical force to 
consign these old habituations to oblivion.   
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If Hemans seeks to destroy the phallic writing on the wall and those “things that 
stood as rocks and towers,” she puts in their place a skeptical, doubting mind.  In doing 
so, she seems to court “feminine lack,” which she privileges over material signifiers of 
phallic power, like trees or writing.  As the Spaniard turns from the death scene, she 
depicts him literally on the run from the phallus:  “the kindling city seem’d/ To spreak, 
float, wave, as on the wind they [the arrowy pillars] stream’d/ With their wild splendor 
chasing me!”  (617-19, emphasis mine).  Even the city up in flames still represents 
phallic power—an institution large enough to light up the night sky when attacked.  
When the Spaniard lights out for the territories of America, he runs toward an emptied 
landscape and imaginary that might be described as a symbolic void.  It should come as 
no surprise that Hemans would actively seek this vacancy as a liberating solution.  At the 
same time, the idea of lack, as Hemans details when the Spaniard arrives in America, 
involves existing—and thinking—outside any system, especially a system of assigned 
gender roles or expectations.  So we might say that Hemans attempts to envision a lack 
that also lacks a feminine stigma. 
 
Hemans’s America:  Emptiness and Negativity 
The remaining stanzas of the first part of the poem narrate the Spaniard’s decision 
to abandon the Catholic faith and convert to Protestantism, even at the cost of exile.  The 
second part of the poem then proceeds to describe the protagonist’s shameful 
homecoming in the eyes of his father and, most importantly, his voyage to North 
America.  Here Hemans moves beyond the narratives of Smith and Robinson, who 
envision their exiles on the edge of the nation, as she, and Maria Jane Jewsbury after her, 
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plots a course of exile or journey outside the nation.  Hemans’s transatlantic imagination 
may very well posit North America as an idealized, virginal space, awaiting inscription 
by male colonists, yet this poem reads less like a New World romance of discovery than 
the troubled journey of a Caleb Williams-type figure constantly on the run from 
England’s romance narratives.  As such, this epic does not develop a narrative about a 
hero (or even an anti-hero) and neither does it exist as a series of lyrical “spots of time.”  
Instead the forest sanctuary posits an interstitial space that straddles both lyric and 
narrative impulses.  If the first part of the poem stages the Spaniard’s cognitive overload, 
then his emigration to America represents the moment of possibility before he—and the 
New World—will settle into conceptual alliances or overwritten narratives.   
The Spaniard first travels through South America, but its Spanish, Old World 
influences again create a cognitive space too overwritten with ideological leanings.  With 
his son in tow, he contritely traces his steps through past killing grounds: 
 The high Peruvian solitudes among; 
 And o’er the Andes’ torrents borne his form, 
 Where our frail bridge hath quiver’d midst the storm. 
 —But there the war-notes of my country rung, 
 And, smitten deep of Heaven and man, I fled 
 To hide in shades unpierc’d a mark’d and weary head.  (623-28) 
The sixteenth century saw the Spanish empire take control of South America, which the 
Spaniard alludes to when he mentions braving presumably Incan arrows with Alvar.  The 
irony of this setting would not be lost on English readers, who were well abreast of the 
recent revolutions to throw the Spanish out of their Latin American colonies.  The 
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Spaniard’s nomadic life “o’er the Andes” and “Through the wide Llanos” of Peru and 
South America brings the conquistador back to revel in the beauties of a land, though one 
emptied of the Incan empire and its native inhabitants.  The reminders of imperial war, 
however, eventually drive father and son to North America.  These remembrances come 
in the form of “war-notes” or other “smitten” sounds, not unlike Stefania’s destructive 
minstrelsy:  “a harping tone,/ Lovely, yet ominous to mortal ear,/ Such as might reach us 
from a world unknown,/ Troubling man’s heart with thrills of joy and fear” (638-41).  
The landscape issues a native music that thrills the heart with a confusing mixture of 
sound that might evoke either joy or fear.  The echoes of imperial conquest are both 
exciting and shameful; this music, says the narrator, “oppress’d/ My soul with stillness, 
like the calms that rest/ On melancholy wave” (643-4).  This kind of ethical paralysis 
resembles the Spaniard’s earlier bouts of cognitive overload, and it is South America’s 
overwritten relationship to imperial Spain that eventually propels him north. 
  His immigration to North America, however, represents a historical anachronism, 
a strange piece of history that marks Hemans’s peculiar and inventive historical-poetic 
methodology.  According to both White’s article on Protestantism during the Inquisition 
as well as the references in Hemans’s poem to the conquistadors’ battles to secure the 
Andes, the Spaniard most likely comes to North America at the end of the sixteenth 
century, before either Jamestown or Plymouth Rock.138  The Spanish had already settled 
Florida, New Mexico and Arizona, and the French had established Jacksonville as a 
                                                
138 White narrates the auto de fe of a priest named Gomez and his two sisters, which is a 
close parallel to Alvar and his sisters, particularly because they join in singing as the final 
defiant act while they die.  These deaths most likely happen in the first or second auto de 
fe of Seville, in either 1559 or 1560 (255-6).  The Andean consolidation occurs between 
1542 and the final battle between the Spanish and the Incas in 1572.  So it is likely that 
the Spaniard leaves Spain at least after 1560 or, at the latest, in the years after 1572. 
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haven for Huguenots, but the Spaniard does not flee to any of these settlements.  Hemans 
conspicuously does not state where in North America the Spaniard establishes his “bower 
of refuge.”  She does use several footnotes to reference works about North America, and 
each of these allude to particularities of the American landscape that she uses to describe 
the forest sanctuary:  the cane grass of Tennessee, the torrent waterfalls of New York, 
and the arcades of trees in New England.139  It would be easy to argue that this historical 
ambiguity indulges in the romance of America as a homogeneous, blank, virginal space, 
with the more material, colonial history of the United States abjected to the poem’s 
footnotes.  Yet the specificity of the references within the footnotes, culled from recent 
travelogues, refuses to let the idea of America become co-opted into anything so blandly 
romantic by bringing attention to landscape features that are markedly northern.   
While in the first part of the poem the Spaniard is rooted in a very secure and 
historical context based on Doblado’s account of sixteenth-century Spanish Protestants 
burned at the stake, his iterations through the forests of New England and New York have 
no connection to historical accounts of Spaniards.  His journeys represent a migratory 
oddity, since the Spanish are not thought to have traveled so far north during the sixteenth 
century.  If his mere presence disallows any easy narrative about English claims to North 
America, the arrival of a Spanish Protestant in New England suggests something of a 
virtual or counterfactual history, presenting a case of immigration to America that might 
                                                
139 An early note (n6) to the Spaniard’s description of the American forest’s “feathery 
canes” points readers to a passage about Tennessee from Adam Hodgson’s Letters. The 
final note to part one (n44) annotates the Spaniard’s description of the “high arcades” 
with a quote from Daniel Webster’s bicentenary speech celebrating the Plymouth Rock 
landing.  The first note on the text of part two (n3), however, further describes the 
“sounding of the torrent-water” with an allusion to a description of upstate New York in 
Anne Macvicar Grant’s Memoirs of An American Lady.   
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have happened but did not.  The Spaniard’s existence navigates a path between the 
historical actuality of the footnotes taken from nineteenth-century American travelogues 
and the fictionality of an idealized America.  As the notes prevent Hemans’s depiction 
from being ahistorical, so the fictionality of the Spaniard plots a new history through the 
American wilderness. 
Isaac D’Israeli uses a similar method his 1823 essay “Of a History of Events 
Which Have Not Happened,” which can serve as a parallel to how Hemans reinterprets 
White and builds her own fictional history of North America.  D’Israeli’s piece has been 
regarded as the first instance of counterfactual history, a historical methodology that 
recently regained credibility at the end of the 1990s.140  Much of Disraeli’s article 
discusses historical events that might have changed the religion of nations during the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation and thus the geo-political landscape of nineteenth 
century Europe.  He includes a citation to White’s article:  “We have lately been 
informed by a curious writer, that Protestantism once existed in Spain, and was actually 
extirpated at the moment by the crushing arm of the Inquisition.  According to these 
catholic politicians, a great event in catholic history did not occur—the spirit of 
                                                
140 Catherine Gallagher makes this claim for D’Israeli’s essay in a talk she gave at the 
University of Jyväskylä (par. 5).  See the paper posted on website of the University’s 
Political Thought and Conceptual Change Centre of Excellence, 
http://www.jyu.fi/yhtfil/PolCon/coepolcon/PolTCH/events/gallagher.pdf.  Two seminal, 
critical works of virtual history are Niall Ferguson’s Virtual History:  Alternatives and 
Counterfactuals (2000) and Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Noel Geoffrey 
Parker’s The Unmaking of the West:  “What-If” Scenarios That Rewrite World History 
(2006).  It may also be useful to make a distinction, as some historians do, between 
“virtual history” and “alternate history,” the first being the historical inquiry into whether 
or not an event might have occurred differently and the second a fascination with what 
kinds of situations a virtual history might have produced.  Alternate histories are thought 
to be the jurisdiction of contemporary fiction writers such as Phillip K. Dick, Newt 
Gingrich and Harry Turtledove, and it is this legacy of fiction as historical methodology 
to which Hemans belongs. 
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catholicism, predominant in a land of protestants” (189-90).  The counterfactual event 
D’Israeli refers to is the Spanish Armada’s defeat of the English navy, which would have 
resulted in Catholicism, rather than Protestantism, being the national religion of England 
in the nineteenth century.  D’Israeli perhaps uses many of these counterfactuals to launch 
a satire on sectarian Christianity, but his comments most forcefully undermine 
teleological or fatalistic views of the history surrounding the spread of religious ideology.  
Hemans employs a historical method similar to D’Israeli’s, essentially concocting a 
counterfactual about what might have happened had some Spanish Protestants survived 
the Inquisition.  This proposition then lends itself to a fictional scenario about America—
a break or narrative crevice that occurs between the tapering off of Spain’s imperial 
history in America and the start of England’s Protestant, colonial process.  The 
Spaniard’s forest sanctuary exists in a brief moment of lyrical time placed between two 
national histories and their colonial narratives, temporarily freeing America from its 
imperial manifest destiny.  Hemans does not merely obviate history from the American 
frontier but writes an impossible history that momentarily suspends both English and 
Spanish imperial narratives.  This logical crux creates a moment of cognitive pause—and 
confusion—that is lyrical in the way it temporarily stops time and encourages questions 
about the way time and history work.  
If his existence figures a counterfactual narrative, the Spaniard’s characterization 
in the New World is strange to say the least, and he represents two kinds of hybrid 
identities whose presence in the New World complicate any interpretation of America as 
the Protestant promised land.  First, he represents Hemans’s notions about androgyny in a 
conquistador turned maternal, and second, he skirts a highly contested political issue of 
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the day, the dispute between Whigs and Tories about Spain’s constitution.  Both Gary 
Kelly and Nancy Goslee have argued that the poem tells a story about the consolidation 
of “an androgynous, nurturing father, and a female sexuality that is displaced and 
depersonalized in the natural setting” (Goslee 244).141  Rather than illustrating a woman, 
like the widow of Cresentius, taking up a male role, infiltrating ideological systems, and 
transmitting destructive, unconscious thought processes, “The Forest Sanctuary” depicts 
a male conquistador who takes on a feminine, nurturing position as he flees patriarchal 
Spain for the vaginal space of a forest sanctuary.  The Spaniard’s emigration and Alvar’s 
auto de fe mark the death of aggressive heroism, as Kelly notes, but he then turns into a 
maternal teacher by tutoring his son in his new religion as he nurtures him:  “Thou that 
hast breath’d in slumber on my breast” (I.68).  The sentiment echoes Coleridge’s “Frost 
at Midnight,” another poem with a maternal-male speaker who teaches his son to hear the 
“trances of the blast” yet advises him to “Fill up the interspersed vacancies/ And 
momentary pauses of thought” (76, 51-2).  In “The Forest Sanctuary” the Spaniard more 
fully keeps gender roles suspended—including those ways of relating to the landscape 
that gender often reifies.  Occurring not at the end of the poem, but at its beginning, his 
maternal comments build a kind of gendered cognitive confusion into his voice from the 
start, not unlike Guido’s presence.  The Spaniard becomes both mother and father but in 
doing so rejects the antithetical roles of domesticating mother and conquering father.  He 
neither carves out a post-Edenic, domestic garden, as many women of the nineteenth 
                                                
141 Susan J. Wolfson was the first scholar to discuss Hemans’s tendency to put both 
genders in play in “‘Domestic Affections’ and ‘the spear of Minerva’:  Felicia Hemans 
and the Dilemma of Gender.” 
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century attempted to do in the American wilderness,142 nor does he lay claim to the 
political or economic legacies of the imperial conqueror; instead, he chooses exile:  “We 
have been wanderers since those days of woe” (620).   
While the Spaniard’s emigration represents his resistance to the tyrannical 
monarchy of Spain reinstated after Napoleon’s demise, his Daniel Boone mentality goes 
even further to resist both Tory notions of civility and Whig demands for new markets in 
nineteenth-century North America.  In light of the raging debate in British periodicals 
about the liberal Spanish constitution of 1812,143 which mitigated monarchical power and 
sparked the Spanish Civil War during 1820-23, Hemans’s depiction of the exile in an un-
chartered land may signal her suspicion of institutions—liberal, conservative or 
otherwise.   The vision of the sixteenth-century North American wilderness helps to 
elaborate Hemans’s juggling of conservative and liberal, political and economic policies 
in the nineteenth century.  Even after the American Revolution, the United States 
presented models for a new England.  In an 1823 article in the Quarterly Review on 
Dwight’s Travels in New England, Robert Southey argues that there were, in fact, two 
New Englands.144  In the one, small towns, with their settled urban architecture and 
market culture, became places for the civilized reproduction of middle class English 
                                                
142 Annette Kolodny examines the letters and diaries of frontier women in the early 
nineteenth century, arguing that the circulation of these written materials among women 
helped them “to domesticate the strangeness of America” through gardens built into the 
forests and wilderness (37).  See especially her chapter “Gardens in the Wilderness” in 
The Land Before Her. 
143 See, for example, “Public Affairs.”  Blackwood’s.  January 1823. (43-46); “The Tory.  
Letter I.”  Blackwood’s.  July 1823.  76-80; “South America.”  Blackwood’s.  January 
1824.  (134-43); Robert William Hay’s “The Crisis of Spain.”  Quarterly Review.  
January 1823.  (536-60); William Jacob’s “Chili, Peru & c.” Quarterly Review.  January 
1824.  (441-72). 
144 Robert Southey.  “Dwight—Travels in New England and New York.”  The Quarterly 
Review.  October 1823.  (1-40). 
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values and virtues.  These quickly growing towns were directly contrasted with other 
“new settlements,” which were built by a different class of men, “foresters, or pioneers” 
(Dwight qtd. in Southey 37).  Southey quotes Dwight explaining that “[t]hese men cannot 
live in regular society” because “[t]hey are impatient of the restraints of law, religion, and 
morality; grumble about the taxes, by which rulers, ministers, and school-masters, are 
supported” (37).  Though they “understand medical science, politics, and religion, better 
than those who have studied them through life” these men, “finding their efforts in vain,” 
particularly efforts in altering the social and political fabric of their societies, “leave their 
native places, and betake themselves to wilderness” (37).   
Like the Spaniard, these men know too much to operate within the civilities of the 
country and are forced into what Southey terms the “outlet” of the American wilderness 
(28).  In Southey and Dwight’s view, “A nation planted in this manner, can scarcely be 
more than half civilized; and to refinement of character and life must necessarily be a 
stranger” (39).  In this typical rhetorical battle between the civilized English and the 
uncivilizing effects of the wild, foreign countryside, Southey and Dwight both warn their 
English readers of the necessity for society, especially the habituating institutions of 
church, school, and the tea table.  Hemans’s Spaniard, however, presents a case of the 
civilized man tramping through uncultivated forest.  Through this figure, Hemans 
dramatically rejects not only the unreformed English imaginary, with its ancient 
insistence on primogeniture, but also the middle class civility of New England for the 
strange and foreign unnamed American wilds.  The Spaniard roams like a Rousseauvian 
nomad outside constitutional governments, perhaps enacting something like Deleuze’s 
deterritorialization, committing to no alliances but the movement through a landscape.  
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His constant itinerancy purposely undermines any subjective positions rooted in a 
national or regional notion of home.  Even so, the Spaniard retains a code of conduct built 
on finding the vacancies offered by the American wilderness.  Rather than teasing him 
into an exculpatory confession, the Spaniard’s experiences tease him temporarily out of 
thought and out of time. 
When Hemans alludes to yet displaces the Spanish immigrant from normative 
gender, political, and historical references, the Spaniard is, as Slavoj Zizek would say, 
“included out” of the American symbolic as a subject who is “included at the very point 
at which signification breaks down” (Ticklish 109).  He neither lays claim to what he 
names the “wilds of the red hunter’s land” nor does he seek acceptance in the settlements 
offered by either his own countrymen or the French Protestants (II.646).  The positioning 
of the Spanish immigrant wandering anonymously in North America essentially posits a 
parallax or hybrid solution to the dilemma of finding oneself either in or out of ideology 
and its institutions.  Zizek’s explanation of Hegel’s negativity is suggestive:  “Hegel 
made this point long ago, when he described the double movement of, first, radical self-
withdrawal into the ‘Night of the World,’ the abyss of pure subjectivity, and then the rise 
of the new order through the capacity of naming:  symbolic order and its homeostasis is 
the human substitute for the loss of natural homeostasis” (Parallax 210).  After the 
Spaniard rips himself from the “natural homeostasis” of Spain or a violent state of nature 
battling in the South American wilds, signification, naming, and language situate the 
subject in a new homeostatic, or balanced social environment, which can monitor and 
process cognitions.  The “Night of the World,” on the other hand, aids the subject in 
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refusing (or hiding from) those structures and ideologies instantiated by language that 
define and limit subjectivity.   
If Hemans’s trope of cognitive overload aims at jolting the subject out of the 
homeostasis of society into the “Night of the World,” then Hemans’s immigrant Spaniard 
does not then become sublated into a new symbolic order.  Neither does he find himself 
in an abyssal, vaginal space that remains forever uninscribed.  Hemans’s construction of 
America, like Zizek’s reading of Hegel, attempts to posit the relationship between the 
two as a problem that the Spaniard represents.  As Zizek goes on to argue:  “The standard 
dialectic between homeostasis and shocks (traumatic encounters) is not enough—in a 
properly Hegelian perspective, we should bring this opposition to its self-relating:  the 
ultimate shock is that of the violent imposition of the homeostatic order itself, the 
drawing of the limit between Inside and Outside” (Parallax 210).  This shock of the 
imposition of the social homeostatic may be precisely what America presents.  Since the 
Spaniard cannot forever remain in a state of cognitive overload, the conceptual and 
symbolic realm eventually tries to reassert itself.  Yet the Spaniard in America presents 
the impossible and uncomfortable co-existence of the two, and Hemans finally figures 
vacancy as the rift that makes conceptual language an uneasy fit onto cognitive data.  
That is to say, America’s emptiness does not represent either access to or negative 
knowledge of the Absolute but the Absolute as negativity itself.  Rather than mimicking a 
Hegelian dialectic between ideology and its absence, Hemans’s move from Spain to 
America initiates a movement from a vacillating dialectic to negativity, or the crux of 
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contradictory possibilities that forever imbalance the subject and the subject’s ability to 
symbolize reality. 145   
The Spaniard’s partial symbolization of America, which effectively refuses 
ideological structures, is most aptly figured through the Spaniard’s final descriptions of 
the sanctuary itself.  If Hemans’s America is denuded of other inhabitants or settlements, 
it does have a certain natural architecture, which posits a new cognitive map for the 
Spaniard.  He does not assert ownership of the North American land so much as he looks 
to the air and “whispery woods” (I.58) that allow him to properly educate his son with an 
independent mind.  The former conquistador appears in no way preoccupied with tilling 
or bettering the land through any sort of Lockean proprietary interest.  Instead, he is 
engrossed with the types of perceptual and cognitive encounters this wilderness nurtures:  
the “magnificent and ancient wild; and mighty rivers, ye that meet the main/ As deep 
meets deep” (I.84-6).   Nancy Goslee has noted Hemans’s use of vaginal imagery in the 
final passages of The Forest Sanctuary:  “Maternal, sexual, and natural merge as ‘night’ 
fulfills all possibilities with its dark vacancy” (244).  Yet similar to Robinson’s caves in 
                                                
145 When the Spaniard finally arrives in the North American wilderness at the end of the 
poem, his locale is conspicuously evacuated of everything but the somewhat erotic and 
thought-provoking characteristics of the landscape.  Though native populations are 
nowhere mentioned in Hemans’s descriptions the either the South and North American 
landscape, neither are the other white settlers.  Although Hemans does a disservice to 
Native Americans, the emptiness of the landscape in a poem about cognition is an 
attempt to clear the mind more than any guise to erase Native Americans from American 
history.  Hemans had certainly read accounts of the Americas that detailed native 
populations, including Adam Hodgson’s Letters and Alexander Von Humboldt’s Voyage, 
both of which she cites in the poem’s footnotes.  Moreover, Tricia Lootens argues that 
the poet, in another poem about America and the Plymouth Rock landing, uses the figure 
of pilgrim burials in New England as a means of retroactively claiming the land through a 
poetics of sentimentality, though Lootens also argues that Hemans may complicate this 
claim with her changing choice of epigraphs.  It is the Spaniard’s position both within the 
landscape and outside the English’s American imaginary, however, that presents a 
problem for ideological formations of America and its frontier. 
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“To the Poet Coleridge,” Hemans’s vacant spaces fill with isolated cognitive events that 
remain unincorporated into language.  The abyss of subjectivity hosts elements of the 
outside world that present themselves as cognitive problems yet to be solved.  This turn 
to vaginal solutions likewise could be seen as Hemans’s positing feminine lack as a 
solution to the problem of phallic symbolization.  Increasingly, she uses periodic 
moments of non-signification “as deep meets deep” that stem the return to any phallic 
signification. 
At the poem’s end, the most prominent of these natural materials or “institutions” 
are the phallic trees combining with or creating a vaginal space of sanctuary.  These trees 
demonstrate that the forest sanctuary is not completely non-symbolized but instead 
becomes marked with certain material, sensory experiences that spur on further emptying 
of the symbolic, or moments of vacancy.  As opposed to the staunch oak that represented 
the Spanish aristocracy, here there is the “most secret tone/ Drawn from each tree, for 
each hath whispers all its own” (II.663-4).  In his essay on The Vespers of Palermo, 
Saglia has remarked on Hemans’s use of choric sound to figure the public sphere as a 
community of voices negotiating social and political problems, and here the forest of 
trees with its many individual tones might figure a land of religious tolerance, with space 
enough to give voice to “varying creeds,/ With all that send up holy thoughts on high!” 
(685-6).  This public choral freedom, however, exists in the poem before juridical law or 
parliamentary procedure instantiates it, and as such seems to place a referendum on the 
ability of any government to ensure the “secret tones” of free speech and the possibility 
of full representation.  As in Charlotte Smith’s vision of Beachy Head, the landscape 
offers a vibrant vacancy which cannot be subsumed by conceptual ideologies that 
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objectify America’s natural features.   Unlike Smith who finds a “lawfulness outside the 
law,” Hemans turns to subjective experiences that undermine the rules of concepts or 
laws. 
    In her final descriptions of the forest sanctuary, Hemans presents readers with 
cognitive events that both represent and cannot be fully inscribed into a grand American 
landscape.  The Spaniard first acknowledges the danger of filling the bower’s emptiness 
with nostalgic memories of his deceased wife and his Spanish homeland, which are, in 
part, the detritus of old ideological structures. 
 In this fresh waste, the breath of whose repose 
 Hath cool’d, like dew, the fever of my brow,  
 And whose green oaks and cedars round me close, 
 As temple-walls and pillars, that exclude 
 Earth’s haunted dreams from their free solitude; 
 All, save the image and the thought of those 
 Before us gone; (II.648-53). 
Here he reflects on the fact that the bower excludes “Earth’s haunted dreams” except his 
own nostalgic thoughts about his past.  He understands that it is his own desire for his 
past that might mar the “free solitude.”  The quasi-domestic space creates a circle of trees 
like a temple around the Spaniard and his son, yet it forms less a hearth than a place 
where the airy woods can present isolated cognitive events, a schema most fully 
represented in the final stanza of the poem. 
  At eve?—oh! through all hours!—From dark dreams oft 
  Awakening, I look forth, and learn the might 
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  Of solitude, while thou art breathing soft, 
  And low, my lov’d one! on the breast of night: 
  I look forth on the stars—the shadowy sleep 
  Of forests—and the lake, whose gloomy deep 
  Sends up red sparkles to the fire flies’ light. 
  A lonely world!—ev’n fearful to man’s thought, 
  But for His presence felt, whom here my soul hath sought.  (II.692-700) 
Only after the Spaniard awakes from those dreams that cloud his view—not only at night 
but “all hours”—can he “look” and “learn” with some modicum of truth-bound sight.  
What the Spaniard finally sees is the deep, vaginal spaces of the “breast of night,” the 
“shadowy sleep/ Of forests” and the “gloomy deep” of the lake, whose darkness 
represents not repressed memories but cognitive silence or emptiness.  These mental gaps 
are then sprinkled with sensory materials like the stars or the light of fire flies, which 
rather than unify, outline, or abstract the landscape, represent distinct, individual sensory 
or subjective positions within an open cognitive terrain.  Rather than completely 
vanquishing signification with absolute silence, Hemans’s version of feminine lack 
constructs experiences of sensory or partial perception that are not subsumed into 
symbolic meaning. Unlike Kristeva’s semiotic, vacancy aims to isolate the movement of 
perceptions, rhythms, or tones and defer symbolic or semiotic meaning-making.  
Although the special features of the land generate encounters that can only be interpreted 
by the mind, the Spaniard’s inability or refusal to fully process or conceptualize these 
moments allows him to remain free from formal or ideological determination, if only in 
this protected space.  In effect, this land cannot stop yielding up its unconscious 
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cerebrations, which the meditative Spaniard lets pass him by, or refuses to process, 
suspended in moments of non-meaning. 
 Hemans likewise signifies these linguistic and neuronal gaps through the rampant 
use of dashes, which draw the reader’s attention to the large number of interlineal pauses 
in any one stanza—larger than in any other of her poems.  The observation of starlight 
and its correlative in the fireflies is followed in both cases by dashes.  More than mere 
placeholders for the speaker’s pause or breath, Hemans’s repeated accent on caesurae and 
other lineal pauses throughout the poem signifies cognitive gaps as part of the Spaniard’s 
thought process.  Since the poem consists of a retrospective account, the entire poem is 
told through the new cognitive perspective the Spaniard has already achieved.  He 
narrates with a poetic voice that includes rampant caesurae as a means of signaling how 
he has incorporated vacancy into the texture of his thought.  As Hemans has the Spaniard 
proclaim at the poem’s start:  “Peace—I will dash these fond regrets to earth,/ Ev’n as an 
eagle shakes the cumbering rain/ From his strong pinion” (I.37-39, emphasis mine).  She 
depicts the Spaniard as seeking to rid himself of his nostalgia for Old World Spain, 
Catholicism, and its patriarchal security, but, with the pun on “dash,” she hints to readers 
that she has a poetic agenda as well.  The use of dashes does not simply help make the 
protagonist’s voice lilting and introspective, intensifying the poem’s status as a proto-
dramatic monologue.  The dashes signify—and emphasize—cognitive stutters.  Her 
technique is not too different from Emily Dickinson’s own dashes, which often stymie a 
reader’s cognition when they are forced to traverse a dash linking supremely abstract and 
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particular experiential details.146  In “The Forest Sanctuary,” perceptual data from 
starlight or fire flies, which could light up the sky or lake’s “gloomy deep” with meaning, 
remains to some extent suspended and unconceptualized when surrounded by dashes.   
In one sense, this luminosity could represent the resurgence of Enlightenment 
reason or progressive abstract thought, and it certainly signifies Hemans’s Protestant 
God—which would, of course, give transcendent meaning to the light’s perceptual 
qualia.  For Hemans, the world is lonely and fearful to meaningful thought but for the 
presence of God.  This resuscitation of meaning through a patriarchal religiosity seems 
again to wrap America (not to mention England and Germany) in a veil of syncretic 
surety.147  Hemans ends the poem, however, by qualifying the nature of her Protestant 
God, a presence “whom here my soul hath sought.”  The final “thought”/”sought” rhyme 
overturns any definitive meaning that God might secure and instead becomes that kind of 
thought which is always sought after yet never truly pinned down or defined.  As each 
reader might give different meaning to perceptions of starlight, so he might conceptualize 
the God he seeks as individualized and largely unaccountable.  God, like the wild 
American landscape, cannot be fully identified or incorporated with the perceptual 
material of its unconscious, which leaves America, like the Spaniard’s mind, partially 
unsymbolized.  It also perhaps renders the landscape, like God, as feminized by lack—
                                                
146 For a summary of scholarship on Dickinson’s dash, see Deidre Fagan’s essay, 
“Dickinson’s Unutterable Word,” where she argues that the dash represents a linguistic, 
cognitive blankness. 
147 Discussing Hemans’s earlier poem “Superstition and Revelation” (1820).  Daniel 
White argues that Hemans’s project is wrapped up in a cosmopolitan religiosity that 
attempts to “see back, through a historical consciousness, to a period when Christian truth 
was immanent” (275).  See his article “‘Mysterious Sanctity’: Sectarianism and 
Syncretism from Volney to Hemans.” 
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something sought but never found, which continually marks the limits of understanding 
as well as the limits of oppressive phallic signifying structures.   
America’s emptiness figures the incomplete ability of the Spaniard to incorporate 
it, as the embodiment of the Spaniard’s greatest material and idealistic desire, into a 
signifying system.  At the same time, pre-conceived ideas of America—from both the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries—do not offer the Spaniard any solid place in the 
symbolic realm of the New World.  Even at the end of the poem, he remains nameless.  
In this way it would be easy to suppose that America is the Spaniard’s, if not Hemans’s, 
objet petit a, the unattainable, only partially symbolized object of desire that carries with 
it a trace of the Real, the abyss of subjectivity, and the vortex of uncollated cognitions.  
America, through the Spaniard’s eyes, is always about to be symbolized, yet can never 
fully be accounted for, in large part because it is, ultimately, the “red hunter’s land,” the 
sign of the Other. 
If Hemans’s Spaniard first encounters free thinking through the trauma of trance-
like paralysis, then he ends in a meditative state that cognizes without complete cognition 
itself.  Most commentators discussing Hemans’s use of voices, song, or sound eventually 
rely on models of either transcendence or immanence,148 yet Hemans’s final, visual 
movement in “The Forest Sanctuary” seems closer to a version of meditation that 
partially empties the mind.  Unlike Buddhist versions of meditation that seek to encounter 
                                                
148 See especially Saglia’s excellent article on Hemans’s voice, “‘A deeper and richer 
music’: The Poetics of Sound and Voice in Felicial Hemans’s 1820s Poetry.”  There he 
argues that voice’s disembodied yet situated character allows Hemans to straddle the 
human and the divine, which further enables her “resist and correct” notions of the 
transcendent through culturally emplaced voices (366).  See also Jason Rudy’s chapter on 
Hemans in his forthcoming Electric Meters and John M. Anderson, “The Triumph of 
Voice in Felicia Hemans’s The Forest Sanctuary.” 
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the wholeness of the subject and the world, Hemans’s new cognitive geography seems to 
rest in the gap of cognition or the caesura of articulation.  As a final figure for the mind 
attempting to release itself from ideological and linguistic habituations, the forest 
sanctuary comes to offer not the nothingness that then must be inscribed with European 
values, but instead an emptiness that resists full co-optation by those very agendas.   
The Spaniard’s narrative accomplishes this with some unusual temporal 
maneuvers.  The forest sanctuary exists in a future anterior time, a place that would have 
been had a Spanish Protestant migrated to America in the late sixteenth century.  The 
second part of the poem drifts into a future that might have happened in the past, but did 
not.  Not unlike Robinson’s potentiality, Hemans posits historical change as a 
counterfactual, which rather than reading current knowledge or archeology back through 
historical accounts, attempts to alter or anticipate any reified futurity by creating an 
interstitial moment in the past.  Her use of the retrospective account, then, with a 
narrative speaker who has always already experienced cognitive overload, infiltrates the 
reader with a voice already ruined with historical contingency, even as he recounts the 
shock and trauma that led him to that type of knowledge.  Similar to Guido’s infiltration 
of the tyrant’s ranks through the cover of “wrought” music, Hemans’s poetry carries with 
it the historical ruination that constantly posits an interstitial moment in the past that 
poses futurity as itself a counterfactual.  Readers cannot help but be infected with a 
feminine lack of knowledge that destabilizes their own long held narratives or beliefs. 
The freedom inherent in this temporal gap comes by way of Hemans’s work to 
provide instances of cognitive liberation.  Vacancy, as a cognitive pause that lies in the 
friction between sensory data and conceptual abstraction, gives Hemans’s characters an 
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unusual sort of freedom.  She grants unconscious cognition as much credence as 
conscious thought processes and gives her characters agency through the material and 
mechanical inner-workings of their brains, even as she privileges non-volitional thought 
and action, such as the trance or meditative state.  Unlike gothic (or Freudian) models of 
repression, which depict emotional and sexual desires released into outrageous ways, the 
unleashing of unconscious cerebration in Hemans’s poetry redefines freedom as a 
cognitive refusal.  Perhaps prefiguring John Stuart Mill’s notion of freedom as a negative 
“freedom from” rather than a “freedom to,” Hemans’s notion of liberation does not 
encourage readers either to do whatever they want, as their instincts dictate, or to follow 
the institutional law as a guarantor of universal rights.  Instead, vacancy cedes them the 
freedom to refuse those desires and laws imbued with linguistic and ideological 
habituations.  Ultimately, art, like the forest sanctuary, offers her characters pause to 




Maria Jane Jewsbury’s Childlike, Ethical Vision 
 
Felicia Hemans was not the only writer who attempted to envision a place outside 
England as a means of vacating patriotic, domestic roles for women.  Maria Jane 
Jewsbury, a good friend and correspondent of Hemans’s, chooses a similar tactic when 
she poetically represents her own journey from England to India as she accompanied her 
husband to his new post as a chaplain of the East India Company.  She publishes a series 
of twelve poems in The Athenaeum, entitled “The Oceanides” (1832-33), sending each 
part back to England from various ports along the way.  The sequence begins with the 
speaker lamenting her departure from her family and England but ends as she says 
goodbye to friends found at sea.  The bulk of the sequence recounts the undoing of an 
English woman’s subjectivity as she faces a dearth of nationalistic reference along the sea 
and increasingly looks forward to an encounter with the exotic, Indian other.  Jewsbury’s 
poems go even further than Hemans’s Spaniard or Charlotte Smith’s hermit of Beachy 
Head when they plot an escape from geography altogether for the groundless seascape of 
a transnational journey.  In doing so, she dramatizes the speaker’s exuberance and terror 
at being ripped from the English imaginary, a tactic that in turn offers her new ways of 
viewing the Indian landscape and thinking about her Indian life yet to come. 
In one of the few scholarly pieces written on “The Oceanides,” Diego Saglia has 
testified to Jewsbury’s “mobile domesticity,” arguing that the poem “dramatize[s] the 
contact with otherness and the dismantling of absolute points of reference” (220).  He 
goes on to suggest that “the very act of self-location, of looking for a place, becomes a 
form of dislocation—the site of the subject is that of a vacuum that cannot be filled” 
(220).  This encounter with the exotic other, he suggests, repeatedly and increasingly 
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vacates both self and home such that they must be constantly recreated and must remain 
at least partially open-ended or averse to ideological prerogatives.  While this reading 
goes a long way to credit Jewsbury with an alternate response to empire and the 
Romantic imperial imagination, I would like to discuss more specifically how Jewsbury’s 
poem involves a much broader attempt to alter perception and visual epistemologies as 
she sets her sights on unknown oceans and foreign soil.  
Similar to Smith’s tactics, Jewsbury’s mode of vacancy seeks to undermine 
naturalized British and especially Indian landscapes, displacing literary and visual 
culture’s avowal of pastoral representations that saw women and colonial natives as 
unthinking, natural objects.  Rather than Smith’s aporia, however, Jewsbury uses verbal 
images and the technology surrounding gothic and popular image production to distance 
representations from their naturalized referents or embodied realities.  In this way, she 
models vacancy as a verbal tool that destabilizes pictorial representation and the 
biological, scientific ideologies about the body such representation accrued.  This visual 
brand of vacancy uses language or verbal images to disrupt the power of the gaze even as 
it highlights visual representation as a sign system that can be manipulated.  By playing 
with pliant images of the human body and the landscape, she demonstrates how 
ontological differences marked on the body by nineteenth-century sciences from 
phrenology to evolution are actually representational ones. 149  Jewsbury’s images are 
pictures with certain details left out, visual representations that always exist in asymptotic 
relationship to their referents.  In the imaginary world concocted adrift on the ocean, she 
                                                
149 Though the nineteenth century has long been discussed as a period that consolidated 
biological racism and classism under the auspices of Malthus, Darwin, and sciences like 
phrenology and anthropology, Peter J. Kitson has recently written specifically on the 
Romantic context in Romantic Literature, Race, and Colonial Encounter. 
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develops a skepticism toward images that has to do with their partially immaterial nature 
and their ability as representations to occlude meaning.   
The methodology of this chapter thus shifts from placing poets in conversation 
with contemporaneous philosophers or philosophy and instead discusses Jewsbury in the 
context of the nineteenth-century material culture.  This poet necessitates a slightly 
different method because she channels her philosophical thinking about vacancy, 
perception, and high Romanticism through the popular gothic genre and visual culture’s 
innovations such as the phantasmagoria.  Yet her use of images as a sign system to 
produce skepticism about visual meaning places her in a continuum with other authors 
who employ language to produce non-knowledge.   As Jewsbury stands at the end of a 
long line of Romantic poets grappling with language, it makes sense that this model of 
vacancy poses another medium, the image, as a means of undermining pastoral, 
gendered, or racialized language.  She imbues poetry with the ideological critique 
amassed from both gothic culture and the tradition of Romantic meditations between the 
word and the image.150  More importantly, in her playful stance toward icons, images, 
and illusions, she presents the road not taken by Hemans.  In “The Forest Sanctuary,” that 
poet eschews Catholic idolatry and sets out to obliterate images and signs that shore up 
patriarchal, imperialist credos.  Jewsbury, quite playfully, takes an opposing position.  
Rather than consuming images or being consumed by the male gaze, she proactively 
produces a host of images to vacate women’s complicated position as an overwritten 
visual object. 
                                                
150 See especially Mitchell’s Iconology:  Image, Text, Ideology. 
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While recent studies on Romantic visual culture have plotted the “return of the 
real” in the material culture of paintings, political cartoons, and picture shows, easy 
connections between pictures, material culture, and social relations only exacerbate 
women’s confinement as the scopophilic object of male viewing.151  As Teresa de 
Lauretis has argued in Alice Doesn’t, woman is both the “telos and origin” of viewing, 
the material (unthinking) grounds of a picture and the idealized object of male desire 
(13).  Jewsbury’s epistemology resembles de Lauretis’ suggestion that women might 
combat cinematic fantasies produced about them by intervening in visual semiotics with 
their own liberating illusions.  Rather than denying the hold images had on women and 
their perceptions, Jewsbury stymies consumption with a creative production of her own 
images.  This visionary production grapples with ideological ways of perceiving as she 
tries to reimagine other “conditions of visibility” (de Lauretis 68).   
One of these conditions is the potential for images to manifest non-knowledge and 
vacancy.  By the end of the sequence, Jewsbury comes to picture two different but related 
types of vacant images.  First, she constructs a double vision by superimposing European 
and Indian landscapes onto each other, a technique reminiscent of the diorama that 
initiates comparison and undermines visual myths and stereotypes.  By asking what it 
might mean to put pictures of the Indian Himalayas and the European Alps in 
conversation, she prods her viewers to look on the “world as childhood new” (IX.17).  
Second, she ends the poem with a final image of an infant, which serves as an allegory 
for those moments before reified knowledge of the world.  As a kinesthetic image, 
                                                
151 Both Gillen D’Arcy Wood’s The Shock of the Real and William Galperin’s The Return 
of the Visible are two such representative histories.   
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moreover, the growing infant presents the provocation for a type of visuality that exceeds 
or refuses to submit to codified viewing.152  
Jewsbury arrives at these solutions by experimenting with and rejecting several 
different models of vacancy, which resemble types of vacancy explored by Robinson and 
Wordsworth.  When the speaker first comes into contact with the ocean, and its terrifying 
threat of literal and figurative death, she attempts to tie herself down to reality through 
the material objects in her cabin brought from England.  Eventually, however, she turns 
to embrace the alterity of the Ocean by depicting her encounter with it as a conversation 
with multiple oceanic personas—including the Ocean, the Waves, and the Oceanides.  
Through this strategy, Jewsbury not only explodes the notion of a patriarchal, 
domineering, wrathful sea that works as the weapon of a justice-seeking Old Testament 
God, but she presents ethics as an encounter with a multiplicity of others.  In constructing 
something like Byronic or Robinsonian multiplicity, the excessive heterogeneity of these 
representations surpasses similitude or the confines of reality, ensuring difference while 
idealistically hoping to shape alternate realities.   
After this potentially freeing but problematic projection, Jewsbury subsequently 
plots the speaker returning to visions of England once more, only now, rather than 
turning to domestic objects, she composes nostalgic images of family and friends upon 
the blank surface of the ocean.  This version of the imagination vacates the limitations of 
reality, such as the body, place, and time and tends toward Wordsworthian transcendence, 
allowing people to connect over great distances.  When disembodied connection finally 
fails, however, the speaker shifts back in the other direction, looking toward India for 
                                                
152 For further reading on Romanticism and the anamorphic image, see Wang’s “Coming 
Attractions:  Lamia and Cinematic Sensation.” 
 
226  
new kinds of encounters.  In a move typical of Romantic women poets, the breakdown of 
this Romantic trope propels Jewsbury toward a third solution that mediates between 
transcendence and multiplicity.   
She finally settles on a model for the production of images that focuses on how 
imagined encounters with the colonial other might create both an ethics of encounter and 
skepticism about alterity itself.  Using the language of dreams and visions, Jewsbury 
imagines images of English and Indian landscapes that are tenuously connected to reality 
and readily malleable to provoke comparison between the two cultures.  Rather than 
underlining either universal similarities or important, untraversable distances inherent in 
comparisons, the poet uses similes to make apparent the gap of the unknown between two 
images that remain twinned in perception.  Thus vacancy ultimately presents poetry 
itself—the “as” of comparison—as the witness and provocation for an ethics of viewing.  
These unthinkable analogies, for Jewsbury, are precisely the point, highlighting the extent 
to which one can never fully see or fully know the Other.  This way of seeing offers a 
self-conscious awareness that the responsible way of approaching the Other is without 
preconceptions, in a childlike state of wonder.  Her technique preserves and highlights 
the special vacancy of imagined pictures, whose only partial representation present blind 
spots that keep us looking and reevaluating our ways of viewing.  In this way, Jewsbury’s 
ideas about spectral images might be compared to Jacques Derrida’s “new international” 
with its bond of affiliation.  It might also be compared to his use of Emmanuel Levinas to 
consider how phantasmic, visual encounters with others productively rupture one’s own 
totalizing, signifying system.  Rather than Levinas’s authentic approach to the other, 
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however, Jewsbury summons the final figure of an infant as an allegory about how to 
greet the image of the Other with new eyes, in friendship.  
 
“Waking Dreams of—Far away”:  Vacating Reality 
From the moment of its inception, “The Oceanides” is a poem about the literal 
and figurative dynamics of transport, a meditation on how the act of traveling gives rise 
to newer, playful models of thought.  Though the few scholars who have written on 
Jewsbury have taken this poem as the record of her actual, emotional journey from 
Manchester to India, she wrote another account of the trip that might fit this role much 
better.  Her “Extracts from a Lady’s Log-Book” were printed in the Athenaeum in 
December 1832, before the first part of “The Oceanides” was published there.153  The 
shift from prose to poetry, among other things, might be viewed as a movement from the 
genre of realistic travelogue to that of poetry exploring a cognitive sea change, as sensory 
perception gives way to imaginary images tenuously moored to reality.  Perhaps most 
intriguing, the poem’s mode of production inherently enacts this separation from reality.  
Jewsbury, composing as she went along the voyage, sent the poems back in parts from 
ports to the periodical, so that the poem was published intermittently.  Whatever number 
a reader might be perusing in England through the pages of the Athenaeum, Jewsbury had 
already vacated that spot and left behind whatever semblance of reality the poem might 
have aggregated.  Not only are these individual poems belated, but they already bear an 
estranged relationship to their original site of composition. 
                                                
153 Two excerpts from the Log-Book appear in The Athenaem on December 1, 1832 and 
December 22, 1832.  The first poem in “The Oceanides” sequence appears there on 
December 29th.   
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The first two poems in the sequence detail the fear and excitement of both 
dislocation and transport from England.  More powerfully, they describe the initial loss of 
the English symbolic and the speaker’s knee-jerk response to secure her English identity 
through domestic objects.  As introductory poems, they reveal the mutual responses that 
simultaneously pull the speaker back to English reality and toward the ocean imagination.  
She begins by describing the ship that will carry her away.  
  She is on her way, a goodly ship, 
  With her tacklings loosed, her pilot gone; 
  Behind, beneath, around, the deep, 
  And far the land where she beareth on: 
  Fading, fast fading, yonder lie 
  The last of her home, the hills of Devon  (I.1-6) 
The first lines depict a vessel that has lost its tacklings and its pilot.  The last, tenuous 
ropes anchoring the ship to the English shore are “loosed,” and the navigator charged 
with steering the ship out of its port has vanished.  Yet the poem as a whole cuts much 
larger, figurative ties to England, which is “Fading, fast fading” and by the end of the 
poem will disappear almost completely.  The ship not only pulls away from the hills of 
Devon but creates a new world amid the empty symbolic of the ocean.  The vessel 
becomes a mechanism of transport that will alight upon the other realities created when 
signification and identity are intrepidly unmoored from familiar, English terrain.  The 
poet goes on to describe the ship:  “To those who watch her from the strand,/ She is but a 
cloud ‘mid sea and air!” (I.9-10).  To those English on the docks, the ship already appears 
groundless, like a “cloud ‘mid sea and air,” floating between earth and sky.   
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 The second half of this poem foreshadows the tendency for the confines of the 
ship to evoke both nostalgic images loaded with ties to the past and also more productive 
attempts at imagining a relationship with the Indian Other, waiting at the other end of the 
journey.  At first, any sensory stimulation transports the speaker into a waking life of the 
past.  Listening to the ship’s band, she remarks, “Tunes gathered from the north and 
south” seem to call out “Arouse thee,” evoking “waking dreams of—Far away” (I.27, 25, 
32).  Even more than the music, “the sea itself wakes more,” stimulating dreams of 
England “With her rills, and flowers, and steadfastedness,/ Till sick thoughts in the soul 
have birth,/ And loath’d is the foaming wilderness” (I.38-40).  By the end of this 
introductory poem, the virtual Indian tropics win out over a romanticized England: 
  No more, no more: we are on our way: 
  The tropics are gained, and who would pine 
  For the pallid sun of an English day? 
  For the glittering cold of its night’s moonshine? 
  No more, no more—why pine for flowers, 
  If DUTY our Indian amaranth be? 
  If we look to the land that shall soon be ours, 
  A land where is “no more sea”!  (I.41-8) 
On first reading, the sea appears to vacate the stability of English domesticity and 
feminine life, which landing in India would, in turn, ameliorate by eschewing the 
uncomfortable, ungrounded the seascape.  This double vacancy would define India in the 
negative, as a paradise gained by virtue of the fact that it is not the chaotic imaginary of 
the sea.  It would represent “A land where is ‘no more sea’,” even if it cannot not offer 
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the security and stability of England.  Yet the rhetorical structure of the stanza belies a 
more important discovery, which the sea and India eventually afford this English traveler.  
The first quatrain sets up a paradoxically pro-English, nostalgic structure with its initial 
rhymes of “No more, no more” with “For the pallid sun” and “For the glittering cold,” 
both references to England’s climate.  The second “No more, no more” is answered, 
however, with two conditional “If” statements that point to a vision of India as a 
conditional state of mind, vacated of English expectations or norms.  The English inherit 
a “DUTY,” or ethical responsibility, to face the Indian landscape without the burden of 
the English imaginary.   
This ethics simultaneously doubles as a tax associated with Indian amaranth, or 
grain.  The parataxis of the line makes it unclear whether there is a duty exacted on the 
amaranth or on the “freighted” English passengers themselves, a payment that essentially 
exchanges English flowers for Indian amaranth.  This relationship is connected 
rhetorically, moreover, by the repetition of “pine” in lines forty-two and forty-five.  In the 
first instance, the speaker nostalgically asks who would pine for either England’s barely 
sunny days or its cold nights.  In the second, she contrasts English flowers and Indian 
amaranth.  This relational, comparative rhetoric signals the ends of Jewsbury’s tactics of 
vacancy, as a mode of imaginative thinking that rips both English and Indian signifiers 
from their rooted, signified, nationalized status and allows linguistic or visual analogy to 
put them into conversation, in an imagined world that holds both English and Indian 
flowers.  Amaranth, which in Greek means “the never-fading flower,” was used as a food 
source in the Americas especially by Aztecs and Native Americans yet was widely 
known throughout the world as a cosmopolitan grain and herb in a number of different 
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varieties.  It may be no mistake that the speaker sets her sights on this ubiquitous, 
cosmopolitan flower, which cannot solely signify an essential India.  This imagined 
representative of India is by definition linked to relationships of exchange and opposed to 
British flowers that remain rooted objects of beauty.  Amaranth’s versatility does not 
signify India as a vacant, blank slate; instead, it suggests a fruitful image that abounds 
with comparative references. 
As the speaker begins number II, “My Sea-Hermitage,” however, fear gets the 
best of her.  In the face of “Seas that have for man no ground,” she nostalgically tries to 
recreate a piece of England on board the ship (II.4).  In this poem, the speaker struggles 
to isolate real objects from perceptions, representations, or images, and realizes how any 
visual representation is already one step removed from reality.  This revelation, however, 
rather than propelling her to deny vision altogether, starts her down the path of inventing 
images that will wrest representational control from the patriarchal gaze.  
In the face of the sea’s vacancy of landed referents, the speaker attempts to create 
a sea hermitage, or a domestic space that might stem the tide of the ocean’s threatening, 
tumultuous squalls. 
  Yet a wanderer o’er thy waves, 
  (Call them liquid land of graves) 
  Frail as feather in the breeze, 
  I am in my cot at ease!— 
  All thy dreaded storms forgot, 
  All thy strength as it were not, 
  Heaving with thee, as a child 
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  With its mother’s pulses mild, 
  Looking on thy billows’ sway 
  As that child on lambs at play; 
  Not a shore from east to west, 
  Not a fear within my breast  (II.31-42). 
These “dreaded storms” can, as in other women writers, be seen as the fits and starts of 
sensibility—her fear of drowning at sea but also the terra incognita that lies at the end of 
this oceanic road trip.  As a kind of prophylactic, the speaker sketches a scene from the 
English pastoral as a refuge from both the sea and the greater “city” of the ship.  She 
feminizes the ocean billows as a mother’s gentle breathing, recreating a domestic tableau 
where a child rests on maternal breasts or rides on young lambs.  By likening herself to a 
child who playfully sways along with the ocean, the speaker domesticates the scene, 
grounding the waves as either a mother’s breast or an animal’s back, which are already 
secured by their material nature.  To combat the vacating force of the ocean, the speaker 
summons the tropes of sympathy, as well as its tangible, affective atmosphere.  While 
here the infant figure is nostalgic, attached as it is to a quintessential English childhood 
spent playing in a romanticized pastoral, later in the poem, the child comes to represent a 
less-grounded, inquisitive, non-teleological way of interacting with the increasingly 
foreign world. 
 This poem eventually coalesces around the speaker’s recapitulation of the objects 
that might recreate a feminine hermitage: 
  And my cabin full of all 
  That may lessen sense of thrall; 
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  Books, read last amid green hills 
  With their poetry of rills; — 
  Miniatures of friends afar, 
  Each a fond memorial star; — 
  Birds that singing in their cage 
  Make my ocean-hermitage 
  Have a sound and look of hours, 
  That once tread on moss and flowers  (II.43-52). 
The speaker desires to fill the oceanic depths of vacancy with a cabin full of things.  Each 
of these objects—books, miniatures, and birds—lessen the speaker’s fear of the sea’s 
thrall by anchoring her to a familiar version of feminine embodiment.  They likewise 
supply crucial visual and aural material reminiscent of better days in England.  Like 
Wordsworth’s “sad still music of humanity” that shores up his identity through the 
memories that poetry preserves and recreates, the speaker superficially claims that her 
books will preserve that self last seen “amid green hills.”  Her “poetry of rills,” moreover, 
might act similarly to Wordsworth’s daffodils, which “flash up on the inward eye” while 
he is “in vacant or pensive mood” filling his heart with the transcendent pleasure that 
only a fragile, imagined union with nature might give.154  Yet even as the speaker 
                                                
154 Jewsbury admired Wordsworth so much that she dedicated her first book to him, and 
this request for patronage eventually amounted to a correspondence with his daughter 
Dora and a short visit to Rydal.  Wordsworth encouraged Jewsbury to stop writing poetry 
and instead concentrate on prose, particularly an account of neglected British women 
poetesses.  Though Jewsbury may have been in favor of treating feminine writers 
separately while in England, her poem written abroad seems to engage with 
Wordsworthian poetics in a way she perhaps could not as she sought the patronage and 
favor of the great poet at home.  For biographical accounts of Jewsbury’s personal and 
literary relationship to the Wordsworths, see Dennis Low, “Gold and Silver Fishes in a 
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amasses these sensations that might lead her to recapitulate memory and a consolidated 
English (or pre-oceanic) identity, she has revealed the already-simulated quality of 
memories, whose instability grows with each league placed between the speaker and her 
longed-for green hills.  Her books and birds cannot be sufficient in and of themselves but 
must always refer to a nostalgic past, that elusive romanticized pastoral of moss and 
flowers. 
This slippage of the pastoral into the imagination comes close to Jean 
Baudrillard’s delineation of simulacra, as images that “mask and denature” and 
eventually vitiate reality (6).  Unlike Baudrillard, however, Jewsbury increasingly 
establishes simulation as a subversive tactic, one which has the potential to change reality 
by loosening it from the iron-clad grasp of the real and its gender-bound epistemologies 
and embodied stereotypes.  Though these images of cabin objects attempt to nail down 
British domesticity even upon the ocean, these books, miniatures, and birds cannot but 
help to evoke a picture of past days spent lounging in the pastoral.  Jewsbury’s 
contemplation of domestic objects ultimately evokes the pastoral as an imagined place 
that marks it as impossibly unreal.  Directed at England and the English pastoral, 
Jewsbury’s descriptions enact what Baudrillard calls the “liquidation of all referentials” 
(2), yet unlike Baudrillard’s simulacra they become an important libratory technique for 
women writers, who were too often tied down to their embodied roles as purveyors of 
sympathy, charged with reproducing English habits and domestic spaces within the 
                                                                                                                                            
Vase:  a Portrait of Wordsworth and Maria Jane Jewsbury.”  See also Norma Clarke’s 
study of the Jewsbury-Hemans-Clarke literary circle, Ambitious Heights.  Writing, 
Friendship, Love—The Jewsbury Sisters, Felicia Hemans, and Jane Carlyle.     
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“wilderness” of the subcontinent.155  As de Lauretis has suggested about feminist cinema, 
Jewsbury’s imaging does not “negate illusion and destroy visual pleasure, but [acts] to 
problematize” the terms of vision (63).  In the next several poems, the poet turns to do 
just that when she undermines the patriarchal hold over images of women and 
domesticity, asserting representational control by creating her own images of the ultimate 
patriarch, God. 
 
Oceanic Debates, Imagined Conversations 
In the following three-poem sequence (numbers III, IV, and V), Jewsbury 
brilliantly troubles a most powerful anchor in representational schemes, the Old 
Testament God.  Opposing his commandment against idolatrous representation, she 
produces several images or idols of the sea, which act as God’s proxies, and these 
representations undermine his ability to establish an ultimate point of reference.  At first 
the ocean appears as merely a figure for the sublime that terrorizes the speaker as she 
weathers several storms.  Soon enough the sea speaks, announcing himself as the judicial 
hand of God:  “By me his wrath is oftenest hurled” (III.11).  One would expect this 
version of the Kantian sublime to threaten the speaker with fragmentation, dissolution, 
and the ultimate alterity, death, but then lead the way for her to shore up a unified, human 
subjectivity as a moral being.  In “The Oceanides,” however, it is the sea that becomes a 
multiple, unstable entity at the hands of the poet.  Jewsbury explodes the singular, 
Christian, sublime, transcendent God when she orchestrates a series of apostrophes by 
                                                
155 As Betty Joseph has recently argued, there has come to be a rich literature about the 
power and place of memsahibs as the British settled India and increasingly began using 
ideologies of cultural superiority (often modeled by white women) to justify British rule 
in the subcontinent (Reading the East India Company, 1720-1840 106-8). 
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Homeric deities, constructing the sea as Oceanus-Isaiah, the sirens, and then the 
Oceanides.156  Jewsbury thus foregrounds the constructed nature of visuality, gender, and 
even our notions of God with her own rampant production of idols.  
In this section, vacancy deracinates unitary subjectivity, reality, and most 
importantly any single image that would represent transcendent meaning and instead 
offers a Robinsonian multiplicity of images, each pointing to a different aspect of 
godliness.  This colloquy of gods and humans lends itself to the form of the multi-part 
poem, which allows different speakers to take center stage.  Through this imagined 
roundtable, Jewsbury constructs a multi-voiced perspective that Michael Macovski calls 
“a proliferating matrix of tongues” in his book, Dialogue and Literature (5).  More 
historically, Jewsbury’s formal dynamics are certainly influenced by phantasmagoria and 
moving picture shows.  In the nineteenth century, phantasmagoria were often used for 
religious instruction or deemed acceptable entertainment for those middle-class families 
who felt the theatre was too crude or controversial (Altick 220, 229, 182-3).  Moreover, 
the Greek undertone of the poem is apt not only as a religious counterpoint but, as Wang 
has discussed in relation to Lamia,  “Greek antiquity provided a ‘surface of inscription’ 
for all these heterogeneous social and epistemological energies” (477).  
Finally, because Jewsbury represents the Ocean destroying ships involved with 
capitalistic or imperial prerogatives, her vacancy is replete with skepticism for material 
goods and materiality.  Her duplicitous “imaging” becomes a critique of both imperial 
                                                
156 Since the sea nymphs go by the name “Oceanides,” it would follow that their Greek 
god and father would be Oceanus, not Poseidon or Nereus.  Poseidon was technically the 
ocean god of the Mediterranean, but Oceanus represented as ruling over all earthly 




histories and the imperial imagination.  She uses the excess and exchangeability inherent 
in commodity culture and channels it into an abounding spirituality—less a communion 
with supernatural ghosts than with anthropomorphic spirits.  This self-reflexive embrace 
of anthropomorphic idols not only brings God closer to humans, and vice versa, but this 
series of poems crucially imports into the poem the connection between the phantasmic 
nature of commodity, encounters with alterity, and ethics.  
Despite the speaker’s attempt to anchor herself in a domestic hermitage, she 
displaces her fear of the sea onto what she imagines to be an angry, destructive deity.  As 
the speaker says in the first lines of number III, the ocean, as God’s hand, wields an even 
more powerful vacancy than man’s own violent nature: 
  And thou—world’s curse and blessing—MAN, 
  Creating, desolating all 
  That mind may gather in its span— 
 Stand forth, and bear a mightier thrall!  (III.5-8) 
The injunction to “stand forth” and “bear a mightier thrall” forces man to bow under the 
destructive force of the Ocean, who institutes God’s justice.  In comparison to man’s own 
destructive (and creative) force, which desolates so that his “mind may gather in its 
span,” the ocean vitiates the possibility that the mind could regroup.  At the very 
beginning of the passage, Jewsbury signals that her sequential representations of the 
vacating, devouring sea, will come to bear on the mind, which will not be able to 
recapitulate itself so easily. 
After this description, the first of the oceanic speakers announces himself, as part 
Greek god Oceanus, part Old Testament prophet replete with power and rhetorical 
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reasoning, threatening the speaker’s life and general constitution.  “The Burden of the 
Sea,” begins with an epigraph from Isaiah XXIII, describing the Lord’s destruction of 
Tyre and its merchants who return to their port city only to find themselves without a 
fortress or a harbor.  Jewsbury presents the Ocean here as a similarly wrathful prophet:  
“‘I am thy prophet—puny world,/ ‘Tis God himself that speaks by me’” (III.9-10).  Just 
as Isaiah announces the demise of world-famous merchants, so the sea proclaims, “my 
weeds are mightier things” (15) and “I mock at man—the same to me/ The royal fleet, the 
pirate vile” (32).  The Ocean mocks human “weeds,” clothing or other material 
merchandize, equally disgusted with both piracy and sanctioned government trading.  
One might go so far as to see Jewsbury mocking the distinction between the East India 
Company’s trading policies and those of the British government in the post-Hastings era.  
Regardless, the Ocean stands as the ethical corrective to England’s imperial superiority 
and exceptionalism, based as it was on its royal fleets and its merchant marines, 
especially those ships that helped to create both the middle class and the British Empire 
through trade with India.   
If the Ocean vacates the earthly desires associated with capital and comes to 
represent the ultimate alterity inherent in death, as an anthropomorphic personification, 
the Ocean brings this alterity into proximity with the speaker.  This great oceanic force 
and puny mankind are repeatedly described in relation to one another.  First the Ocean 
explains:  “Yet I am one, or calm or heaving,/ The changing or the changeless sea” (37-
38).  In the next lines, the Ocean describes itself as an instrument of God’s justice striking 
down and equalizing all men:  “And victor, vanquished—joyous, grieving/ But one, is 
mortal man to me” (39-40).   As the Ocean reveals its long history of drowning 
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merchants at sea and denuding them of their material commodities, this speech likewise 
navigates the Ocean and men into a conversation, or more accurately, into an analogical 
relation with each other.  Both Ocean and man are at once diversely represented as 
changing or changeless, joyous or grieving, yet both are “one,” representations of 
universality related to the eternal, vacating hand of God.  Both possess a materiality that 
puts them at the mercy of God—man’s mortality and the Ocean’s liquid power—and 
both ultimately crave the immaterial knowledge of that which is beyond their physical 
dimensions. 
In essence, both exist in an asymptotic relationship to God, or knowledge itself.  
As the Ocean proclaims in the following stanza:  “I know not little, know not great—/ 
[…]/ The hollow of his hand I know” (45, 48).  Knowledge of God is unavailable, even 
for the Ocean, who only knows “the hollow of his hand” or an empty space just next to 
God.  In this way representations of the ocean and man travel toward but cannot arrive at 
that empty “one” or “hollow” that consistently displaces signification or concrete 
knowledge.  It is this void that encourages Jewsbury to concoct multiple images of God 
such as the figure of the Ocean.   
This multiplicity of the sea speaks to the notion that whatever God might be, he is 
already an image to be tarried and played with at the level of signification.  Her position 
comes close to Derrida’s when he disputes the idea that fatherly specters shore up the 
patriarchy and suggests that they in fact map a way out of the ultimate patriarchal 
signifier.157  As he writes in Specters of Marx:  “The religious is thus not just one 
ideological phenomenon or phantomatic production among others.  On the one hand, it 
                                                
157 Orrin N. C. Wang, in “Ghost Theory,” sides with Derrida’s claim that hauntology 
might provoke revolution, arguing that this legacy remains paramount for Romanticism.   
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gives to the production of the ghost or of the ideological phantasm its originary form or 
its paradigm of reference, its first ‘analogy.’  On the other hand, […] the religious also 
informs, along with the messianic and eschatological, be it in the necessarily 
undetermined, empty, abstract, and dry form that we are privileging here, that ‘spirit’ of 
emancipatory Marxism” (166-7).  Derrida divulges the structure of specters, first 
manufactured through representations or analogies of God not simply as nostalgia for the 
past but as specters that conjure up what might be, in the future-to-come.  Though 
Jewsbury does not necessarily view vacancy as a mode of futurity, as does Smith, the 
point to be made here is that she does use the simulated nature of the deity as an 
emancipatory structure—rather than a defensive one—precisely because the of the way 
phantasms produce a critical distance from materiality, history, and imperial realities.  
Ultimately, Jewsbury’s specters of the ocean critique the ocean’s domination and related 
British imperial prowess underwritten by Christian superiority.   
 The possibility that these images of God lead to ethics or to freedom becomes 
apparent once the poet represents the ocean’s other faces, which also characterize the 
voices of others.  In part IV, “The Sunken Rock,” the ocean continues to speak to the sea-
goers in a domineering voice, but with a more taunting, manipulative agenda.  The 
specter of the prophet transforms into something like a siren.  The “waves” increasingly 
mock the passengers for their anxiety along with the cautious “seaman grey” for his fear 
of rocks “sunken or seen” and his rational use of “chart and line” (6, 36, 37).  Then they 
attempt to entice passengers to give up on the pilot and let them take the helm: 
  We will love and leave thee never; 
  We will tell our secrets thee; 
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  And thou shalt be for ever, 
  Our nursling of the sea!  (47-50) 
If, in part III, the Ocean acted under the reasoning and rhetorical paternal sign, this new 
incarnation of the Waves attempts to charm the passengers with love, sympathy, secrets, 
and the care of a governess or mother figure.  Yet directly in the next stanza we see that 
this is merely a seductive ploy to capture the ship:  “She sinks in our arms as if drunk or 
asleep; —/ Down with her, fathoms, fathoms deep,—” (53-54).  The Ocean that turned its 
nose up at acquisition in number III now reveals another face, with a plot to possess the 
ship, drowning passengers in a suffocating embrace.  This domineering, feminine voice 
lulls voyagers with her songs even as she seduces them not with sex but with the promise 
of palliation and comfort.  The Waves are part possessive mother and part sirens whose 
acquisitive, manipulative nature leads travelers to their deaths. 
 At this point the eponymous Oceanides appear, another feminine aspect of the 
sea, to lament the fate of the passengers and the ire of their “father sea.”   
  We are daughters of the deep, 
  Yet, because his daughters, weep 
  That the sound of human woe 
  Through our caverned halls should flow (84-87) 
Thus the Oceanides step in not to mediate but to express their woe, pitying men and 
lamenting the Ocean, who is “stern and full of death” (90).  These voices can do nothing 
but express their regret and sympathy for “a mightier race than we!”: 
  We would save, but we are weak 
  […] 
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  We may pity their great need, 
  And, when hushed is foam and surge, 
  Sing, as now, their funeral dirge; 
  Hide awhile the limbs of youth 
  From some monster’s ravening tooth, 
  Bind sea blooms round beauty’s locks 
  […] 
  But ‘tis all that we can do  (92, 97-102, 106) 
The daughters of the sea, then, serve as the affective balm to the sea’s wrathful, deathly 
prerogative.  Without any power to act against him, all they can do is lament the fate of 
the humans, save them from further mutilation by flesh-eating sea-dwellers, and, most 
interestingly, augment their beauty with flowers.  These characteristics help to frame the 
Oceanides as the sympathetic feminine voice (as opposed to the Waves’ false promise to 
take the ship as its “nursling”), but more pointedly the Oceanides represent feminine 
writing.  These water nymphs mourn their way through rhyming couplets, and their 
speech articulates the sensibility, sympathy, and high emotion often associated with 
women writers in the Romantic period.  The Oceanides view their proper place as 
dwelling among the graves of the dead, memorializing them with dirges and preserving 
their bodies as long as they can.  Most significantly, they transform dead humans into 




The Oceanides, as the eponymous protagonists of the poem, pose a feminist 
critique to the masculine, wrathful, rhetorically minded Ocean.158  These female voices, 
however, do not simply reassert the necessity for pitying, affective sympathy.  Together 
the differing aspects of the sea show the ineffectuality of both material acquisitions and 
embodied sentimentality.  In their place, the speaker develops a new kind of sympathy 
through the techniques of visualization, where one vision or perception of the ocean does 
not overwrite another but is placed next to it, as one of many neighboring images.  This 
phantasmic production of anthropomorphic images of God, which speak as if they were 
living, not only resembles Derrida’s hauntology but W. J. T. Mitchell’s call for 
iconology.  As he puts it in What Do Pictures Want, “Critical idolatry involves an 
approach to images that does not dream of destroying them … but [plays] upon them as if 
they were musical instruments” (26).  The phantasmagoria evoked by the sea and put into 
play by the speaker enacts a cognitive multiplicity of voices, replacing excessive, 
material acquisition with a spiritual plethora, a diversity the Oceanides implicitly 
represent.  Moreover, by vacating the commandment for singularity, Jewsbury likewise 
undermines the Old Testament’s vengeful, univocal, law-based justice.  
If the Ocean represents the fatherly injunction doling out blind justice, and the 
Waves portray seductive material greed or a mother’s insatiable need to comfort others, 
                                                
158 In her prose article on Felicia Hemans published in the Athenaeum, Jewsbury 
delineated what she saw as a clear difference between poetry by men and women.  Where 
men’s poetry works through “power” and “passion,” women’s poetry operates through 
“beauty.”  As Joanne Wilkes has argued, these two categories are not always mutually 
exclusive as Hemans might be seen as manifesting “the power of beauty” (qtd. in Wilkes 
114).  Jewsbury’s review of Hemans was written before she embarked on her 
transcontinental voyage or she began writing of The Oceanides, and I would argue that 




then the Oceanides become the scene’s extra pair of eyes, the witnesses, or what Levinas 
has called the third party.  They watch what the Ocean and the Waves do to “Beauty’s 
queens and kings,” those humans who are denuded of material wealth, who from the 
Oceanides’ perspective are the Others (69).  As Levinas says of the third party in 
Otherwise than Being, “It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the 
question:  What do I have to do with justice” (157).  The Oceanides, when they make 
themselves unnecessarily responsible for humans, act as the third party, observing the 
interactions between God, the sea, and humans.  They witness the Ocean’s cruelty and 
domination of humans, and their observations act, in part, as a protest, exclaiming, “none 
know their graves but we!” (83).  With this knowledge about actual and symbolic death, 
they enact an aesthetic prowess, marking the dead with their sea flowers and their 
flowerets of poetry.  The daughters twine beauty with the ethical imagination, and the 
songs and flowers of the Oceanides present aesthetics as the ultimate ethical witness.  
Their flowers and their poetry essentially mark what is not visible:  death, alterity, and 
the inability of truly seeing the Other.   
This vacancy, or the blind spot of alterity allegorized by an invisible God, 
produces images of his various faces.  This type of viewing encourages a “brotherhood” 
built through imagined encounters rather than universal commandments or categorical 
imperatives.  In number V, “Address to the Deep,” the speaker comes to terms with these 
multiple models for justice.  She constructs the poem through the repetition of the 
question, “Wild, ferocious, restless Sea,/ What have I do to with thee?” (23-24), 
combining the exhortatory tone of the Isaiah poem with the rhyming couplets of the 
Oceanides verse.  The speaker accuses the ocean of physically separating “many lovely 
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lands” with its “thousands hands,” isolating people on islands, such as Britain, that 
ultimately leave them “harborless,” or without connection to other people (38).  Without 
the wrathful sea, man would supposedly remain in a state of “perfect brotherhood,” no 
longer limited or apportioned by the sea, a disconnection that leads to human evil.  
 This theodicy culminates in the final stanza, when the speaker reverses her 
position: 
  Gloomy, weary, restless Sea, 
  Yes, I have to do with thee; 
  Not on frame, nor yet in power, 
  But on evil’s sadder dower: 
  Have I called the one dark name 
  Human spirits may not claim?  (V.47-52) 
Acknowledging the constructed nature of her own anthropomorphic poetics, the speaker 
must finally admit that all the bad intentions she has ascribed to the sea, all that has 
caused “brotherhood’s admeasurement,” are really modeled on human evil and greed.  
This reversal invokes a certain amount of persecution or guilt—“evil’s sadder dower,” 
and it is this complicity that ultimately brings man in proximity to other men, in 
brotherhood.  This idea of guilt bears a strong resemblance to Levinas’s argument that 
guilt and persecution put the self in proximity with the other.  He writes, “The subject 
resting on itself is confounded by wordless accusation.  […]  The accusation is in this 
sense persecuting; the persecuted one can no longer answer it.  More exactly, it is the 
accusation which I cannot answer, but for which I cannot decline responsibility” (127).  
Both Levinas and Jewsbury similarly invoke a certain amount of guilt and skepticism that 
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in turn propel the self to repeatedly encounter the Other.  In Levinas, the inability to 
answer to this responsibility—or to ever truly know the other—propels an infinity of 
ethical encounters.   The philosopher and poet part ways, however, because he advocates 
for an authentic, face-to-face encounter with the other that would largely be antagonistic 
to her technology of the image.  Even more, it would essentially throw women back into 
a mode of knowing through embodied sensibility that too often trapped them as 
unthinking, feeling subjects of the nineteenth-century.  In place of authenticity, Jewsbury 
alternately produces images and illusions that allow alterity to speak, though imperfectly, 
in the attempt to break out of pictorial representations that might define the Other before 
she has a chance to speak.   
One presumes that the speaker of “The Oceanides” cannot literally answer her 
own accusation, that she cannot claim a “dark name” for herself, and yet she cannot 
decline responsibility for human hostility and persecution, especially as a consuming 
English woman.  The speaker at sea cannot completely separate herself from British 
trade, the excessive nature of these poems, or the proselytizing efforts of civilizing 
missionaries who would call out God’s justice to Indians.  It is this—initially—wordless 
accusation lodged by the sea (as the Other and on behalf of the Other) that helps to create 
the speaker’s longed-for proximity and brotherhood.  In effect the act of representing the 
Ocean spawns images and enables dialogue between the guilt-ridden Britain and India.  
Rather than figuring an ultimate paternal signifier for God, the multi-faceted sea becomes 
a libratory force vacating the attachment to reference or reality, especially a reality that 




The Voyager’s Regret:  “Pining after things that were” 
 Before Jewsbury can begin to realize any imagined utopia that might host British-
Indian interaction, the speaker must finally relinquish her English past left ashore.  In 
these next few poems, the speaker longs once more for images of family members that 
connect and anchor her to reality, and in doing so she learns the difference between 
haunting ghosts that only reproduce the English past and images that produce dialogue, 
difference, and the ability to construct other ways of seeing outside the English 
imaginary.  Her memories plague her and rise up in numbers VI, VII, and VIII as an 
uncanny’s double relationship to “homeliness” and “unhomeliness” that persists in 
threatening to undo the speaker’s move toward India.  Jewsbury’s approach to the gothic 
aboard the cloistered ship bears a resemblance to Katherine Ellis’s feminist approach to 
the genre in The Contested Castle, where she argues that the gothic becomes a site of 
ideological resistance to separate spheres.159  We might view the turn away from the 
gothic, uncanny images at the end of this mini-sequence as a final move away from 
images that pine for referents grounded in realities such as English domesticity.  
After the multiplicity of the previous poems, the speaker draws back in fear at the 
infinite possibilities promised by skepticism and the production of images.  Instead, in 
these poems, the speaker sketches a transcendent connection that would unite her with 
relatives in England.  This virtual communication, which transcends the body, resembles 
Wordsworth’s consolidation of the self over time as well as episodes in novels such as 
Smith’s Old Manor House or Austen’s Pride and Prejudice when lovers wander in the 
                                                
159 For other sources on the gothic as a genre of domestic terror see Anne Williams’ Art of 
Darkness.  Michael Gamer in Romanticism and the Gothic:  Genre, Reception, and 
Canon Formation discusses the gothic as Romanticism’s other, whose haunted domestic 
scenes are the inverse of the open pastorals of the Romantic imagination. 
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woods pining for each other and unexpectedly meet. By the end of this series of poems, 
however, the speaker eventually rejects these nostalgic images because of the way they 
serve to reify a woman’s place in the private sphere and, at the same time, obscure 
visions of non-European landscapes.160  Seeking to become one with these images—to 
live inside an idealized picture of the English home, the speaker temporarily allows these 
“bad idols” to stamp out all other voices or images the oceanic seascape might produce.    
After her jarring encounter with the ocean, the speaker cannot help but to wish for 
a more familiar semblance of reality.  In number VI, the speaker dwells on “The 
Voyager’s Regret,” specifically travelers pining for absent family and friends. 
 THEY are thinking far away 
 Of their loved ones on the water; 
 The mother of her son, 
 The father of his daughter;  (VI.1-4). 
Though it is the mother and father who are “on the water,” the syntax estranges the clause 
from its antecedent, placing it closer to the “loved ones,” the son and daughter, such that 
they seem to appear as images on the water itself.  The voyager’s regret itself is double—
                                                
160 For a reverse of this argument see Joseph’s use of Homi K. Bhabha’s reading of the 
uncanny in Location of Cultures.  Bhabha argues that for the dislocated colonial subject, 
the uncanny is less a nostalgia for home than it is a blurring of home and world that 
reveal future political alternatives.  Joseph uses Bhabha to reveal how the home itself 
becomes a microcosm of the world, offering colonial and English women new access to 
power and subjectivity (94-95).  Jewsbury’s poem plots the reverse motif of dislocation, 
of the Englishwoman moving into colonial territory, and I would argue that in shedding 
these simulacra of home, she also sheds at least some of the limited trappings of English 
domesticity.  For reasons that I hope will appear clear later in the chapter, Jewsbury 
likewise refuses the racial “identity tourism” that Edward Said first chastised Kipling for 
and which Lisa Nakamura, in “Race In/for Cyberspace,” has recently observed in 
cyberspace MOOs.   
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the speaker misses her family and at the same time repents her remembrance of them as 
an uncanny haunting that positions her as always in pursuit of an irretrievable past.   
  A prisoner on the ocean, 
  How oft my cabin-room 
  On this wilderness of motion, 
  Reminds me of a tomb! 
  Yet through its windows streaming, 
  Flash daybreaks rich as noon; 
  And on my couch comes gleaming 
  Full oft a sunlike moon.  (VI.17-24) 
The nostalgic, haunting thoughts of family members eventually transform the formerly 
comforting, domestic cabin into a gothic space.  The “tomb” of domesticity here 
resonates with gothic imagery of the English domestic hearth in number VIII, which both 
wards off and becomes the site of “foe or demon dire” (VIII.11).  The speaker, now a 
prisoner of her own memories, views her room as a tomb, housing not only the 
phantasmagoria of family and friends but her own spectral English identity.  A bit like 
Jane Eyre in the red room, whose ruminative and artistic subjectivity is produced from 
the pressure of enclosed spaces, the speaker likewise resembles Ann Radcliffe’s Emily 
from The Mysteries of Udolpho, who is constantly looking out of the castle window onto 
the outside world to escape the confines of her physical and intellectual imprisonment.     
In this passage, the speaker signals her self-consciousness about creating images 
of her family for her own comfort when she theorizes her nostalgia by describing it in 
competing terms of gothic and Enlightenment imagery.  She does not dwell for too long 
 
250  
in her tomb before the bright light of the tropics comes through the cabin windows, as if 
the powerful “sunlike moon” might remedy the dark, gothic atmosphere with reasoned—
if slightly inverted, non-European—Enlightenment thought.  Yet even this light, like 
Robinson’s invocation of Enlightenment light in “To Sight,” all too powerfully flashes 
and gleams, and either arrests the speaker’s mind or provokes temporary blindness.  
Likewise, the starry sky, which should display scientifically proven marks of guidance to 
oceanic travelers, is replaced by an unreadable text when the speaker finds herself under 
tropical skies “unseen, unknown before,” without the aid of familiar constellations (18).  
Not only have “constellations vanished” but “The heart’s star of the banished,/ The Pole 
Star, is gone” (29, 31-32).  The crucial, guiding light of the heart, the northern star, has 
disappeared, and along with it both the speaker’s emotional center as well as the 
scientific ability to plot a course through a real relation to the stars.  The speaker finds 
herself adrift, without affective or rational knowledge.   
 Though she should be able to see new, Eastern constellations in this perceptual 
vacancy, she cannot help but recreate images of loved ones onto the tropical sky.   
Strange birds the blue air cleaving 
  Attract the wanderer’s sight, 
  And strange creatures weaving 
  Their path, through waves as bright; — 
  But I, grown sick with pining 
  After the things that were, 
  Over the deep reclining 
  But see ‘mid strange or fair, 
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  My sister’s sweet face shining!— 
  My father’s thin grey hair!  (VI.33-42) 
Like the new constellations that the poet cannot yet see, the strange birds and creatures 
remain estranged from the viewer’s ken.  The poet, finally, acknowledges that it is 
because she has “grown sick with pining/ After the things that were,” that she cannot see 
anything but spectral images of her sister and father (italics, Jewsbury’s).  Grown 
insightful to her own blindness, she admits that she is too homesick with nostalgia to take 
in any new perceptions.161  Rather than attending to those objects “strange or fair” before, 
she instead projects visual images of her sister’s face and her father’s hairline onto the 
ocean’s vacancy.  In this way she turns this gothic scene into a moving picture show 
replete with entombed shadows and looming solar, lunar, and stellar lights.  
The self-reflexive nature of these images in part draws from contemporaneous 
visual illusions concocted by popular, mechanical, moving-picture devices.  While shows 
such as the diorama were still fashionable in the 1830s, Jewsbury’s technique here 
resembles more the phantasmagoria, which used a magic lantern to revolve figures across 
a screen.  Her first published work was actually entitled Phantasmagoria; or Sketches of 
Life and Literature (1825).  Commentators have mostly dismissed any relationship 
between this miscellany and the magic lantern show, yet Jewsbury is clearly working 
within the genre of phantasmagoria, “a rapidly transforming collection or series of 
imaginary (and usually fantastic) forms, such as may be experienced in a dream or 
                                                
161 In the “Log-Book,” Jewsbury writes of her seasickness:  “I have done little, but say 
with Mariana in ‘The Moated Grange,’ “I am aweary, aweary….  An active mind may 
countervail much of this” (824).  The reference to Mariana’s imprisonment inside a 
defunct, quotidian domesticity in Tennyson’s poem may further point out not only 
Jewsbury’s self-reflexivity about her familial ghosts or the entrapment of their 
domesticity but also the remedy—an active mind producing the simulations it chooses. 
 
252  
fevered state, or evoked by literary description” (OED 2).  Both the genre and the optical 
illusion present figures for the imagination as a dreamy collage of illusions.  
Perhaps responding to Keats’s interrogation of dreaming in “The Fall of 
Hyperion,” Coleridge’s infamous composition of “Kubla Khan,” and DeQuincey’s own 
fears of suddenly appearing figures like the Malay, the speaker of Phantasmagoria, 
somewhat tongue in cheek, riffs on dreaming in her meta-poetic piece “A Vision of 
Poets.”  She muses:  “Authors are your only accomplished dreamers; —they can dream 
when and what they please—by day as well as night; —awake as easily as when asleep.  
Indeed it might in many cases be said with truth, that authors dream to live, and live to 
dream” (Book I, 55).  In this particular piece, the author dreams up a colloquy of 
Britain’s famous poets and attends to their conversations about the state of literature and 
its canons.  This fantasy of a grand British writers’ conference both illustrates Jewsbury’s 
idea of the imagination as a magic lantern beaming the specters of British poets across 
the mind and also portrays poetry as a great, virtual conversation between writers of 
many ages.  At the end of the essay, famous poets, probably Milton and Shakespeare, 
hand down their wisdom and laurels directly to the next generation of poets—one of 
whom is most likely Wordsworth.162 
This successful imaginary transmission of inheritance might be countered with the 
water-bound speaker’s impossible knowledge of her relatives in England, or Jewsbury’s 
later, largely failed poetic relationship with Wordsworth.  Though she and the poet did 
correspond through the medium of Dora Wordsworth, he largely cut off any poetic 
                                                
162 As if to further add to the imagined nature of the conversation, none of these poets are 
named.  Instead, readers must intuit who these figures are from contextual clues about 
their styles and reputations. 
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exchange when he suggested that she stop writing poetry and stick to prose.  Perhaps she, 
seven years later, finally decided that dwelling in the past does not, in fact, make for good 
poetry.  Yet perhaps in “The Oceanides,” Jewsbury throws off the idea of familial legacy, 
rejecting imagined inheritances for more mutual, forward-looking encounters.  While 
Jewsbury does not give up the logic of phantoms, in “The Oceanides,” she does seem to 
place an injunction on dredging up past visions that only serve to restrict the imagination 
and keep her enclosed in the tomb of antiquated thought.163   
The speaker’s other extensive projection of English nostalgia, in number VIII, 
creates an even more self-conscious meditation on the dangers of nostalgic images.  
Similar to the techniques in number VI, this poem contrasts the dark, melancholy, 
enclosed spaces of English winters, with the over-powering “too fiercely bright” light of 
the tropics (VIII.17).  “A New Year’s Day Song” contemplates the material comforts 
offered to the English in the winter, which now would be unnecessary and even 
disgusting for the English at sea in the torrid zone: 
  The blazing Christmas fire 
  Is but a name of cheer, 
  As from foe or demon dire 
  Should we shrink, if it were here: 
  And robes defying cold, 
  Are but treasures in the North;— 
                                                
163 In an 1831 essay on Percy Shelley’s “Wandering Jew,” Jewsbury writes that while 
Wordsworth represents the past, Shelley is to be admired for looking toward the future.  
This might lead us to believe that she eventually turned from the impinging model of 
Wordsworth to a more open-ended Shelleyan one.  Her essay on him is characterized by 
both admiration and dissent, perhaps a sign that his model is one of mutual encounter, 
rather than a haunting anxiety of influence. 
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  From the muslin’s snowy fold 
  We languidly look forth.  (VIII.9-16) 
The modest luxuries of fire and robes, still so valuable to those the speaker has left 
behind, now pale in comparison to Indian muslins, an imperial fabric that not only 
supplies light clothing but the ship’s sails, for which “muslin” is slang (OED 2).  Though 
England houses the tranquil Christmas scene, it paradoxically evokes the “foe or demon 
dire” against which it must protect.  By contrast, “the muslin’s snowy fold” enables 
passengers to “languidly look forth,” calmly and without fear toward the future.  This 
reversal gives way to the realization that the enclosed, memorialized domestic space and 
its bulky, material trappings. 
  Closed doors, and shutters fast, 
  The joys of winter eve, 
  They are numbered with the past; 
  Or, when the heart would weave 
  Some fond memorial spell, 
  (For some beloved one nigh,) 
  Of all that distant dwell— 
  Are remembered with a sigh!  (VIII.25-32) 
In the first three lines of the stanza, the speaker puts aside the memories of the “closed 
doors, and shutters,” which now are “numbered with the past.”  She nearly admits that 
writing of England’s wintry domestic—and its need to protect women, especially, from 
nature’s elements—is itself a nostalgic verse form.  Likewise that “fond memorial spell,” 
the verse or narration that creates the trance-state or enchantment and produces images or 
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memories of “all that distant dwell” only further separates the speaker from the English 
hearth.  Rather than “spelling” out or representing clearly those family and friends, all the 
speaker has access to are the spells reproducing dreamy, illusory remembrances.   
As the final lines of the poem suggest, the problem with this type of imaging is 
not the imaginary nature of memory, but what happens when the speaker wants to 
connect these images of her family back to their real referents.  She poses a final 
question, “Do they think of us to-day?” and at first answers, “They do!, our own,/ 
Where’er their homes may be” (33, 41-2).  Yet in the poem’s final lines, she admits that 
the loved ones cannot really respond:  “Alas! none answer, but above/ The clouds—the 
waves below!” (47-48).  The attempt to simulate a relationship ultimately fails when 
“none answer.”  This imagined, visual relationship, unlike the telepathic and nearly 
telegraphic communication between Jane Eyre and Rochester at that novel’s end, fails to 
transmit overseas.164  Only the clouds and waves reply, with their changing rhythms and 
airy, unstable forms.   
This failure of the Romantic imagination, the repeated logging of the impossible 
connection between the speaker adrift at sea and her grounded relatives back home, 
recurs not only because the speaker increasingly becomes more distant from England. 
Unlike Wordsworth in “Tintern Abbey” or “I wandered lonely as a cloud,” who can 
preserve himself in an eternal recollection, Jewsbury is attempting to imagine and 
commune with images of family presently celebrating a holiday.  All she has to construct 
the image of her family are her memories, which cannot be fully truthful to the events 
                                                
164 Richard Menke connects the commonplace reading of Jane and Rochester’s telepathic 
connection to the advent of the telegraph in his recent book, Telegraphic Realism:  
Victorian Fiction and Other Information Systems. 
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taking place in the present or future—because they do not account for changes that 
necessarily have happened since the speaker had access to her family.  She has traveled 
so far as to invalidate her memories as anything but past images, and she is all to aware 
that her family has most likely moved on since she has last seen them.  Thus, the moving 
waves and shifting clouds allegorize kinesthetic images, like people, whose growth and 
change necessarily garbles communication.  One might commune with memories, but 
memories cannot stand in for present, living people.   
Moreover, Jewsbury’s speaker cannot use the unchanging pastoral of the Lake 
District to anchor the up-to-date images of herself or her family.  The repetition of 
“wherever” in line 46 emphasizes the extent to which the speaker is unclear where she 
might be at any given moment in her journey, except in terms of relative positioning.  
Neither can she easily locate the English homestead with any certainty—“where’er their 
homes may be.”  As the speaker moves forward in her journey, the past can no longer 
help to establish the locations of the present and vanishes as a point of reconnection.  
Jewsbury, however, is able to reuse this idea of relative position when she links the 
speaker with India by correlation and juxtaposition, creating another kind of doubling 
that moves beyond uncanny notions of the homely and unhomely. 
 
Ethics, Friendship, and the Infant:  “To trace/ The lines of brotherhood afar” 
When the speaker can stop trying to use the unknown of the sea to recreate 
England, she looks in the other direction, toward India and those strange birds and 
constellations that might project other lessons for her upon the sky.  Jewsbury eventually 
uses the technique of producing images only tenuously tied to reality to create pictures of 
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England and India simultaneously, which in turn offers a means of modeling or 
visualizing what interaction with India might be like.   This approach straddles the all-or-
nothing approaches of multiplicity and transcendence for a type of comparison that 
necessarily produces vacancy’s non-knowledge about the other as part of an ethical, 
imagined encounter. 
In her comparisons of English and Indian landscapes, Jewsbury employs visual 
analogies that do not simply exchange similar features, forming friendship upon the 
erasure of difference. Rather than the model of fungibility or exchangeability produced 
by commodity culture, she explores a quite different visualization built from an ethical 
substitution or reciprocity between images of India and England.  Her consistent 
deployment of poetic analogy places England and India into insoluble proximity.  Both 
Fred Botting and Bill Nichols before him have pointed out that the use of metaphor to 
compare humans with animals, gothic monsters, and cyborgs modifies human identity 
(Nichols qtd. in Botting 110).  Yet Jewsbury employs the more self-reflexive simile, with 
an insuperable “like” or “as” that always foregrounds itself as an aesthetic manipulation 
of two images—of local landscapes, fauna, or animals—that cannot fully be conflated. 
Behind the reciprocal, imagined bodies of England and India, the analogy always raises 
its own specter as the third, poetic witness of both parties. 165  The non-coincidence of 
                                                
165 Derrida’s late turn to Levinas helps to theorize the connections between friendship and 
difference (not to mention loss, hospitality, the gift and the Other).  One particular strand 
of this conversation dwells on the ethics and difference that surround human-animal 
interactions, and I am loosely drawing off these works because of the way Jewsbury 
focuses her ideas about encounter around comparisons between features of the landscape 
as well as indigenous animals.  See Derrida, “The Animal that Therefore I Am,” Levinas, 
“The Name of the Dog” in Difficult Freedom:  Essays in Judaism, David L. Clark, “On 
Being ‘the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany’:  Dwelling with Animals after Levinas,” and 
Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet. 
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these images produces a perceptual gap or blind spot, a vacancy in representation that 
capitulates in skepticism about visual knowledge of India, which Jewsbury finally 
allegorizes as childlike wonder or through the image of an infant.  This unscripted, 
youthful mode of viewing resists romances of scientific discovery but instead temporarily 
suspends the ideologies that persist in prefabricated, overdetermined images of the Other. 
 By Part IX, the speaker disembarks at the port on Ceylon, or modern-day Sri 
Lanka.  Jewsbury clearly signals that this initial encounter does not provide the speaker 
with access to Indian reality.  “The Eden of the Sea” begins with the speaker exclaiming: 
“A dream! A dream!” announcing the fantastic quality of the poet’s description of 
Ceylon.  Though she is certainly enthused to have landed on solid ground and proceeds to 
document the material aspects of the isle respite—particularly its animals and fauna, 
Jewsbury’s new Eden is constructed much like Keats’s encounter with the nightingale.  
The poet disembarks at the island port, which she describes as an escape from the 
enclosed space of the ship, with its “narrow walks and small abode,/ Exchanged for 
roaming, land, and ease” (IX.7-8).  Her illustrations, though they often focus on small 
details of the landscape, together account for broader ways of seeing.   
  Ceylon, thy wooded shores are fair! 
  I love the land left far behind, 
  Its glorious oaks, and streamlets clear, 
  Yet wherefore should mine eye be blind, 
  My heart be cold to beauty here?—(IX.13-16) 
In Ceylon, the poet finally throws off the addiction or habituation to watching the ghosts 
of England rise up everywhere at sea, and instead aims to see both glorious oaks and 
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Indian beauty simultaneously.  This double vision occurs a few lines later, when 
Jewsbury describes Ceylon’s cocoa trees.  This project of simultaneous viewing is once 
again reminiscent of pre-cinematic entertainment, particularly the diorama.  As Sophie 
Thomas argues, the diorama often replicated grand landscapes or the great monasteries, 
cloisters, and churchyards of Europe.  Not only did these shows push the viewer toward 
an immersive experience by blurring or obscuring the edges of the viewing platform or 
picture frames (par. 8), but the diorama, as opposed to its predecessor the panorama, “by 
shifting the image between multiple oppositions, was based increasingly upon a principle 
of doubling:  before/after, day/night, winter/summer, light/dark, vacant/occupied, 
surface/depth, and so on” (par. 13).  William Galperin, however, in his discussion of the 
diorama, suggests that the interruptions caused by changing images led less to a 
“suspension of disbelief than a resistance toward illusions ordinarily fostered by art” (35).  
Contemporaneous reviews (especially those in the Athenaeum) mocked the diorama, and 
Galperin uses these to suggest that dioramic perception makes viewers aware of the 
mechanisms of their own viewing.  This self-reflexivity may shatter the illusion of a 
magical vision, yet as a perceptual poetic device in “The Oceanides,” the jarring 
imposition of two images serves as a method of ideology critique.   
Jewsbury’s own views of Ceylon operate by putting in proximity two supposedly 
antithetical images, highlighting their mediation by the text’s rhetoric and the speaker’s 
machinations.  These views of Ceylon constantly shuttle back and forth between 
references to India and to England and entail several interruptions.  One might go so far 
as to claim that Jewsbury’s preoccupation with repetition and rhyme in this sequence—
from the “no more, no more” of number I to “A dream, a dream” of this poem—
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allegorizes the difference between lyrical nostalgia and the irony created through 
juxtaposition, which visually (and aurally) draws the reader to take another look.  
Jewsbury’s rhetoric of doubling privileges the gothic’s tendency toward skepticism, 
critique, and parody over its subconscious and uncanny aspects when it seeks to make 
apparent and then vacate long-held fears about Easterners. 
 This creation of a virtual world aims to put to bed the savage preconceptions 
readers might have about the Southeast Asian wild.  First, however the speaker positions 
herself as an inquisitive child immersed in the rich sensory landscape and freed from 
adult-like presuppositions. 
  No, in a world as childhood new, 
  Is it not well to be a child?— 
  As quick to ask, as quick to view, 
  As promptly pleased, perchance as wild?  (17-20) 
This representation of Ceylon, as a possible earthly representation of Eden, seems rather 
close to nineteenth-century fears about racial ideology and de-evolution.  The Indian isle, 
like Tahiti, at first seems to promise the reader a glimpse of noble savages at play.166  
Moreover, the tints of savagery and utopia become entwined when, two stanzas later, the 
speaker has a Crusoesque fear of “creatures strange and fierce” (33).  Yet, as in Hemans, 
Jewsbury’s new world serves not as a space of pre-lapsarian innocence but as a wild, 
cognitive vacancy, created through childish thinking on the part of the speaker.  She is 
inquisitive—asking questions of this new world rather than dominating it—and takes 
                                                
166 James C. McKusick’s “The Politics of Language in Byron’s The Island,” discusses 
Byron’s depiction of Tahiti as a site for license and responsibility.   He similarly 
characterizes the South Seas as a basis for Coleridge and Southey’s pantisocracy in 
Romanticism and Colonialism. 
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views quickly without previous notions of how she might see the landscape.  Rather than 
infantilizing the Orient, Jewsbury creates Ceylon as an Edenic place potentially free from 
Western preemptive notions of the East—a world “as” childhood, related to the concept 
through simile not metaphor.  The repetition and anaphora of “as” makes visible the 
distance between racial infantilization and the simile as a self-reflexive act of comparison 
that prods the viewer into a childish state of viewing.  The grounds of knowledge in 
Ceylon are those of unknowing not dominance, as she attempts to reframe the island as 
something not yet seen by Western eyes and thus not yet known.  
Jewsbury repeatedly enacts this discarding of old preconceptions of Ceylon, 
beginning with the speaker’s rejection of the isle as a space for savages: 
  I know that creatures strange and fierce 
  Here lurk, and here make men afraid; 
  But let the daring hunter pierce 
  Their hidden lairs—in this bright shade, 
  Let me forget save what I greet, 
  The air alive with glancing wings; 
  Tame creatures pecking near my seat; 
  Resplendent flowers, and happy things.  (33-40) 
This passage is not a simple turn toward domestic quietism in the sunnier spaces of a 
strange place.  Instead, Jewsbury depicts the speaker dismissing the uncanny specters of 
her own fears about humanity, typically displaced on the savage or racial other.  What 
she “knows”—what she has been told or subconsciously fears—is that savages lurk in 
places like Ceylon, yet twice she decides to “let” those fears go.  Though the “daring 
 
262  
hunter” reacts with an aggressive, masculine attempt to pierce the savage’s hidden lairs in 
an Enlightenment prerogative of discovery, the speaker decides on a different reaction, 
represented as a cognitive break marked by a caesural dash.  After this pause, she vows to 
forget both the fears of the unconscious and the rational domination of the consciousness.  
She clears her mind of all preconceptions save what she “greets,” letting herself welcome 
or be influenced by these other beings before imposing herself on them. 
Just as Jewsbury rejected the dark, enclosed gothic spaces of the ship along with 
blinding Enlightenment light in number VI, she likewise rejects the gothic and the 
quotidian here.  The pastoral becomes a model of representation of a different type of 
place.  For Jewsbury, Ceylon does not simply represent that lost, utopian Romantic past 
but a virtual space of contact.  This animal and vegetal reserve does not represent an 
intransigent reality; instead, her imaginary pastoral provides the opportunity for the 
transnational traveler to wonder what it means to perceive and understand a new 
landscape.  Distanced from experience in this way, the speaker can suspend pre-images 
of Ceylon and to create other representations whose meaning is not yet completely 
codified.  She signals this resistance to reification in part by creating kinesthetic images 
of India.  The animals that she reacts to are also involved in their own responsive actions, 
with their wings “glancing” off the speaker and their beaks “pecking” near her seat.  The 
pun on the word glance seems to signal that the speaker too is being looked at in an 
interactive world where both parties curiously glance, prod, and peck at each other.   
Representations of India, like the one Jewsbury explores, dangerously risk 
overwriting the real India with an Orientalist view that such a European gaze might 
entail.  Moreover, one might note that Jewsbury, like Hemans, portrays no Indians at all 
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in the poem.  Yet she does not really portray the English either but her own simulations 
of them, a point of which she is increasingly self-aware.  The speaker’s earlier 
simulations of the Ocean and the English essentially help her to understand that her ideas 
of the East are merely images as well, but as such, have the potential to make Europeans 
aware of their own ideological ways of seeing themselves and others.  This stance is an 
ethical one when the speaker self-reflexively admits to not knowing India, only her 
preconceived fears of it.  Like Levinas, Jewsbury retains a healthy skepticism about every 
image of the Other presented to her, committing only to seeing, repeatedly, with the fresh 
eyes of “childhood.”  Moreover, by using self-reflexive representations of the landscape, 
she can create pliable illusions of both spaces—something that might be less ethical if 
exercised on people she had or had not yet met. 
After clearing these grounds, the speaker finally works through images that 
explicitly and implicitly call up the geography of both countries: 
  The squirrel at his morning meal, 
  And morning sport—so lithe and free, 
  No shadow o’er the grass may steal 
  With lighter, quicker steps than he, 
  Racing along the cocoa leaf 
  You see him through its ribs of green; 
  Anon, the little mime and thief 
  Expanded on the trunk is seen. 
 
  These cocoa-trees—not fair in woods, 
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  But singly seen and seen afar, 
  When sunset pours his yellow floods, 
  A column, and its crown a star! 
  Yet, dowered with wealth of uses rare, 
  Whene’er its plumy branches wave, 
  Some sorrow seems to haunt the air; 
  Some vision of a desert grave!  (41-56) 
At first the speaker locates an animal found in both England and India—the tree squirrel.  
The dioramic potential of the speaker’s visual scenes fades at the prospect of an animal 
that can seemingly straddle both European and Asian landscapes.  No leap in perception 
is necessary to make the squirrel “seen.”  
The next stanza, however, disrupts this single vision when it turns to the cocoa 
trees, implicitly in comparison with the “glorious oaks” mentioned earlier in the poem.  
Unlike the awe-inspiring forests of oaks that compose the grand, rolling English 
countryside, these cocoa trees are not grouped in woods, but are “singly seen” from a 
distance.  The trees are singular, as if they cannot be conceptualized or generalized like 
English oaks.  The star imagery figures the treetop as a thing of the sky severed from its 
earthly bounds.  At the same time, the column reference overlays the tree with images of 
Greek edifices while the crown allusion frames this Indian treasure as the jewel in the 
crown of the British empire, ultimately relating the Indian fauna to Western imagery.  It 
is no surprise, then, that the final lines of the poem turn to those “uses rare” that convert 
the tree’s beauty into wealth, or commodified chocolate.  Thus the tree, when put into 
conversation with Western imagery, unleashes sorrow and death that “haunt” the 
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landscape.  This collocation of English imagery evokes similarity that might make the 
Indian trees readable, yet at the same time, the cognitive attempt to understand cocoa 
trees within a Western context provokes the “vision of a desert grave.”  The confluence 
of Western and Eastern representations ends in a vacancy of sight, the desert of the real 
pastoral filled with nothing but guilt for those imperial prerogatives that raze the Indian 
landscape of its natural wealth and beauty.   
These images of the tree together manifest what Mitchell has called the composite 
of the Romantic image, the totem and the fossil.  Mitchell argues that Romantic natural 
objects and images manifest both “a longing for an intimate relationship with nature, and 
the greeting of natural objects as ‘friends and companions’” as well as the drive toward 
death, mechanism, and modernity (184-5).  For Jewsbury, however, this dialectic 
transforms into something more than the twinned desire for sentimentality and irony.  
The superimposition of both intimate and destructive images of the tree engenders a 
parallax of viewing that can never meet and thus reveals a blind spot in the images’ visual 
semiotics.  The abutting of the two images of the cocoa tree—as a singly seen star and as 
a pillar of the British economy—throw the entire representational system into an ethical 
mode that vacates the tree of its ability to be seen or known.  Because Westerners cannot 
yet see the tree without thinking chocolate, they cannot yet know it.  Unlike the universal 
squirrel valued for its exchangeability or the oak tree revered for its English beauty, 
cocoa trees exist as a double vision.  This dioramic sight provokes vacancy as a 
comparison that restricts codified images or any single, dominating gaze. 
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 The rejection of a pre-determined Ceylon further prompts the speaker to discard 
literary or biblical versions of the place, which end, again, with a visual analogy between 
England and Ceylon’s mountainous geographies. 
  Ceylon! Ceylon! ‘tis nought to me 
  How thou wert known or named of old, 
  As Ophir, or Taprobane, 
  By Hebrew king, or Grecian bold:-- 
  To me, thy spicy-wooded vales, 
  Thy dusky sons, and jewels bright, 
  But image forth the far-famed tales— 
  But seem a new Arabian night. 
 
  And when engirdled figures crave, 
  Heed to thy bosom’s dazzling store— 
  I see Aladdin in his cave; 
  I follow Sinbad to the shore. 
  Yet there, the least of all thy wealth, 
  Thou heiress of the eastern isles! 
  Thy mountains boast of northern health; 
  And Europe amid Asia smiles.  (57-72) 
Here the speaker tries out fabled antecedents that might plot Ceylon in Biblical, Greek, or 
Persian stories.  Ophir was a port said to send King Solomon riches every few years, and 
Pliny writes of Taprobane as an idyllic refuge that rejected inherited monarchy.  This 
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outpost has been productive of a variety of storied tales that allow for exchanges between 
cultural histories and geographies, especially those that are traded in bad faith.  Ceylon, 
with its dazzling riches and lush greenery traffics in the material and sensual.  These 
characteristics—its “spicy-wooded vales … dusky sons, and jewels bright” help to 
“image forth the far-famed tales” that mark India as racially other and merely available 
for sensual pleasure or the production of commodity wealth (emphasis mine).  The 
evocative nature of the landscape lends itself to visual worlds like those created through 
iconic stories purveying Orientalist stereotypes and racial tourism.   
Ultimately, though, the speaker insists on creating a “new Arabian night,” a newer 
tale that replaces the export of older narratives.  As she states at the outset, “‘tis nought to 
me/ How thou were known or named of old.”  Even more pointedly, the material wealth 
hidden in Aladdin’s cave, which Sinbad covets to make his fortune, is “the least of all thy 
wealth.”  Rather it is the “northern health” that strikes amity between Europe and Asia.  
The framing vista of mountains—a visual analogy—creates overlapping views in both 
geographic regions.  In this way, the dazzling riches of Ceylon seem less desirable than 
its mountainous vista that might correspond to the European Alps.  Older tales that 
encourage Orientalist habits of viewing the East are jettisoned for a mechanism of visual 
analogy that allows for comparison and contrast. 
The underlying capitalist structure and critique of the poem enables a mode of 
substitution, rather than commodity exchange, that ultimately underwrites an ethical 
space of the imagined landscape.  Jewsbury, with her repeated reference to India’s 
dazzling wealth, jewels, and spices, is exceedingly aware of how India’s bountiful 
landscape produces and reproduces global commodity culture—including Eastern tales—
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at the whim of desirous British and European subjects.  However, as the speaker rises 
from Aladdin’s cave and Sinbad’s shore to the mountains of both East and West, it is as if 
the airy mountains provide a vacant, intellectual and speculative space through which to 
imagine non-transcendent, reciprocal contact between two geographies.  The 
“phantasmagoric form of the social relations between men,” as Derrida says (166), 
evokes an imagistic exchange based on value, which Jewsbury then modifies into a form 
of contemplation based on insuperable proximity.  Mountains and their airy peaks are not 
physically exchangeable as commodities, except of course through poetry.  Yet 
Jewsbury’s poems stymie any mystical fungibility, and instead repeatedly ask, without 
definitively answering, what it might be like to put the Alps next to the Himalayas.  Thus 
this skeptical resistance to materiality and to skin-deep appearances ends with a cognitive 
interruption in the imperial, storied imagination.  
This airy climate—and “northern health”—comes to a head in number X, “Sunset 
and Night,” where the speaker describes the spectacular and rich seascape at dusk.  This 
poem illustrates the “BEAUTIFUL! O beautiful!” as the sun sets on the ocean, and the 
invocation of the beautiful signals this poem as a meta-poetic gesture, finally worked 
through at the end of the sequence (1).  Jewsbury playfully suggests how the sun might, 
in fact, set on the British Empire when a British egalitarian speaker sets her ethical sites 
on East as its otherness provokes a meta-visionary experience.  The sunset evokes 
especially beautiful colors and vibrant scenes, as the intense gold, purpled air and the 
“crowds” of clouds create a visionary moment:  “Each some form of glory taking;/ Each 
some splendid vision waking” (13-14).  This sensory, visual experience trips the mind 
into a mode that once again supercedes reality.  The subsequent descriptions of the 
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seascape proceed to blur the boundaries between the sea and sky, revealing a structure of 
substitution, mutuality, and the imaginary rearrangement of signifiers.  The speaker 
engineers a visual analogy between ocean and sky as the dusk light refracts equally on 
both:  “Sea and Heaven, depth and height,/ Met in such harmonious light” (15-16).  
Eventually this comparison allows for more drastic contact between the two: 
 There, in that cloud-garden glows 
 All the richness of the rose; 
 There, meandering, seem to run 
 Rivers that have washed the Sun, 
 Or, instead of common mould, 
 Wandered over beds of gold.  (23-28) 
The speaker sees rose gardens in the clouds, rivers washing the sun, and clumps of mould 
texturing the skies.  Similar to her imagining the faces of her father and sister on the sea, 
she paints the screen of the sky with elements from the material landscape, distorting real 
and imagined, material and immaterial. Those things that usually populate the earth now 
find themselves, or representations of themselves, in the sky.  The passage suggests, 
however, not the erasure of embodiment but its simulation in the sky to make the 
physically impossible possible—the comparison between physical features that are 
materially distinct.  This substitution reveals that physical differences—such as color—
may not be ontological ones.  Alternately, if water and air are two different substances, 
they are still comparable, if only through poetic invention that deals in reciprocal images.  
The movement of the material into the immaterial, virtual realm demonstrates how 
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virtuality might finally bring together—without unifying—two worlds that cannot yet 
physically meet.  
As an allegory about cultural exchange, vacancy presents a model of friendly 
comparison that still retains much of the stranger about it.  This metaphorics of friendship 
continues throughout the rest of the poem and becomes the true legacy of the “New 
Eden.”  As the speaker disembarks from Ceylon in the last lines of this poem, she takes 
leave 
  Not as the stranger of a day, 
  Who soon forgets where late he dwelt, 
  But like a friend, who, far away, 
  Feels ever what at first he felt.  (IX.77-80) 
Here the speaker doubles as friend and stranger and as such traces the wonky temporality 
of vacancy.  The speaker’s future thoughts of Ceylon—her next approach to this place—
will not be characterized by a kind of forgetting that renders the virtual subject a 
complete amnesiac.  As a friend, the speaker will connect with this new Eden from far 
away, through the auspices of camaraderie, yet she will retain “ever what at first he felt,” 
or the intermingling of distance and proximity, estrangement, and affiliation.  The 
speaker’s relationship with this space will archive a history of their actual and literary 
interactions.  Yet unlike the images of the speaker’s family members, Ceylon forever 
retains an otherness that forces the speaker repeatedly to greet it, and its inhabitants, 
anew.  As in Levinas, true friendship involves a responsibility for the other as a stranger 
that the self does not understand and that she repeatedly cannot resist.  In this way, 
Jewsbury’s Ceylon highlights the ever-changing nature of encounters and, more 
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pointedly, the preservation of a non-understanding about the Other that shapes the way 
we envision her.167  The entire poem seems to devolve on the repetition of “feels” and 
“felt,” when the future, as a projected present, is channeled back to the past.  This 
doubling sends the reader back to the beginning of the poem and initiates a circular 
temporal and structural logic, not unlike Hemans’s use of counterfactual history to 
reorient what we might know about both past and future colonial landscapes.  The 
intensely visual nature of the poem ends up returning the speaker (and the reader) to a 
place just before vision, to her exclamatory first words, “A dream! a dream!” which 
themselves signify a suspended cognitive state somewhere between consciousness and 
unconsciousness.  In these last lines, Ceylon finally allegorizes virtuality as a mode of 
vision that suspends vision and perception, only offering partial sight. 
This insistent returning to a beginning point of strangeness, non-understanding, or 
perceptual confusion is encapsulated in the penultimate poem in the sequence, “To An 
Infant Afar.”  This vision of an infant in England becomes a final meta-image for 
vacancy as a virtual form of knowledge.  At first the poem appears to resort to the kind of 
nostalgic virtual imaging the speaker had recourse to earlier in the poem.  She begins by 
lamenting the distance between herself and the infant, a “home-encircled little one” 
(XI.10). 
 Yet, how oft I see a thing, 
 Gentle one! fragile one! 
                                                
167 Significantly, Levinas terms this occurrence the “saying,” an exposure to the other’s 
ineffable, unreadable expression or face that interrupts the “said,” a propositional 
statement of signification about the other.  In a sense, the subject’s formation is always a 
response to a non-signifying, vacant expression or image, which perhaps might be 
characterized as an interruption in the visual nature of the face. 
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 That, before mine eye can bring 
 Thee, by Fancy’s symbolling 
 Gentle one! fragile one!  (XI.16-20) 
Though the poet’s imagination once again conjures an image of an English relative, this 
virtual infant is quite different from Jewsbury’s other family figures because the infant 
may never know the speaker.  The poet hardly knows this relative either, so it becomes an 
image almost entirely without a referent.  The speaker repeatedly compares herself to the 
child:  “I am sailing on the sea,/ …/ And long years must come and flee,/ Ere I look again 
on thee/ Changing, growing little one” (11, 13-15).  As projected years “come and flee,” 
the infant represents a perpetual unknown, who most likely will never be looked upon.  
Similar to Wordsworth and Robinson’s idiot figures, it presents an allegory of non-
knowledge.  Forever poised on the brink of growing up, the image of the infant pauses 
time and the accumulation of knowledge. 
Just as the speaker’s own relative position undermines her ability to create reified 
images of family, the infant is also a moving target.  This “symbolling” kinesthetic image 
of a “growing one” cannot be easily consolidated, and the infant embodies the technology 
of shifting images, which resists perception and any definitive meaning images might 
offer.  Jewsbury highlights this paradox when she describes the child as representing 
multiple states at once—fragility and intrepidity, health and weakness, sensibility and 
freedom from care.  
All things that are weak and fair, 
  Rosy one! merry one! 
  Image infants everywhere, 
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  Careless, amid cause for care, 
  Ever helpless little one!  (31-35) 
This paradoxical “carelessness, amid cause for care” represents an intrepid approach to 
the unknown even in the face of danger.  Rather than promoting sensibility’s “care,” the 
speaker offers the cheerful, active, and curious infant who perhaps learns through fearless 
errancy.  The infant models a precarious yet carefree existence, but even more generally 
the virtual comparison of two superimposed images, carelessness and care.  By 
engendering simultaneous reciprocity and contradiction, this double vision projects non-
knowledge and the partially unreadable image. 
During the remainder of the poem, the speaker compares this child-like way of 
being in the world to other things beside herself:  “tiny birds,” “flying fish,” “baby 
billows,” the “cloud at morn,” and the “moonbeam’s quivering light” (23, 24, 25, 26, 28).  
The poem manages to “Image infants everywhere” announcing the infant as the meta-
model for vision and visualization.  This poem no doubt indulges in the Romantic 
obsession with childhood, not to mention its use of other empty-headed figures such as 
idiots and savages.168  Rather than resorting to memorialized innocence, like 
                                                
168 For an exploration of this trope and its ideological uses in Romantic authors, see 
especially Judith Plotz, Romanticism and the Vocation of Childhood.  One might look to 
critics on Wordsworth and infancy in the Intimations Ode, such as Linda M. Austin, 
“Children of Childhood:  Nostalgia and the Romantic Legacy,” who argues that 
childhood represents a mnemonic vacancy to be filled in by autobiographical narrative.  
Likewise see Alan Richardson’s “The Politics of Childhood:  Wordsworth, Blake, and the 
Catechistic Method,” for a consideration of childhood indoctrination.  One might also cite 
recent queer theorists such as Lee Edelman who critiques childhood as the possibility of 
futurity against which queers are positioned as nay-sayers of the social and biological 
order.  See his No Future:  Queer Theory and the Death Drive.  Alternately, Kathryn 
Bond Stockton suggests childhood is always queer, both in terms of sexuality but also as 
a time suspended before adolescence or adulthood when children might envision other 
ways of growing beside growing up. “Growing Sideways, Or Versions of the Queer 
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Wordsworth’s Lucy, or the possibilities for transcendence, like Wordsworth’s idiot boys, 
Jewsbury, like other women writers, crafts childhood as a model for constantly 
encountering strangeness, resisting judgment, and understanding oneself through 
reciprocal relationships with others that one does not quite understand.  The infant might 
be like fish, birds, the waves, or even moonlight, and yet it is not any of these things. 
As many theorists of childhood have noted, adults all too often project their own 
desires and fantasies of futurity onto their infants, yet Jewsbury reverses this tendency, 
projecting the infant onto all things, including the speaker.  As such, the juvenile speaker 
represents less an impossible future like Derrida’s avenir than a moment or pause that 
suspends cognition, ideological reification, and the narratives of desire that pictures often 
evince.  The infant might allegorize an androgyny and universality that occurs before 
interpellation into society, which might be particularly appealing to a woman dreaming of 
a different place in the world.  Without a hint of the future, though, the infant more likely 
represents the inquisitive but dangerous moment before understanding, an image that is 
temporarily dislocated from its ideological systems and open for inscription.169 
Jewsbury’s childishness functions as a progressive, skeptical epistemology.  
Toward the end of the poem, the fantasy of brotherhood and friendship is made possible 
through this childish avoidance of over-determined colonial ideologies.  Infancy, 
however, cannot last forever.  Unlike Hemans’ Spaniard who continually roams an open 
                                                                                                                                            
Child: The Ghost, The Homosexual, the Freudian, the Innocent, and the Interval of 
Animal,” Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children. 
169 To take Natalie Melas’ approach, rather than interpellating the colonial subject into 
the English imaginary, Jewsbury’s speaker chooses to become dissimilated or dislocated 
from English interpellating structures.  For Melas’ re-imagining of Althusser’s 




cognitive space with an infant for a companion, Jewsbury’s speaker cannot remain adrift 
forever on the open symbolic of the sea and must eventually land in India.  The final lines 
of the last poem take leave of the ship’s universe and the world she has imagined during 
her journey:  “But then, I did not dream to find/ Such friendship as a I leave behind” 
(XII.39-40).  The ending might signal that the friendship and virtual reciprocity modeled 
at sea will no longer hold once the speaker is confronted with the acute exigencies of life 
in India.  Perhaps on the subcontinent, the shock of the real, and the history it imports, 
will dampen any imaginative or merely literary attempts to change it.  Moreover, in 
becoming a memsahib in India with a power all her own, Jewsbury’s speaker may not be 
able to remain a child excluded from the political structures or racial ideologies of adults.  
Certainly, Hemans, Robinson, and Smith all to some extent acknowledge the 
impossibility of the kind of social change they envision.  Although Jewsbury’s speaker 
must put aside her new-found friendship with Ceylon, if she carries with her this new 
mechanism for ethical visualization, she might welcome each strange encounter that she 
faces in India. 
Of all the women writers in this study, Jewsbury’s vacancy delves most literally 
into how to change perception and our ways of understanding new images.  In the wake 
of the reforms of 1832 provoked in large part by identity politics and the Chartist 
movement, she also documents how the evocation and evacuation of personas or 
characters might help to suspend or create new roles for women.  Both Hemans and 
Jewsbury describe pioneering characters who literally and figuratively find different 
landscapes with different mental topologize that might preserve their individuality and 
their intellectual prowess.  Smith and Robinson’s hermit and idiot figures become more 
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figurative and elusive in contrast.  All of these women writers pit the altered states of 
their subversive figures—hermits, idiots, meditating immigrants, or infants—against the 
overdetermined, embodied representations of landscapes that served to portray women as 
embodied, unthinking features of a natural pastoral.  Except maybe for Smith, who 
pictures vacancy as a figure of linguistic suspension, all the other poets eventually arrive 
at a kind of rhetorical or tropological process where vacancy inheres and must be uttered 
repeatedly.  As the promises of the French Revolution and wider reforms to gender and 
society slowly faded into the past, it is no wonder that women felt the need to repeatedly 
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